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from Boston Globe Lax security eases access to lethal strains By Beth Daley and Raja Mishra, Globe Staff, 10/13/2001 As federal investigators try to trace apparent anthrax attacks in Florida and New York, they are hampered by a simple, chilling fact: Scores of low-security labs store the deadly bacteria with little oversight. For decades, anthrax lab samples moved freely among researchers and universities, from Georgia to California and around the world. Hundreds of samples were traded, copied, and mailed on. Authorities kept few tabs on the transactions, and remain unable to account for many. Anthrax, which primarily causes disease in sheep, has been studied by agricultural scientists for years, mostly to protect livestock. And it has long been treated like any other research material - as a hazard, not a security risk. Today, despite 1996 federal rules intended to prevent biological attacks, lax security still abounds at university labs handling anthrax, say specialists. And researchers continue to report their anthrax transactions haphazardly. ''Some labs only have locks on the front door,'' said Dr. Philip Brachman, an anthrax specialist at Emory University's public health school. ''Security is nil.'' Anthrax security failures, though rare, have been dramatic. One US lab sent anthrax strains to Iraq, whose government is among the world's most feared bioterror threats. In another case, a forged letter got anthrax into the hands of a white supremacist who had previously been convicted for fraudulently obtaining samples of bubonic plague. ''If you know someone working in the lab, you can get a sample,'' said Brachman. ''Or maybe you pay a lab technician $100 to get one. Or maybe just break in.'' In addition to high-profile security breakdowns, there have been scores of smaller, troubling cases. For instance, an anthrax sample from Pakistan bound for a Lousiana State lab sat on a dusty shelf in a New York airport for two months. Anthrax spores can easily survive for such lengths, even at room temperature. ''The package wasn't marked, of course, and we got it and it was fine. It was just one of those things that happens,'' said Lousiana State researcher Martin Hugh-Jones. The lapses underscore the reality of anthrax: A lot of it exists, usually under little or no security. The 1996 law - the cornerstone of US biological attack prevention - mandated reporting of all anthrax transactions. Detailed paperwork is now required before labs can either send or receive anthrax samples. Scientists must present the Centers for Disease Control with specific, narrow reasons for their requests. Many are denied because either the proposed research or the destination lab does not meet CDC standards. But federal authorities rarely police labs to ensure that rules are being followed, say specialists. Many labs, they said, still send samples back and forth without bothering to do paperwork. The law was enacted after a student at Ohio State University in 1995 ordered three vials of bubonic plague-causing bacteria from Maryland-based American Type Culture Collection, the world's largest contagion bank. In a subsequent investigation of the nonprofit company, FBI officals found it had sold seven anthrax strains to Iraq months before the Persian Gulf War erupted. Even more troubling, said Hugh-Jones, is that ''there are a lot of people who have cultures off the books,'' undocumented and casually traded. Cultures are often shipped in overnight packages with few markings to note their contents - just a wrapped test tube in an express-mail box. It's not just anthrax that officals are concerned about. About 1,500 contagion banks worldwide hold 1 million strains of microorganisms, including scourges like bubonic plague, ebola, and malaria. These repositories serve a valuable purpose: Doctors use them to better diagnose diseases, and researchers can advance microbiology through studying them, according to Dan Shapiro, an infectious disease specialist at Boston University. Not all have anthrax. But many do. Since the 1996 law, researchers must fill out an ''EA101'' form for each anthrax transaction and keep a log. Laboratories are open to inspections by the CDC, to see if they are complying. But specialists acknowledged yesterday that many simply bypass the cumbersome and form-laden process and simply call up friends in the business who possess anthrax cultures. Otherwise, said some researchers, research would never be conducted. ''There are so many forms to fill out that people don't bother sometimes,'' said Dr. Fred Southwick, chief of infectious diseases at University of Florida's medical school. ''What are they going to do? Throw us in jail?'' Harvard Medical School, the largest local handler of contagions, said it keeps no live strains of anthrax. For other deadly viruses and bacteria, said spokesman John Lacey, ''All of our labs are secured, as are all of our facilities. Entry passes are required for all faculty, students, and staff.'' Infectious disease doctors around the country said they suspect that many university labs never bother to tell the CDC they have anthrax, not out of malice but simply because they had it for so long prior to the 1996 law. It was, after all, a staple of 1950s and '60s agriculture research. In fact, it is one of the oldest studied bacteria. And although some specialists say there are far fewer total cultures around than prior to 1996, others say many colleges likely have anthrax hanging around in specimen labs - some barely aware of it. ''There's a lot of academic research going on. It is out there and it's much easier to get than other diseases,'' said Alan Louie, senior manager for the applied biotech laboratories at Arthur D. Little, a technology consulting firm. Even more disturbing, some disease specialists say, is the vast number of infectious disease cultures that exist elsewhere in the world unchecked. ''This is only one of many dozens of countries,'' said Shapiro. ''This is a global phenomenon. And we need to investigate all countries who have acquired organisms from these collections that could potentially serve as sources of bioterrorism.'' This story ran on page A1 of the Boston Globe on 10/13/2001. � <A HREF="http://www.boston.com/globe/search/copyright.html";>Copyright</A> 2001 Globe Newspaper Company. ============================================================ 12 CDs for 1 with BMG Music Service! 12 CDs for 1 with BMG Music Service! 12 CDs for 1 with BMG Music Service! http://click.topica.com/caaadKjb1ddNBb2HgmNf/BMG ============================================================ Visit and show your support for the Grass Roots Oyate http://members.tripod.com/GrassRootsOyate Clemency for Leonard Peltier. 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