To: Struan and Bo From: Roger Below is the Pirsig quote that is being analyzed: RMP: "In the Metaphysics of Quality the world is composed of three things: mind, matter and Quality. Because something is not located in the object does not mean that it has to be located in your mind. Quality cannot be independently derived form either mind or matter. But it can be derived from the relationship of mind and matter with each other. Quality occurs at the point at which subject and object meet. Quality is not a thing. It is an event. It is the event at which the subject becomes aware of the object. And because without objects there can be no subject, quality is the event at which awareness of both subjects and objects is made possible. Quality is not just the result of a collision between subject and object. The very existence of subject and object themselves is deduced from the Quality event. The Quality event is the cause of the subjects and objects, which are then mistakenly presumed to be the cause of the Quality!" Struan then dissects it piece by piece. RMP: 1)"In the Metaphysics of Quality the world is composed of three things: mind, matter and Quality." STRUAN: OK A presupposition, but we know that. I'm not happy with 'Quality' and nobody thinks that subjects and objects are all there is, but that comes later. ROGER: Just to clarify, this is RMP's starting point on the narrative in ch 19 of ZMM where Phaedrus slowly unveils his creative thought process regarding Quality. Is this where you got the quote, or did you get it from someplace else, perhaps where RMP paraphrases himself? In ch 19 it is clear that he too rejects this trinity as he does most of the other initial statements you have listed out here. As for his terms 'mind' and 'matter', I think we can agree that the 'matter' term is shorthand for what he spells out in Lila as 'the universe of distinguishable things.' RMP: 2) "Because something is not located in the object does not mean that it has to be located in your mind." STRUAN: Agreed. The carpet is really blue but my mind is a 'factor' in that reality. NOTE: A 'factor.' Not, 'the only factor', or even, 'the decisive factor.' The 'blueness' is a property of the object (UNDER AYER'S DEFINITION) but it is also contingent upon the mind therefore: ROGER: I also agree. RMP: 3) "But it can be derived from the relationship of mind and matter with each other." STRUAN: Precisely the point. RMP: 4) "Quality occurs at the point at which subject and object meet" STRUAN: Absolutely. Note that mind has become subject and matter, object. Can we use these interchangeably? Quality occurs at the point at which mind and matter meet. Fine with me. ROGER: Note that in ZMM RMP follows points 3 and 4 with the narrative "That sounded warm." In other words, this is close, but not quite right. These statements are corrected and contradicted later on this page as his thoughts evolve. Just to clarify, you are agreeing to two of the premises that Pirsig goes on to reject. RMP: 5) "Quality is not a thing. It is an event" STRUAN: Of course ROGER: This is indeed a central tenet of the MOQ. Points 1 through 4 are not. RMP: 6) "It is the event at which the subject becomes aware of the object" STRUAN: Again. It is the event at which mind becomes aware of matter. Ok ROGER: Again, in ZMM this narrates his flowing chain of thoughts. This portion is "hot" according to the author, but not quite there. RMP: 7) "And because without objects there can be no subject, quality is the event at which awareness of both subjects and objects is made possible." STRUAN: Aha! That is why the subtle shift from mind and matter to subject and object has been made. I agree that an object pre-supposes a subject, but what about this? "And because without matter there can be no mind, quality is the event at which awareness of both mind and matter is made possible." There is no logical contradiction in postulating mind without matter. The strong 'a priori' argument that objects rely upon subjects has vanished completely. Notice that this is not a question of whether mind is contingent upon matter in the sense that it could not have come into being without it, it is a question of whether the mind can function without perception of matter. Notice also that this does not need to be empirically validated (although I suspect it can), the fact that it is logically possible is enough. The argument collapses at this point. ROGER: Again, in ZMM he carefully clarifies that this is not the final answer.......but it is almost complete. RMP: 8) "Quality is not just the result of a collision between subject and object" STRUAN: Hmm . . . . tell me more ROGER: I agree, he is NOW beginning to unveil the essence of ZMM, Lila, radical empiricism and Zen. RMP: 9) "The very existence of subject and object themselves is deduced from the Quality event." STRUAN: 'Deduced.' It is that 'awareness' thing again. Notice that deduction is not empirical. cf. point 7. Can I say, "The very existence of mind and matter themselves is deduced from the Quality event?" Is deduced by what? The subject? Pirsig has made the huge jump from, Quality being 'derived from the relationship of mind and matter,' and occurring, 'AT THE POINT AT WHICH SUBJECT AND OBJECT MEET,' to: 10) "The Quality event is the cause of the subjects and objects, which are then mistakenly presumed to be the cause of the Quality!" STRUAN: So how does he make this jump from quality 'being DERIVED from the relationship between mind and matter' (my emphasis) to it being the CAUSE of mind and matter? The answer is that he does it with that short sentence in point 7. He does it by sneakily replacing mind and matter (which is what he is really talking about) with subjects and objects in order to give his reasoning veracity. ROGER: You are totally dismissing the narrative development and subsequent rejection of thoughts in ZMM Ch 19. A fundamental principle of the MOQ indeed is that "The Quality event is the cause of the subjects and objects, which are then mistakenly presumed to be the cause of the Quality!". With a flash of insight, he goes on to say "IT [Quality] HAS CREATED THEM." This, as you know, is fundamental to radical empiricism. According to William James in "Does Consciousness Exist?", primal reality is nondualistic pure experience. Consciousness and content ( the knower and the known) are two aspects of the same undivided experience. In James own words: JAMES: ".....a given undivided portion of experience, taken in one context of associates, plays the part of the knower, of a state of mind, of consciousness; while in a different context, the same undivided bit of experience plays the part of the thing known, of an objective content ..... in one group it can figure as a thought, in another as a thing" ROGER [again]: Pirsig says the same thing throughout ZMM and Lila. He explains in Ch 9 that Whitehead's "dim apprehension" is DQ and that objects are not primary but rather "... a complex pattern of static values derived from primary experience.... In this way, static patterns become the universe of distinguishable things." In Ch 29 of Lila, Pirsig directly addresses radical empiricism and James term "pure experience," equating it to "pure value": RMP: "...subjects and objects are not the starting point of experience. Subjects and objects are secondary. They are concepts derived from something more fundamental which [James] described as 'the immediate flux of life' .... Pure experience cannot be called either physical or psychical: it logically precedes this distinction." STRUAN: Now, to the Logical Positivist (and almost everybody else) these problems do not arise, because most people do not agree with assumption that subjects and objects (and Quality if we must) are all there is. Time is a good example (and I too saw Professor Barbour's lectures) of something most people would say exists and is real, yet it is not reducible to a subject or an object. Space is another. Radio waves another, and so on. The problem is Bo, that you think, along with Pirsig, that subjects, objects and Quality are all there is. If someone disagrees with your formulation of Quality, then you automatically assume that for them only subjects and objects are left. This is not the case and people like Ayer can quite happily talk about the relationship between subjects and objects, can quite happily explain subjects and objects in terms of relationships, can quite happily talk of values as being derived from the way subjects and objects relate to each other and yet still not have a Subject Object Metaphysics. ROGER: As clarified above, you have totally distorted Pirsig's argument in the book. You are faulting him for inconsistencies in his argument that he himself rejects. The Space, time and radio waves argument is also weak. All of these are derived from pure experience. They are all part of "the universe of distinguishable things." He does customarily abbreviate this to "matter", or "object", but this is just for ease of understanding. Thanks for your time, Roger MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/ MD Queries - [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at: http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
