Thanks Dick, Nat and Brian for your work on this ID.  I have a couple
improvements I would like to discuss:

I would suggest replacing the "oauth_server_metadata_uri" link relation
with "oauth2-isser", and dropping the ".well-known" suffix from the value.
For example:

Link: <https://as.example.com>; rel="oauth2-issuer"

The rationale for this are two-fold:

1. It allows the discovery mechanism to be more flexible, or application
specific.  For instance, OpenID Connect discovery could be used and take
advantage of already deployed ".well-known/openid-configuration"
documents.  Applications could also take advantage of other discovery
mechanisms, either now (such as LRDD and WebFinger) or in the future.

2. It aligns the syntax (underscores vs dash) with
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wmills-oauth-lrdd-07
(which I also think should be revived as link relations).  Also, existing
conventions with registered link relations seem to prefer dashes rather
than underscores.

I would suggest replacing the "resource_uri" link relation with "canonical"
(RFC6596), which seems to fit the purpose and avoids registering a
potentially duplicative link relation value.

There is language in the draft requiring the client to check "host" values
between TLS certificates and link relation values.  This seems unnecessary
to me, for a couple reasons.

1. It unnecessarily constrains the logical organization of resources, which
may be hosted on multiple domains and yet have a canonical URL by which
other systems, including the authorization server, identify them.  Allowing
the canonical URL to differ from the host of the initial request will avoid
these limitations.

2. The resource server must ultimately do audience checking in order to
validate the access token.  I believe this accounts for all the security
considerations, and alleviates the burden from the client to do any
checking itself.

Jared Hanson
Auth0 Inc.

-- 
Jared Hanson <http://jaredhanson.net/>
_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

Reply via email to