[Ron] Individualism works best within a social body. Individualism absolute is every one for themselves...
[Arlo] The best society is one that achieves the maximum balance of static and Dynamic to maximize freedom. It attains this balancing the needs of its "individual" citizens with the "greater good" of the nation. Outlawing murder, for example, is an example of social control over individual behavior that conversely increases overall freedoms. Taxation to support public libraries, I have argued several times, is another area where social control increases overall freedom. Taxation to fund a military is a similar process. But this is simply a diversionary tactic, typical talk-radio rhetoric, todevolve the discussion into "individual person" versus "groups of people". Thisis NOT what I, nor Pirsig, nor Granger, nor anyone else refer to when they talkabout the "collective consciousness". Nor is it what is implied in youroriginal posts (if I understood you correctly). The "collective consciousness" is described by Pirsig as the Mythos, whichincludes the Logos. The emergent-self, as described by Granger and Pirsig, isnot an external, removed "little homunculus". This is the S/O view, Platt's view, of which Pirsig says, "This Cartesian "Me," this autonomous little homunculus who sits behind our eyeballs looking out through them in order to pass judgment on the affairs of the world, is just completely ridiculous. This self-appointed little editor of reality is just an impossible fiction that collapses the moment one examines it." Of course, this is why Platt resorts to such deceptive and dishonest rhetoric to support it. Of this S/O understanding of "self", Pirsig also says this. "Everyone seemed to be guided by an "objective," "scientific" view of life that told each person that his essential self is his evolved material body. Ideas and societies are a component of brains, not the other way around. No two brains can merge physically, and therefore no two people can ever really communicate in the mode of ship's radio operators sending messages back and forth in the night. A scientific, intellectual culture had become a culture of millions of isolated people living and dying in little cells of psychic solitary confinement..." The MOQ offers something better, and this better view of "self" is an emergent, evolutionary "software reality" (as Pirsig calls it), that arises from the mutually-transformative and mutually-generative involvment of "unique biological being appropriating collective consciousness". In LILA, Pirsig writes, "Between the subject and the object lies the value. This value is more immediate, more directly sensed than any "self" or any "object" to which it might be later assigned. It is more real than the stove. Whether the stove is the cause of the low quality or whether possibly something else is the cause is not yet absolutely certain. But that the quality is low is absolutely certain. It is the primary empirical reality from which such things as stoves and heat and oaths and self are later intellectually constructed." But the "self" is not "intellectually constructed" in isolation. Its "intellectual construction" derives from social activity. This is what he means when he condemns Descartes declaration. "If Descartes had said, "The seventeenth century French culture exists, therefore I think, therefore I am," he would have been correct." More correct, indeed. Pirsig wrote, "Mental patterns do not originate out of inorganic nature. They originate out of society, which originates out of biology which originates out of inorganic nature." The "self" is, of course, a "mental pattern", a self-referential "strange loop" that emerges to bring order and reference to the mutally-transformative, mutually-generative interplay between bodily-kinesthetic experience and collective consciousness. Without appropriating the collective consciousness, Pirsig warns that the child (my desert-island baby example) would never move beyond a bodily-kinesthetic experience of the world. "... [E]ach child is born as ignorant as any caveman. What keeps the world from reverting to the Neanderthal with each generation is the continuing, ongoing mythos, transformed into logos but still mythos..." The important thing here is that the collective consciousness is NOT external to the human "self". That's just either a faulty dualism or deliberately distortive rhetoric. Nor is the collective consciousness akin to favoring "a group over a person". That again is deliberately deceptive talk-radio rhetoric. Ian calls it dishonest, and that is quite an understatement. Pirsig writes, " One answer is to fudge both mind and matter and the whole question that goes with them into another platypus called "man." "Man" has a body (and therefore is not himself a body) and he also has a mind (and therefore is not himself a mind). But if one asks what is this "man" (which is not a body and not a mind) one doesn't come up with anything. There isn't any "man" independent of the patterns. Man is the patterns. This fictitious "man" has many synonyms: "mankind," "people," "the public," and even such pronouns as "I," "he," and "they." Our language is so organized around them and they are so convenient to use it is impossible to get rid of them. There is really no need to. Like "substance" they can be used as long as it is remembered that they're terms for collections of patterns and not some independent primary reality of their own." Man IS a collection of patterns, of experiences encompassing the MOQ's four-levels. And as man appropriates those patterns, he becomes enabled to ACT on those levels. Man can respond to social quality because he IS social patterns. Man can respond to intellectual quality because he IS intellect. Man is NOT some external, removed "thing" that sits and interacts with "patterns-over-there". Man is the patterns. You had asked about a "collective unconscious". Personally, what is typically meant by this term I include within the collective consciousness. As we appropriate the collective consciousness, we don't just appropriate "active" knowledge, we appropriate particular ways of thinking and seeing that are often not articulated, but drastic in terms of their effect on the emerging self. For example, in English, "arguing" is metaphorically framed as a "war". "I won that argument." "I was losing the argument until I brought out the big guns." Etc. (George Lakoff has written extensively on this). In some Hispanic cultures, "arguing" is metaphorically framed as a "dance". "We tangoed around the idea." In English, our interlocutor in an argument is our "opponent", in these cultures the interlocutor is our "partner". Beyond this, the sum total of collective knowledge gravitates towards certain "themes". Jung referred to these as "archetypes". Campbell as the "monomyth". Dawkins as "memes". These are themes and patterns we internalize often without being consciously aware of doing so. Are they universal? Perhaps as the human experience universally shares an inorganic and biological substrata of experience (we are all susceptible to gravity, so seeing birds in flight may have a universal effect on the collective consciousness as it grows). Are they regional/local? Perhaps, as our kinesthetic experience varies from polar to desert climes. And still other parts of the collective (un)consciousness may be unique to specific cultures (how we categorize material artifacts, for example... the "sorting sand into piles" section of ZMM). What do you think? moq_discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
