Greetings,
Happy to oblige Platt.
1) Is direct everyday experience synonymous with intuition?
This question was a request for clarification of the way Horse used the term. I think
that intuition
is one aspect of everyday experience but am happy, for the sake of argument to use the
term
intuition instead. You see, if I intuit that my cat will eat a mouse tomorrow, I can
only verify
that intuition tomorrow when I hear the squeaks. This seems to be a qualitatively
different
'everyday experience' to my having seen my cat eat a mouse yesterday. My question
would have been
better if I had asked, 'Is your use of the term 'everyday . . . etc.' Your
clarification clears that
one up for me. (Horse?)
2) Can we ascertain what is good from empirical evidence?.
I agree with you.
3) If we can, then how.?
Once again, I agree with you.
4) How does 2 and 3 square with non-naturalism?
Oh bugger. Now I'm in trouble. Non-naturalism (as in the theory, not merely anything
opposed to
naturalism) denies that ethical language can be reduced to factual statements and so
would deny 2).
Your position that 2) is acceptable if we allow a 'sense of value' is the same as the
intuitionist
position with the only exception being that you regard such a sense of value as a form
of empirical
evidence. I'm still trying to work out the ramifications of such a distinction and am
not sure it
actually matters one jot. This is where I need help. What is the difference between
ethical
non-naturalism (which, as Horse points out, uses naturalistic terms as an intellectual
construct
applied to SQ not DQ) which recognises intuition as empirical, and ethical
non-naturalism which
makes a distinction between empirical and 'sense of value?' The only theoretical
difference that I
can see between the MoQ and established forms of ethical non-naturalism is that the
MoQ regards
subjects and objects as being, in some sense, 'properties' of good, in a sort of
upside down
naturalism, while non-naturalism is happy to remain silent on the issue and simply to
say that we
can all intuit what good is. On a meta-ethical level there is no difficulty in
non-naturalism being
seen either way, while on a normative ethical level I fail to see the advantage.
So, the MoQ is a form of non-naturalistic upside down naturalism with a healthy dose
of downside
down naturalism thrown in for good measure - and I think an element of inverted
prescriptivism might
come in handy at some point soon. Where's the ambiguity? Its over there in the box!
Now you see why
I am asking the questions. I genuinely seek answers.
Struan
------------------------------------------
Struan Hellier
< mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
"All our best activities involve desires which are disciplined and
purified in the process."
(Iris Murdoch)
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