Hello, Peter: 1) In the ISO/IEC 24727 WG4/TF9 effort we've explictly stated that the work product is independent of transport protocols.
2) Furthermore, AFAIK none of the ISO/IEC 7816 standards speak to any properties of the processor nor are there any ISO test methods that speak to physical security of integrated circuit cards. This is neither a NIST position nor a US position. It's simply a reading of the documents on the table. 3) And, yes, it is strange that an industry that claims it is all about security has done virtually nothing when it comes to defining it or measuring it or standardizing it. When it comes to these supposedly core matters about all we hear is "It's all very complicated and confidential. You'll just have to trust me." 4) Part 4 in the ISO/IEC 24727 series is chartered to address end-to-end security in the ISO/IEC 24727 framework. Cheers, Scott -----Original Message----- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Peter Williams Sent: Tuesday, April 12, 2005 1:31 PM To: 'MUSCLE' Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: [Muscle] NIST Services > -----Original Message----- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:muscle- > [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Scott Guthery > Sent: Tuesday, April 12, 2005 9:30 AM > To: MUSCLE > Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: RE: [Muscle] NIST Services > > Anders: > > NIST/PIV has nothing whatsoever to do with physical transmission or > the physicality of the platform. You can run it on a USB token, a > PCMCIA token, a harddisk, a TPM, a cell-phone or a tom-tom. That's interesting. So in the NIST vision (i.e. US position to ISO), one can ping the TPM as a PIV device, and transfer the keying material to a soft cryptomodule, like a harddrive. And the transfer format is a PKCS#12 file, or something similar. Presumably, the TPM will have multiple personalities - the PIV set (which facilitate key export and mobility of "personal id" information between form factors, and other sets that identify you otherwise for non PIV purposes (e.g. DRM enforcement, evidentiary purposes, crypto export control enforcement per login, etc). There will be a distinction between "personal" id information that you have privacy rights over (the PIV set), and other identification data that is "non-personal" and you probably wont really know even exist. When I talked to Wave at the RSA Show, they were singularly unable to articulate how the fixed motherboard TPM would interact with the smartcard/mobile-device: as a cooperating peer, and as a secure channel partner. They just went on and on about the usual HP Bristol Labs integrity metrics stuff for controlling what particular users might do with a software platform (i.e. the Personal Computer). Viewing the PIV as a common interface, with mobility and roaming properties, and as the linkup between the TPM and one or other mobile token (that is not a TPM) is an interesting concept. Still doesn't address the end-end security problem tho., one PIV device to another, with some degree of writer-to-reader security suited to personal id information flow. If the PIV is on a near field device, users don't want the RFID personal privacy problem - where any other local NF terminal can scan your existence and presence, usefully, and possibly pull your data. There has to be PIV-PIV authentication - independent of the mobile form factor - and some W3C-like privacy handling scheme for then controlling the automatic release of personal data items, to authenticated peers. _______________________________________________ Muscle mailing list [email protected] http://lists.drizzle.com/mailman/listinfo/muscle _______________________________________________ Muscle mailing list [email protected] http://lists.drizzle.com/mailman/listinfo/muscle
