madhushreeag commented on code in PR #44365:
URL: https://github.com/apache/superset/pull/44365#discussion_r4032778375
##########
superset/security/api.py:
##########
@@ -268,6 +285,128 @@
except ValidationError as error:
return self.response_400(message=error.messages)
+ @expose("/login-token/", methods=("POST",))
+ @event_logger.log_this
+ @safe
+ @statsd_metrics
+ @transaction()
+ def login_token(self) -> Response:
+ """Mint a one-time login token for iframe embedding.
+ ---
+ post:
+ summary: Mint a one-time login token
+ description: >-
+ Exchanges a caller-supplied proof of identity for an opaque,
single-use
+ token that GET on this same path trades for a session cookie.
Intended
+ to be called server-to-server by a trusted parent application so
the
+ underlying credential never reaches the browser. The
+ LOGIN_TOKEN_IDENTITY_RESOLVER hook decides what counts as proof.
+ responses:
+ 200:
+ description: The minted token and its expiry
+ content:
+ application/json:
+ schema: LoginTokenResponseSchema
+ 401:
+ $ref: '#/components/responses/401'
+ 404:
+ $ref: '#/components/responses/404'
+ 500:
+ $ref: '#/components/responses/500'
+ """
+ if not login_token_utils.is_enabled():
+ # 404 rather than 403: with the feature off there is nothing here
to
+ # be forbidden from, and this keeps the surface closed by default.
+ return self.response_404()
+
+ if (userinfo := login_token_utils.resolve_identity(request)) is None:
+ return self.response_401()
+
+ token, expires_on = login_token_utils.mint(userinfo)
+ logger.info(
+ "One-time login token minted for '%s' from %s",
+ userinfo.get("username") or userinfo.get("email"),
+ request.remote_addr,
+ )
+ return self.response(
+ 200,
+ access_token=token,
+ expires_at=int(expires_on.timestamp()),
+ )
+
+ @expose("/login-token/", methods=("GET",))
+ @event_logger.log_this
+ @statsd_metrics
+ @transaction()
+ def login_with_token(self) -> Response:
+ """Consume a one-time login token and establish a session.
+ ---
+ get:
+ summary: Consume a one-time login token
+ description: >-
+ Reached by navigating an iframe to this URL. Exchanges the token
for a
+ standard session cookie and redirects to `next`, so the frame
holds an
+ ordinary Superset session with the user's own roles and row-level
+ security. The token is deleted on use.
+ parameters:
+ - in: query
+ name: token
+ required: true
+ schema:
+ type: string
+ description: The opaque token returned by POST on this path
+ - in: query
+ name: next
+ required: false
+ schema:
+ type: string
+ description: Internal URL to redirect to; rejected if not internal
+ responses:
+ 302:
+ description: Session established; redirect to `next`
+ 401:
+ $ref: '#/components/responses/401'
+ 404:
+ $ref: '#/components/responses/404'
+ 500:
+ $ref: '#/components/responses/500'
+ """
+ if not login_token_utils.is_enabled():
+ return self.response_404()
+
+ token = request.args.get("token", "")
+ # A single failure mode for unknown, malformed, expired and
already-spent
+ # tokens, so the response cannot be used to probe which one it was.
+ if not token or (userinfo := login_token_utils.consume(token)) is None:
+ return self.response_401()
+
+ user = self.appbuilder.sm.auth_user_oauth(userinfo)
+ if user is None:
+ # Provisioning declined the identity: the user is deactivated, or
+ # AUTH_USER_REGISTRATION is off and they have no account yet.
+ logger.warning(
+ "One-time login token resolved an identity that could not be "
+ "provisioned: '%s'",
+ userinfo.get("username") or userinfo.get("email"),
+ )
+ return self.response_401()
+
+ login_user(user)
+ logger.info("Session established from a one-time login token for
'%s'", user)
+
+ # Only ever redirect to a value that has passed the internal-URL check.
+ # Assigning into a separate variable inside the guarded branch — rather
+ # than reassigning the request-derived one — keeps the sanitizer on the
+ # path to the redirect, which taint analysis can follow.
+ requested_next = request.args.get("next") or "/"
+ safe_next_url = "/"
+ if is_safe_redirect_url(requested_next):
+ safe_next_url = requested_next
+ else:
+ logger.warning("Rejected unsafe `next` on login-token consume")
+
+ return redirect(safe_next_url)
Review Comment:
False positive - `next` is validated by
`superset.utils.link_redirect.is_safe_redirect_url` which rejects
protocol-relative URLs, any scheme other than http(s), and any netloc outside
the configured base hosts; a rejected value falls back to `/`. CodeQL only
recognizes a fixed set of sanitizers (Django's
`url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme` and similar) and cannot see ours. The
suggested fix would add a Django dependency, which Superset does not have.
`superset/views/redirect.py` uses the identical source/sanitizer/redirect shape.
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