Four comments.
First: What is the rationale for including the parameters as Link headers
rather than part of the WWW-Authenticate challenge, e.g.:
WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="example_realm",
scope="example_scope",
error=“invalid_token",
resource_uri="https://api.example.com/resource";,
oauth_server_metadata_uris="https://as.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
https://different-as.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server";
My understanding is that the RFC6750 auth-params are extensible (but not
currently part of any managed registry.)
One reason to go with this vs Link headers is CORS policy - exposing Link
headers to a remote client must be done all or nothing as part of the CORS
policy, and can’t be limited by the kind of link.
Second: (retaining link format) Is there a reason the metadata location is
specified the way it is? It seems like
<https://as.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server>;
rel=“oauth_server_metadata_uri"
should be
<https://as.example.com>; rel=“oauth_issuer"
OAuth defines the location of metadata under the .well-known endpoint as a
MUST. An extension of OAuth may choose from at least three different methods
for handling extensions beyond this:
1. Add additional keys to the oauth-authorization-server metadata
2. Add additional resources to .well-known for clients to supporting their
extensions to attempt to resolve, treating ‘regular’ OAuth as a fallback.
3. Define their own parameter, such as rel=“specialauth_issuer”, potentially
using a different mechanism for specifying metadata
Given all this, it seems appropriate to only support specifying of
metadata-supplying issuers, not metadata uris.
Third: I have doubts of the usefulness of resource_uri in parallel to both the
client requested URI and the Authorization “realm” parameter.
As currently defined, the client would be the one enforcing (or possibly
ignoring) static policy around resource URIs - that a resource URI is arbitrary
except in that it must match the host (and scheme/port?) of the requested URI.
The information on the requested URI by the client is not shared between the
client and AS for it to do its own policy verification. It would seem better to
send the client origin to the AS for it to do (potential) policy verification,
rather than relying on clients to implement it for them based on static spec
policy.
The name “resource URI” is also confusing, as I would expect it to be the URI
that was requested by the client. The purpose of this parameter is a bit
confusing, as it is only defined as “An OAuth 2.0 Resource Endpoint specified
in [RFC6750] section 3.2 - where the term doesn’t appear in 6750 and there does
not appear to be a section 3.2 ;-)
It seems that:
a. If the resource_uri is a direct match for the URI requested for the client,
it is redundant and should be dropped
(If the resource URI is *not* a direct match with the URI of the resource
requested by the client, it might need a better name).
b. If the resource URI is meant to provide a certain arbitrary grouping for
applying tokens within the origin of the resource server, what is its value
over the preexisting “ realm” parameter?
c. If the resource URI is meant to provide a way for an AS to allow resources
to be independent, identified entities on a single origin - I’m unsure how a
client would understand it is meant to treat these resource URIs as independent
entities (e.g. be sure not to send bearer tokens minted for resource /entity1
to /entity2, or for that matter prevent /entity1 from requesting tokens for
/entity2).
Admittedly based on not fully understanding the purpose of this parameter, it
seems to me there exists a simpler flow which better leverages the existing
Authentication mechanism of HTTP.
A request would fail due to an invalid or missing token for the realm at the
origin, and and the client would make a request to the issuer including the
origin of the requested resource as a parameter. Any other included parameters
specified by the WWW-Authenticate challenge understood by the client (such as
“scope”) would also be applied to this request.
Normal authorization grant flow would then happen (as this is the only grant
type supported by RFC6750). Once the access token is acquired by the client,
the client associates that token with the “realm” parameter given in the
initial challenge by the resource server origin. Likewise, the ‘aud’ of the
token as returned by a token introspection process would be the origin of the
resource server.
It seems any more complicated protected resource groupings on a resource server
would need a client to understand the structure of the resource server, and
thus fetch some sort of resource server metadata.
Fourth and finally: Is the intention to eventually recommend token binding
here? Token binding as a requirement across clients, resources, and the
authorization servers would isolate tokens to only being consumed within an
origin. This would actually make redundant/supplemental the AS additions
defined within this spec (resource/origin request parameter, ‘aud’
introspection response member)
-DW
> On Jun 12, 2018, at 1:28 PM, Dick Hardt <dick.ha...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Hey OAuth WG
>
> I have worked with Nat and Brian to merge our concepts and those are captured
> in the updated draft.
>
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hardt-oauth-distributed/
> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hardt-oauth-distributed/>
>
> We are hopeful the WG will adopt this draft as a WG document.
>
> Any comments and feedback are welcome!
>
> /Dick
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
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