Platt,
Thanks for your thoughtful post.

   GLENN 
   I�m in complete agreement with your decision. Though it must 
   have been tough to choose the morally incorrect position, 
   considering MOQ puts intellectual patterns (philosophical 
   discussion above social ones (visiting grandchildren). 

   PH 
   In the MOQ moral hierarchy the higher intellectual level relies on 
   the welfare of the lower social level to ensure its own survival and 
   growth. So spending some time tending to and nurturing the 
   social level is hardly immoral by MOQ lights as you suggest. 

Discussions on moq.org have stressed this important aspect as a caveat. 
Frankly, Pirsig doesn't stress it all that much. He's more interested in 
putting the social level in submission to the intellectual level, which is
in direct conflict with this important caveat. The resolution to this 
conflict requires another moral decision, for which MOQ gives no guidance.
The most difficult moral issues of our time, like abortion and gun control,
exhibit this very conflict. And we're right back where we started.

   GLENN 
   This criticism of science can also be leveled against MOQ, 
   because what MOQ calls real is *also* what is empirically 
   verifiable. 

   PH 
   Yes, but the MOQ defines empiricism more broadly than most 
   scientists do. Whereas science usually limits what is �empirically 
   verifiable � to the physical senses and what can be measured by 
   instruments, the MOQ broadens the meaning considerably. From 
   Lila, Chapter 8: 

Hmm. The statements in your previous post refuted empiricism whether
it's the broadened version or not...

   PIRSIG
   �The Metaphysics of Quality subscribes to what is called 
   empiricism. It claims that all legitimate human knowledge arises 
   from the senses or by thinking about what the senses provide. 

The clause which states 
"or by thinking about what the senses provide" is where I start getting
nervous. How do you know your mind is not suffering delusions, 
hallucinations or being subjected to trickery? MOQ only requires these
interpretations be logically consistent, agree with experience, 
and possess an economy of explanation.

What about verifiability?
When he says "agree with experience" it's not clear if the interpretation
only has to agree with your own experience or if it must also agree with 
other's experience. If the latter, are they having the same experience as 
you and at the same time?

And in cases where we can't verify a phenomena can we at least demand 
consensus?

What about completeness?
Are all the sensory data being explained well by the interpretation or are
only some?

Finally, requiring "economy of explanation" is wrong. A complicated 
explanation in itself doesn't necessarily make it false, it only makes
the burden of proof more difficult.

   PIRSIG
   Most empiricists deny the validity of any knowledge gained 
   through imagination, authority, tradition, or purely theoretical 
   reasoning. They regard fields such as art, morality, religion, and 
   metaphysics as unverifiable. The Metaphysics of Quality varies 
   from this by saying that the values of art and morality and even 
   religious mysticism are verifiable, and that in the past they have 
   been excluded for metaphysical reasons, not empirical reasons. 

Unless he is using a definition for "unverifiable" I'm not aware of, or
he has come up with some experimental techniques he has failed to
divulge, these things are indeed not verifiable. I don't know if he is
confusing verifiability with simple experience here? I just don't know.

   PIRSIG
   They have been excluded because of the metaphysical 
   assumption that all the universe is composed of subjects and 
   objects and anything that can't be classified as a subject or an 
   object isn't real. There is no empirical evidence for this 
   assumption at all. It is just an assumption.� 

It depends on what he means by "real". Certainly almost all people
think emotions are real. Pain is real, for example. No one would
deny this. So if this is what he means by "real" then I think SOM is
a strawman.

If he means "primary reality" when he speaks of "real" here, then I
could argue there IS empirical evidence to support the belief that 
substance, or a distant cousin, is primary reality. The evidence isn't 
conclusive, but at least there is evidence. In contrast, there is no 
evidence whatsoever that primary reality is composed of morals.

   PLATT
   Do you object to this broader definition? 

As best as I can understand it, yes!

   PH 
   Yes, it�s not only possible to have personalized realities but we all 
   do. As Pirsig said about Lila, �She�s a culture of one.� While our 
   physical, biological and much of our social reality may be the 
   same, the reality of our individual thoughts and emotions is 
   indeed personal. In that sense, as I�ve argued here before, �Mine 
   is the only world.� 

Naturally everyone has personal thoughts and emotions. This is not
what I meant by "personalized realities". I'm talking about one person who
believes in astrology, and another who doesn't believe in God but believes
he can beat the stock market with a "system". Or one person who doesn't 
believe in psychics but believes she has guardian angels. Etc.
Can all these people, with all their private world-views, have "equal" 
interpretations of reality? I don't think so.

   PLATT
   To minimize the 
   role of faith you add �consensus� to that criteria, but keep in mind 
   that many truths of science were initially met with great skepticism 
   by the entrenched academy. 

As they should have been. Skepticism is healthy. (It would be nice to see
a little more of it on moq.org.) The important thing is that people 
eventually came round to the better way of thinking.

   PLATT
   I think you raise an important point, however, because the 
   foundations of our Western society are being undermined today by 
   post-modern relativists who claim there is no reality that exists 
   independent of our perception of it and that truth is determined not 
   by adherence to set of historically tested criteria but by cultural 
   and/or personal whim. I fear we are approaching dangerously 
   close to all things being �equally true� with resulting chaos, paving 
   the way for self-appointed authoritarian types to come to the 
   rescue. Against this assault on the scientific method and 
   rationalism I�ll fight as ferociously as you. 

Now you're talking!

   PH 
   I believe (like Plato) that the worlds I listed--mathematical, moral 
   and aesthetic�exist independently of our perception, i.e., they 
   exist whether people exist or not. By contrast, the cartoon world, 
   sports world, entertainment world, business world, political world, 
   technological world, etc. are people-dependent. IMHO, the 
   absolutes of Beauty, Truth and Goodness are �out there� whether 
   we�re here or not. I realize this is an act of faith on my part, but my 
   senses tell me I�m right in the same way they validate an 
   independent material reality. What the MOQ has down for me is 
   open my eyes to how an independent, evolutionary �goodness� 
   might have created us and all that we know. In my book, it sure 
   beats the �by chance� explanation put forth by science which 
   amounts to no explanation at all. 

It *is* an explanation but it seems you don't like it on moral grounds.
But also it's hard to believe we could become such complex life forms
by the process of chance and natural selection, even given millions of 
years. DQ to the rescue? Darwinian evolution still has some explaining to 
do in my view. But evolutionary goodness doesn't feel right either. If 
it's so fundamental to reality, why are the other moons and planets in our 
solar system so lifeless? What are *their* purpose?
   
   PLATT
   I know you hold the view that morality is people-dependent, a view 
   shared by most. Pirsig claims greater explanatory power for his 
   assumption of an independent moral world structured as he 
   describes. What values do you see, if any, in that assumption and 
   his theory? Do you think his �platypus� arguments are correct? 

The "illuminations" by MOQ on the platypus problems aren't very satisfying.

   PIRSIG, Ch. 8
   In a value-centered Metaphysics of Quality this "scientific reality" 
   platypus vanishes. Reality, which is value, is understood by every 
   infant. It is a universal starting place of experience that everyone 
   is confronted with all the time.

My 4 year old announced suddenly in the car this morning that he knew 
why the earth turned. I closed all the windows to make sure I could hear 
his answer, since I'm sure I don't know why. He said "To get night and 
day". Bless his little heart - he knows the value it gives us. But if MOQ 
were the prevailing metaphysics all along, and this were the extent of our 
curiosity and investigations into nature, we'd still be living in caves in 
the year 2000.

   PIRSIG, Ch. 12
   In the Metaphysics of Quality this dilemma [free will vs. determinism]
   doesn't come up. To the extent that one's behavior is controlled by 
   static patterns of quality it is without choice. But to the extent that 
   one follows Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior is 
   free.

All he's done is recast a nearly identical problem in MOQ terms. Now the 
question becomes, "When am I free to follow the path of DQ and when am I 
constrained to follow static patterns of quality?"

   PIRSIG, Ch. 12
   So what the Metaphysics of Quality concludes is that all schools are 
   right on the mind-matter question. Mind is contained in static 
   inorganic patterns. Matter is contained in static intellectual 
   patterns. Both mind and matter are completely separate evolutionary 
   levels of static patterns of value, and as such are capable of each 
   containing the other without contradiction.

If it's not still contradictory it's weird. A timeline of evolution is 
clearly described by MOQ, where inorganic matter comes first and minds 
come later. Saying matter is contained in static intellectual patterns 
is saying brand new matter is being created by the mind on the fly. Is 
this matter different from the matter that evolved before mind did?

   PLATT
   Do you see any hope for a rational or scientifically-based morality? 

No. At least not one that's convincing.
Glenn

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