Thanks for the comments: Ill assume the original design team is no longer
active, and I can set some new goals. I see no reason why the target should
not keep RSA raw as a block cipher, to support the legacy apps. We can also design
changes mandated by a common criteria evaluator, reflected in javacard 2.2 specification,
in this area.
(1) Ill assume that the old SUNFED group published their protection profile for JavaCards around
the time you programmed muscle, and have updated it for javacard 2.2 RMI (solves
the end-end T0 integrity problem) and Object Deletion functional group (addressing
KeyPair deletion, and parameter reconfiguration, indirectly).
(2) I assume that most of the CC evaluation work focussed on the wider card
management system view of the smartcard - rather than the crypto services, per se, that
must support online applications such as SSL which switch cipher suites on demand.
(3) Ill assume modern die for ICCs support USB, have flash for post-issuance applets
and heap, and have MMU that support JavaCard Os's least privilege model.
(4) Ill assume the ICC is mounted in the 7816-1 package, managed, personalised and
issued in that form by a card management system; is used operationally mostly
in a PCMCIA reader (whose own reader is present in most command and control
workstations) and a PKI manages the lifecycle of the combined unit (trusted PC card +
7816-1 ICC)
(5) Finally, my big assumption, is that the trusted ICC is rekeyed regularly, over the
air (or net) by a PKI, and rekey means in practice deleting and reissuing post-issuance applets
and their alloced' persistent heap objects, recovering resources. I do not assume JavaCard
garbage collection, or evaluation of the JavaCard OS's own object delete TOE SEF.
All that said, this set of supposed rationales motivates two programming changes, and
one JavaCard OS manufacturing change:
(a) a new access right, to control execution of the rekey/delete behaviour
(b) conclusion of strong identity login, an authentication assurance necessary for asserting
an authorization seeking the rights in (a)
(c) the OS in ROM will contain root keys in a non-deletable package. The package can
allow post-isstance applet to register root keys to the secure storage (TCPA style), for
limited purposes.
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