Greetings,
Thanks for your contribution Horse. I will pick up a few points here after commenting
to others that
anyone who rejects pure naturalism will obviously see the naturalistic fallacy
dissolve. This is why
in my initial question I asked those who DO see the MoQ as naturalistic to explain how
it escapes
the fallacy. I didn't really expect those who don't accept naturalism to feel the need
to criticise
a criticism of something they think is wrong. Am I missing something?
Glove, I'm not ignoring you, I just don't think I'm asking you the question you think
I am and am
having a hard time understanding where you are coming from. Sorry.
Horse:
"Quality posesses things - we haven't yet shown that Quality and
good are identical and there is no mention of this in Lila."
"Yet?" Does this mean we might be able to do so? It is hard to escape the conclusion
that they are,
given the all encompassing nature afforded to both, but I will have to think on this
one and get
back to you.
Horse:
"As Struan has mentioned Moore's position regarding good, and
Moore's position is solidly emotivist, I'd like to say something about
it. When Moore states:
"If I am asked "What is good", my answer is that good is good and
there's an end of the matter. Or if I am asked "How can good be
defined?", my answer is that it cannot be defined and that is all I
have to say about it."
he is making an emotivist claim."
Moore's position is not emotivist at all, it is intuitionist. They are two entirely
separate
theories distinguished by their respective position upon cognitivism in ethical
language. Moore's
ethic is cognitive in that ethical statements are literally true or false and
communicate real
knowledge. We verify this knowledge through 'moral intuition.' Good for Moore is, ". .
a unique and
indefinable quality, something which, although it cannot be analysed, we can
recognise," which
sounds very familiar, does it not? Emotivism, on the other hand, denies that any
knowledge is
communicated by ethical statements and that consequently no ethical statement can be
literally true
or false. Emotivism is therefore non-cognitivist.
The only difference I see between your position and that of Moore is that Moore sees a
fact/value
divide while you deny the distinction. An important difference it is, but if we can
concentrate upon
the similarities there may be a way of reconciling the two positions.
I shall transport myself to your answers to my questions which effectively sum up your
posting.
Horse:
"1) In terms of DQ or the Quality Event - Yes. DQ is, as many have
pointed out, 'mystic' in nature and is not defineable, scientific,
mathematical or reducible. This does not mean however, that it is
necessarily non-empirical - which is obvious.
2) In terms of SQ and beginning with the basic premiss that "the
physical order of the universe is also the moral order of the universe" -
Yes. It is reducible, defineable and discernible.
4) As above they are two aspects of the same thing. They are not
necessarily contradictory - given their fuzzy nature - and the fuzzy
nature of certain aspects of the MOQ."
So we come full circle to my very first posting asking this meta-ethical question
where I suggested
that the MoQ might be naturalistic on one level and non-naturalistic on another. Let
me know if you
agree with my summary of your position:
The MoQ is naturalistic when looked at from a SQ standpoint, intuitionist in that DQ
cannot be
defined by scientific method and the fact/value divide, which, (if valid) would render
this position
untenable, is disposed of because all factual statements are really moral statements
and all factual
questions are really moral questions.
How does that sound Horse?
Struan
------------------------------------------
Struan Hellier
< mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
"All our best activities involve desires which are disciplined and
purified in the process."
(Iris Murdoch)
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