Thanks Karsten, That's moving in the right direction. But I think the last sentence is still too strong and maybe prone to misunderstanding given it's not 100% obvious in the JARM case what exactly constitutes an authorization response parameter.
I'd say the last sentence could just be dropped altogether. Or maybe changed to something like this, "Therefore, an additional iss parameter outside the JWT is unneeded when JARM is used." On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 12:45 AM Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen < [email protected]> wrote: > Hi Brian, > > thank you for your feedback. > > I agree that the language is too strong here. What do you think about this > new note? > > Note: The "JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 (JARM)" > [JARM] defines a mechanism that conveys all authorization response > parameters in a JWT. This JWT contains an iss claim that provides the same > protection if it is validated as described in Section 2.4. Therefore, an > additional iss authorization response parameter as defined by this document > MUST NOT be used when JARM is used. > > Best regards, > Karsten > On 15.05.2021 00:35, Brian Campbell wrote: > > Overall it looks pretty good to me. > One little nit is that I don't love this text from the end of sec 2.4 that > talks about JARM: > > 'Note: The "JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 (JARM)" > [JARM] forbids the use of additional parameters in the authorization > response. Therefore, the iss parameter MUST NOT be used when JARM is used. > However, JARM responses contain an iss claim that provides the same > protection if it is validated as described in Section 2.4.' > > JARM doesn't exactly forbid additional parameters but rather just wraps up > all the authorization response parameters as claims in a JWT which is > itself sent as a single form/query/fragment parameter. So really the iss > authorization response parameter of this draft is still sent as a claim of > the JARM JWT. It just happens to be the same as the iss claim value that > JARM is already including. > > On Sat, May 1, 2021 at 2:47 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> All, >> >> We have not seen any comments on this document. >> Can you please review the document and provide feedback, or indicate that >> you have reviewed the document and have no concerns. >> >> Regards, >> Rifaat & Hannes >> >> >> On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 3:04 AM Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Hi all, >>> >>> the latest version of the security BCP references >>> draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00 as a countermeasures to mix-up attacks. >>> >>> There have not been any concerns with the first WG draft version so far: >>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/ >>> >>> I would like to ask the WG if there are any comments on or concerns with >>> the current draft version. >>> >>> Otherwise I hope we can move forward with the next steps and hopefully >>> finish the draft before/with the security BCP. >>> >>> Best regards, >>> Karsten >>> >>> -- >>> Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen >>> Senior IT Security Consultant >>> Phone: +49 (0)234 / 54456499 >>> Web: https://hackmanit.de | IT Security Consulting, Penetration >>> Testing, Security Training >>> >>> Is your OAuth or OpenID Connect client vulnerable to the severe impacts of >>> mix-up attacks? Learn how to protect your client in our latest blog post on >>> single >>> sign-on:https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attacks >>> >>> Hackmanit GmbH >>> Universitätsstraße 60 (Exzenterhaus) >>> 44789 Bochum >>> >>> Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896 >>> Geschäftsführer: Prof. Dr. Jörg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj Somorovsky, Dr. >>> Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> OAuth mailing list >>> [email protected] >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> [email protected] >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> > > *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and > privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). 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Thank you.* > > -- > Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen > Senior IT Security Consultant > Phone: +49 (0)234 / 54456499 > Web: https://hackmanit.de | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, > Security Training > > Möchten Sie sich für ein Projekt mit dem Thema Single Sign-On oder den > Standards OAuth und OpenID Connect vertraut machen? > Dann melden Sie sich jetzt an für Ihre Einführung in Single Sign-On, OAuth > und OpenID Connect am Mittwoch, 09.06.2021, von 10:00 - 14:30 > Uhr!https://www.hackmanit.de/de/schulungen/uebersicht/139-einfuehrung-in-single-sign-on-oauth-und-openid-connect > > Hackmanit GmbH > Universitätsstraße 60 (Exzenterhaus) > 44789 Bochum > > Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896 > Geschäftsführer: Prof. Dr. Jörg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj Somorovsky, Dr. > Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz > > -- _CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). 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