madhushreeag commented on code in PR #44365:
URL: https://github.com/apache/superset/pull/44365#discussion_r4033179016
##########
superset/security/api.py:
##########
@@ -268,6 +285,128 @@ def guest_token(self) -> Response:
except ValidationError as error:
return self.response_400(message=error.messages)
+ @expose("/login-token/", methods=("POST",))
+ @event_logger.log_this
+ @safe
+ @statsd_metrics
+ @transaction()
+ def login_token(self) -> Response:
+ """Mint a one-time login token for iframe embedding.
+ ---
+ post:
+ summary: Mint a one-time login token
+ description: >-
+ Exchanges a caller-supplied proof of identity for an opaque,
single-use
+ token that GET on this same path trades for a session cookie.
Intended
+ to be called server-to-server by a trusted parent application so
the
+ underlying credential never reaches the browser. The
+ LOGIN_TOKEN_IDENTITY_RESOLVER hook decides what counts as proof.
+ responses:
+ 200:
+ description: The minted token and its expiry
+ content:
+ application/json:
+ schema: LoginTokenResponseSchema
+ 401:
+ $ref: '#/components/responses/401'
+ 404:
+ $ref: '#/components/responses/404'
+ 500:
+ $ref: '#/components/responses/500'
+ """
+ if not login_token_utils.is_enabled():
+ # 404 rather than 403: with the feature off there is nothing here
to
+ # be forbidden from, and this keeps the surface closed by default.
+ return self.response_404()
+
+ if (userinfo := login_token_utils.resolve_identity(request)) is None:
+ return self.response_401()
+
+ token, expires_on = login_token_utils.mint(userinfo)
+ logger.info(
+ "One-time login token minted for '%s' from %s",
+ userinfo.get("username") or userinfo.get("email"),
+ request.remote_addr,
+ )
+ return self.response(
+ 200,
+ access_token=token,
+ expires_at=int(expires_on.timestamp()),
+ )
+
+ @expose("/login-token/", methods=("GET",))
+ @event_logger.log_this
+ @statsd_metrics
+ @transaction()
+ def login_with_token(self) -> Response:
Review Comment:
Fair point. An attacker who can mint for their own identity and induce a
victim's browser to navigate to the consume URL within the TTL can place that
browser in the attacker's session. Single use and a 60s TTL reduces the risk
but does not eliminate. Also, The attacker here would not get access, but
victims input.
An OAuth-style `state` binding doesn't translate cleanly, if the parent app
is on a different origin and so can't set a cookie Superset reads. A workable
variant exists for deployments where parent and Superset share a registrable
domain, but it's conditional, so it needs to be optional and well documented.
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