Hi Glenn:
Thanks for your challenging reply. Indeed, your skepticism of the
MOQ is healthy. I�m glad to see it .
GLENN:
Discussions on moq.org have stressed this important aspect as
a caveat (that the social level supports the intellectual level).
Frankly, Pirsig doesn�t stress it all that much. He�s more
interested in putting the social level in submission to the
intellectual level, which is in direct conflict with this important
caveat. (Parens added.)
PH:
If you are saying Pirsig is anti-religion and pro-science and pro-
individualism I agree. But, just as a safe environment underlies
our well-being, so a healthy social level supports intellectual
freedom. I think Pirsig stresses the point well enough.
GLENN:
The resolution to this conflict requires another moral decision, for
which the MOQ gives no guidance. The most difficult moral issues
of our time, like abortion and gun control, exhibit this very conflict.
And we�re right back where we started.
PH:
No guidance? Seems to me that �Lila� is full of moral guidance,
based on Pirsig�s theory of an evolutionary moral hierarchy which
explains in rational (rather than emotional) terms why, for
example, it�s better to kill a germ than a scientist. Abortion and
gun control issues are more complex to be sure, but the rational
framework is there for those who care to pursue it.
GLENN:
The statements in your previous post refuted empiricism whether
it�s the broadened version or not.
PH:
Sorry that I failed to make myself clear. I didn�t intend to refute
empiricism. As Pirsig says, it�s a very high quality intellectual
pattern, one he fully supports. My point was simply to illustrate that
all attempts to explain the world begin with a leap of faith. As John
Barrow, author of �Theories of Everything: The Quest for Ultimate
Explanation� put it: �If religion is defined as belief in truth that
cannot be proved, then math is the only religion that can prove it is
a religion.� (Godel�s Theorem). Likewise, the confidence
scientists have in the creative power of chance is an article of faith,
as are their beliefs in causation, mechanisms and a rational,
orderly world.
GLENN:
The clause which states �or by thinking about what the senses
provide� is where I start getting nervous. How do you know your
mind is not suffering delusions, hallucinations or being subjected
to trickery? MOQ only requires these interpretations be logically
consistent, agree with experience and possess an economy of
explanation.
PH:
Seems to me that �logically consistent� takes care of the
examples you cite. Shouldn�t take long to figure out that pink
elephants go away once you sober up. I will concede, however,
that most people act emotionally rather than logically. Pirsig is
careful to use the phrase �legitimate knowledge� in his description
of empiricism.
GLENN:
What about verifiability?
PH:
Yes, I think Pirsig�s description of empiricism would be better if he
added, �confirmation by others in a position to know� or some
such phrase that avoids any implication that verification is just a
matter of majority rule. But your point is well taken.
GLENN:
What about completeness? Are all the sensory data being
explained well by the interpretation or are only some?
PH:
Agree. The more data the theory explains, the better. But, let�s not
limit data to �sensory data.� There is intellectual data, for example,
like math. And there�s the data, widely verified, of spiritual or
�mystic� experience.
PIRSIG:
The Metaphysics of Quality varies from this by saying that the
values of art and morality and even religious mysticism are
verifiable, and that in the past they have been excluded for
metaphysical reason, not empirical reasons.
GLENN:
Unless he is using a definition for �unverifiable� I�m not aware of,
or he has come up with some experimental techniques he has
failed to divulge, these things are indeed not verifiable. I don�t
know if he is confusing verifiability with simple experience here? I
just don�t know.
PH:
I don�t presume to speak for Pirsig, but it seems to me �simple
experience� is how we verify anything. It doesn�t take a
complicated experiment to verify the truth that it�s raining outside.
Reading a number on a computer screen as particles collide is a
�simple experience.� Your definition of �unverifiable� must include
criteria (like complicated experience?) I�m unaware of. Do you
mean verified by those �in a position to know?�
PIRSIG:
They have been excluded because of the metaphysical
assumption that all the universe is composed of subjects and
objects and anything that can�t be classified as a subject or an
object isn�t real. There is no empirical evidence for this
assumption at all. It is just an assumption.
GLENN:
It depends on what he means by �real.� Certainly almost all
people think emotions are real. Pain is real, for example. No one
would deny this. So if this is what he means by �real� then I think
SOM is a strawman.
PH:
Good point. SOM says that pain, emotions, morals, etc. are real,
but subjective and thus mere opinion as opposed to objective
�substance.� I think SOM considers matter you can kick more
�real� than emotions or ideas. But admittedly Pirsig isn�t too clear
here except to make the point rather obliquely that all metaphysics
is based on assumptions. From my understanding of the MOQ,
Pirsig objects to the prevalent paradigm of materialism which he
identifies as SOM. I�m sure there�s a better description of SOM in
�Lila� but I can�t put my finger on it at the moment.
GLENN:
If he means �primary reality� when he speaks of �real� here, then I
could argue there IS empirical evidence to support the belief that
substance, or a distance cousin, is primary reality. The evidence
isn�t conclusive, but at least there is evidence. In contrast, there is
no evidence whatsoever that primary reality is composed of
morals.
PH:
I smell a whiff of rhetoric in the above. You introduce a concept of
�primary� reality, define it as composed of substance, then argue
that because morals are not composed of substance they�re not
primary reality. From what I read about quantum physics, the
evidence for so-called primary reality is that it�s nothing at all, a
vacuum, a diaphanous potential. Anyway, there�s lot�s of evidence
in �Lila� to support the contention that primary reality (what one
experiences first) is value, evidence that I corroborate every day in
countless ways. ( Ex: It�s better to be writing this than watching TV.)
GLENN:
Can all these people, with all their private world-views, have
�equal� interpretations of reality? I don�t think so.
PH:
Agree. I think there should be consensus by those who have taken
the trouble to follow a required discipline, whether in science,
history, art or other serious pursuit. Of course, this leaves wide
open philosophical matters such as metaphysics on which even
among the academics there�s little consensus. For that I don�t
have an answer.
GLENN:
Skepticism is healthy. (It would be nice to see a little more of it on
moq.org.) The important thing is that people eventually come
around to the better way of thinking.
PH:
Ah, you�ve introduced a couple of moral judgments. Perhaps you�ll
agree they are unavoidable, and that science, just like any other
discipline, is replete with moral values such as don�t fudge the
results of an experiment to prove a theory. Perhaps such values
necessarily come first�injunctions on how to �think better.�
Seems to me they do.
GLENN: (Commenting on Pirsig�s �solution� to the free will-
determinism issue.)
All he�s done is recast a nearly identical problem in MOQ terms.
Now the question becomes, �When am I free to follow the path of
DQ and when am I constrained to follow static patterns of quality?�
PH:
It varies with the individual and circumstances. Unlike science
which values stereotypical, repeatable behaviors, Pirsig
repeatedly stresses the uniqueness and value of individuals.
PIRSIG:
So what the Metaphysics of Quality concludes is that all schools
are right on the mind-matter question. Mind is contained in static
inorganic patterns. Matter is contained in static intellectual
patterns. Both mind and matter are completely separate
evolutionary levels of static patterns of value, as such are capable
of each containing the other without contradiction.�
GLENN:
If it�s not still contradictory it�s weird. A timeline of evolution is
clearly described in by MOQ, where inorganic matter comes first
and minds come later. Saying matter is contained in static
intellectual patterns is saying brand new matter is being created
by the mind on the fly. Is this matter different from the matter that
evolved before mind did?
PH:
Your critique was raised by Maggie and answered by Roger last
year. Unfortunately, while I remember the date, I can�t recall the
answer. Perhaps someone will jump in and enlighten both of us.
I think it may have something to do with Pirsig�s contention that the
reason there�s a mind-matter problem is because the biological
and social levels get left out. In any case, you raise a good point
that deserves a better answer than I�m able to provide.
GLENN:
But also it�s hard to believe we could become such complex life
forms by the process of chance and natural selection, even given
millions of years. DQ to the rescue? Darwinian evolution still has
some explaining to do in my view. But evolutionary goodness
doesn�t feel right either. If it�s so fundamental to reality, why are the
other moons and planets in our solar system so lifeless. What are
�their� purpose?
PH:
As I�m sure you know, many scientists have wondered how the
laws of physics came to be. To claim they happened without
reason is to violate the most aggressively defended assumption
of science�that nature is rational at each step of a causal chain
all the way down to the bedrock of the laws of physics. To
suddenly flip-flop when the question of original creation is asked
is hardly reassuring. As Paul Davies put it, �Free-floating laws that
come from nowhere and have no purpose, reason or justification
fall into the same irrational category as miracles.� So it�s a matter
of taste or, as you say, �feel.� You can get your reality because
something went �oops� or because it�s �right.� Personally, I lean
to the latter, especially now that Pirsig has shown how it could
work.
GLENN: (Answering my question, �Do you see any hope in a
rational or scientifically-based morality?)
No. At least not one that�s convincing.
PH:
So where does that leave us? What can we base moral standards
on besides �culture� with resulting relativism. Are we set adrift
believing morality is anything you like?
Platt
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