"Does Pirsig adequately support his notion that we have a 'sense of value' analogous to the five traditional senses?"
Pirsig said in his SODV paper: "The Metaphysics of Quality follows the empirical tradition here in saying that the senses are the starting point of reality, but -- all importantly -- it includes a sense of value. Values are phenomena. To ignore them is to misread the world. It says this sense of value, of liking or disliking, is a primary sense that is a kind of gatekeeper for everything else an infant learns." Wim said: Couldn't this quote be read as implying that the 'sense of value' is not analogous to the five traditional senses, but 'primary', kind of summarizing or abstracted from them? The 'gatekeeper' metaphor might suggest that the 'sense of value' has a separate and different role from other senses that provide 'imput' for interpretation by the 'sense of value'. I wouldn't take the metaphor too literally however. I don't think this 'sense of value' is really separate from the five senses (and I don't interpret Pirsig as stating that it is). It's merely an analytical tool for describing how these five senses are working: through them we only experience what has value. Matt: I think the quote can be read "as implying that the 'sense of value' is not analogous to the five traditional senses, but 'primary.'" Interpreting the passage this way is consistent with Pirsig's redescription of reality as Quality. With a "sense of value" as primary, I take it this means that all other senses evolve out of the original historically and in each individual's case the five senses are simply five different kinds of a "sense of value." However, I think this (my preferred interpretation) is already stretching the text a bit and I think Pirsig is far too ambiguous to say one way or the other. The first three lines supply heavy weight for interpreting him as saying that the sense of value _is_ separate from the five senses. The fourth supplies a heavy gloss over the first three, towards Wim's interpretation, but I don't think it is a clear cut gloss at all. Pirsig says, "it includes a sense of value," which is hard to interpret any other way than as an _addition_, not as a redescription. His next line is the chopped, "Values are phenomena." This is more ambiguous than the first, but if it were to read as a redescription, we would have to read the line as "Values are what phenomena are." This, I think, is a more strained interpretation than reading it as "Values are phenomena also." If we read it this way, that makes values a separate commodity then other things bouncing around reality. This would impl y a sense of value as separate. In addition, if we read the second line linearly with the first, with the first providing the gloss for the second, the interpretation leans heavily towards reading it as the latter (values-as-additional-phenomena), rather than the former (values-as-phenomena). The third line then prompts us to gloss backwards to the meaning of the second. "To ignore them is to misread the world." "Them" refers to "values" in the proceeding line and it steers us to interpret that line as values-as-additional-phenomena. If values were the sum total of reality, if it were used redescriptively, then it wouldn't be possible to ignore them because you are everywhere and always in touch with reality. It would seem the major problem with reading this passage is ambiguity in the way Pirsig uses the term "value," and I find this throughout his books and throughout our writings on this forum. I think Pirsig uses "value" in two ways, as synonymous with Quality, i.e. in its redescriptive, ubiquitous sense, and in the more traditional sense of being synonymous with morals. So, in answer to the topic question, "Does Pirsig adequately support his notion that we have a 'sense of value' analogous to the five traditional senses?" I think we have to answer in one of two ways: 1) "mu," because we do not have a sense of value that is analogous to the other senses because all Pirsig means is his redescription of reality or 2) no, because if we have a "sense of value" analogous to our five senses then it would be empirically testable as a physical section in our brains (like the other five senses) and I severely doubt we find a section in our brain that senses morals and can be developed or underdeveloped _physically_. A corrollary of 1) is that we can still keep the sentiment of "Values are phenomena," despite the fact that it clutters up this passage, when values are synonymous with morals. I took the entire point of the Quality redescription to be that values are as real as rocks. Matt MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_focus/ MF Queries - [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from moq_focus follow the instructions at: http://www.moq.org/mf/subscribe.html
