Hi Struan, Magnus, Glove and Group:
IMHO G. E. Moore�s �naturalistic fallacy," or any kind of a fallacy for that
matter, resides in Pirsig's intellectual level which, as Magnus and Glove
point out, is dominated by the assumption that the world is divided into
subject and objects. Thus, for most intellectuals, the �good" belongs on
the subject side of the S-O split. There's no place else to put it.
Enter Pirsig who proposes the radical idea that instead of putting the
world at the top and splitting it into subject-object that we put the �good� at
the top and split it into static-dynamic.
Just as the �world� or �all that exists� can�t be defined, Pirsig�s primary
�good� can�t be defined. Once you accept the idea that the primary good
is beyond definition, the naturalistic fallacy becomes moot.
Then how do you know the primary good exists? Because you are it--
�direct everyday experience�--as Pirsig says. And just as an eye cannot
see itself or a tongue taste itself, you cannot get outside of yourself to
define yourself, whether "naturalistically" or any other way.
I think Magnus said the same thing in different words. "Since good is
more primary than subjects, there can be nobody discerning it."
If you want to talk about intellectual ethics (fallacies are bad) or social
ethics (racists are bad) then we can bring in Pirsig's evolutionary
morality and talk about inter-level and intra-level squabbles.
But to answer the question posed by Struan, we have to go back to initial
assumptions on which intellectual discussions--and fallacies--are based.
Given Pirsig's assumptions and metaphysical structure, the "naturalistic
fallacy" dissolves itself.
Finally, it would be fun to turn Moore�s fallacy back on himself by asking
if he considers his discovery and writing about the naturalistic fallacy to
be good naturalistically.
Platt
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