bito-code-review[bot] commented on code in PR #44365: URL: https://github.com/apache/superset/pull/44365#discussion_r4039701685
########## superset/security/login_token.py: ########## @@ -0,0 +1,206 @@ +# Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one +# or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file +# distributed with this work for additional information +# regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file +# to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the +# "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance +# with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, +# software distributed under the License is distributed on an +# "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY +# KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the +# specific language governing permissions and limitations +# under the License. +"""One-time login tokens for establishing a session inside an iframe. + +An SSO redirect flow cannot run inside an iframe: identity providers commonly +refuse to be framed, and the redirect chain depends on cookies that browsers +treat as third-party in an embedded context. A parent application that already +holds a trustworthy proof of the user's identity uses these tokens to turn that +proof into an ordinary Superset session in two steps: + +1. its backend mints a token, presenting a credential that an operator-supplied + resolver validates (server-to-server, so the credential never reaches the + browser), and +2. the browser navigates the iframe to the consume endpoint, which exchanges the + token for a session cookie. + +The token is an opaque handle to a short-lived server-side record; no identity +data travels in the URL. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import logging +from datetime import datetime, timedelta +from typing import Any, Callable, cast, TypedDict +from uuid import UUID, uuid4 + +from flask import current_app, Request + +from superset.daos.key_value import KeyValueDAO +from superset.key_value.types import JsonKeyValueCodec, KeyValueResource + +logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) + +LOGIN_TOKEN_RESOURCE = KeyValueResource.LOGIN_TOKEN +LOGIN_TOKEN_CODEC = JsonKeyValueCodec() + +# Kept short deliberately: the token is handed to a browser as an iframe URL, so +# it lands in access logs and the parent page's DOM. A lifetime measured in +# seconds bounds the window in which an observer could replay it. +DEFAULT_LOGIN_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS = 60 + + +class LoginTokenUserInfo(TypedDict, total=False): + """The identity a resolver returns for a one-time login token. + + This mirrors the ``userinfo`` contract of Flask-AppBuilder's + ``auth_user_oauth``, which the consume step delegates to. ``username`` + identifies the user, falling back to ``email`` when absent. ``role_keys`` are + resolved through ``AUTH_ROLES_MAPPING``, so a caller can only ever request + roles the operator has already mapped -- authorization stays with the + operator rather than moving to the parent application. + """ + + username: str + email: str + first_name: str + last_name: str + role_keys: list[str] + + +LoginTokenIdentityResolver = Callable[..., LoginTokenUserInfo | None] + + +def is_enabled() -> bool: + """Whether the flow is usable: feature flag on and a resolver configured.""" + # Deferred: ``superset/__init__`` imports the app factory, so a module-level + # import here would be circular via superset.daos / superset.security. + from superset import ( # pylint: disable=import-outside-toplevel + is_feature_enabled, + ) + + if not is_feature_enabled("LOGIN_TOKEN"): + return False + + return current_app.config.get("LOGIN_TOKEN_IDENTITY_RESOLVER") is not None + + +def get_ttl_seconds() -> int: + """The configured token lifetime, falling back to the default.""" + configured = current_app.config.get( + "LOGIN_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS", DEFAULT_LOGIN_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS + ) + try: + ttl = int(configured) + except (TypeError, ValueError): + logger.warning( + "LOGIN_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS is not an integer (%r); using %s", + configured, + DEFAULT_LOGIN_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS, + ) + return DEFAULT_LOGIN_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS + + return ttl if ttl > 0 else DEFAULT_LOGIN_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS + + +def resolve_identity(request: Request, **kwargs: Any) -> LoginTokenUserInfo | None: + """Run the operator-supplied resolver against an inbound mint request. + + The resolver is the whole authentication boundary for minting: it decides + what counts as proof of identity (an OIDC id token, an existing session, a + credential checked against an internal service). A resolver that raises is + treated as a rejection rather than a server error, so a failing validation + can never be mistaken for a successful one. + """ + resolver = current_app.config.get("LOGIN_TOKEN_IDENTITY_RESOLVER") + if resolver is None: + return None + + if not callable(resolver): + logger.error("LOGIN_TOKEN_IDENTITY_RESOLVER is not callable") + return None + + try: + userinfo = resolver(request, **kwargs) + except Exception: # pylint: disable=broad-except + logger.exception("LOGIN_TOKEN_IDENTITY_RESOLVER rejected the request") + return None + + if not userinfo: + return None + + if not (userinfo.get("username") or userinfo.get("email")): + # auth_user_oauth derives the username from one of these two; without + # either there is no identity to provision. + logger.error("LOGIN_TOKEN_IDENTITY_RESOLVER returned no username or email") + return None + + return userinfo + + +def mint(userinfo: LoginTokenUserInfo) -> tuple[str, datetime]: + """Store ``userinfo`` behind a fresh opaque token. + + Returns the token and its expiry. The token is a ``uuid4``, so it carries no + identity data and is not guessable. + """ + token = uuid4() + expires_on = datetime.now() + timedelta(seconds=get_ttl_seconds()) Review Comment: <!-- Bito Reply --> The reviewer's suggestion to use `datetime.now(timezone.utc)` is a standard best practice for avoiding timezone-related bugs. However, as you noted, the existing key-value layer uses naive `datetime` objects and `TIMESTAMP WITHOUT TIME ZONE` database columns. Applying this change in isolation would introduce a mismatch between the timezone-aware writer and the naive readers, potentially causing tokens to expire immediately or never, depending on the server's local time. Given that a proper migration would require updating the column type, all readers, and all writers simultaneously, your decision to defer this change is appropriate for this PR. -- This is an automated message from the Apache Git Service. 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