Gervase Markham wrote:
On a related point, can we perhaps use this new high/low assurance bit

Uh, what new high/low assurance bit? Has someone already committed to implement this, and we've agreed to take the patch? :-)


in the cert store as something to hang cert revocation off? If you want to be in the high assurance store, you have to have a working OCSP server defined in your certs, or something like that?

Two points:

1. A number of "high assurance" CAs do not have OCSP set up. In doing my CA list at

  http://www.hecker.org/mozilla/ca-certificate-list

(which covers only new CAs applying for inclusion) I tried to track down information on CA's OCSP services; as you'll note, it's not that common. However providing CRLs is almost universal, but...

2. Neither Firebird nor Thunderbird have CRL checking (let alone OCSP validation) turned on by default; it must be manually enabled by users (e.g., by clicking on a link to a CRL -- try one of the ones on the page referenced above). This is a big product gap that needs to be filled, e.g., by recruiting some more NSS/PSM developers.

Frank

--
Frank Hecker
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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