Hi Brian,

thank you for your feedback.

I agree that the language is too strong here. What do you think about this new note?

Note: The "JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 (JARM)" [JARM] defines a mechanism that conveys all authorization response parameters in a JWT. This JWT contains an iss claim that provides the same protection if it is validated as described in Section 2.4. Therefore, an additional iss authorization response parameter as defined by this document MUST NOT be used when JARM is used.

Best regards,
Karsten

On 15.05.2021 00:35, Brian Campbell wrote:
Overall it looks pretty good to me.
One little nit is that I don't love this text from the end of sec 2.4 that talks about JARM:

'Note: The "JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 (JARM)" [JARM] forbids the use of additional parameters in the authorization response. Therefore, the iss parameter MUST NOT be used when JARM is used. However, JARM responses contain an iss claim that provides the same protection if it is validated as described in Section 2.4.'

JARM doesn't exactly forbid additional parameters but rather just wraps up all the authorization response parameters as claims in a JWT which is itself sent as a single form/query/fragment parameter. So really the iss authorization response parameter of this draft is still sent as a claim of the JARM JWT. It just happens to be the same as the iss claim value that JARM is already including.

On Sat, May 1, 2021 at 2:47 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

    All,

    We have not seen any comments on this document.
    Can you please review the document and provide feedback, or
    indicate that you have reviewed the document and have no concerns.

    Regards,
     Rifaat & Hannes


    On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 3:04 AM Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
    <[email protected]
    <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

        Hi all,

        the latest version of the security BCP references
        draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00 as a countermeasures to
        mix-up attacks.

        There have not been any concerns with the first WG draft
        version so far:
        https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/
        <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/>

        I would like to ask the WG if there are any comments on or
        concerns with the current draft version.

        Otherwise I hope we can move forward with the next steps and
        hopefully finish the draft before/with the security BCP.

        Best regards,
        Karsten

-- Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
        Senior IT Security Consultant
        Phone:  +49 (0)234 / 54456499
        Web:    https://hackmanit.de  <https://hackmanit.de>  | IT Security 
Consulting, Penetration Testing, Security Training

        Is your OAuth or OpenID Connect client vulnerable to the severe impacts 
of mix-up attacks? Learn how to protect your client in our latest blog post on 
single sign-on:
        
https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attacks
  
<https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attacks>

        Hackmanit GmbH
        Universitätsstraße 60 (Exzenterhaus)
        44789 Bochum

        Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
        Geschäftsführer: Prof. Dr. Jörg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj Somorovsky, 
Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz

        _______________________________________________
        OAuth mailing list
        [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
        https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
        <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>

    _______________________________________________
    OAuth mailing list
    [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
    https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
    <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>


/CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited.  If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments from your computer. Thank you./

--
Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
Senior IT Security Consultant
Phone:  +49 (0)234 / 54456499
Web:    https://hackmanit.de | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, 
Security Training

Möchten Sie sich für ein Projekt mit dem Thema Single Sign-On oder den 
Standards OAuth und OpenID Connect vertraut machen?
Dann melden Sie sich jetzt an für Ihre Einführung in Single Sign-On, OAuth und 
OpenID Connect am Mittwoch, 09.06.2021, von 10:00 - 14:30 Uhr!
https://www.hackmanit.de/de/schulungen/uebersicht/139-einfuehrung-in-single-sign-on-oauth-und-openid-connect

Hackmanit GmbH
Universitätsstraße 60 (Exzenterhaus)
44789 Bochum

Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
Geschäftsführer: Prof. Dr. Jörg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj Somorovsky, Dr. 
Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz

Attachment: OpenPGP_signature
Description: OpenPGP digital signature

_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

Reply via email to