Hi Markus,

while I understand you anger: As long as extension are there you could add an 
additional spec describing how to use DID within SD-JWT VC. As we already have 
possible SDO for this I kindly ask you to contribute on the subject.

@Rifaat, @Hannes: Thanks for your work as chairs.

Best
Steffen

Von: Markus Sabadello <mar...@danubetech.com>
Gesendet: Montag, 15. September 2025 19:58
An: oauth@ietf.org
Betreff: [OAUTH-WG] Re: Call for WG Feedback on DID Resolution in SD-JWT VC


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On one of the relevant Github threads, 15 people agreed that removal was a bad 
idea:
https://github.com/oauth-wg/oauth-sd-jwt-vc/issues/250#issuecomment-2256016913

There are many other Github issues, comments, and PRs that also expressed 
disagreement with the removal.

Several people have stated on Github that removal would be a problem for their 
existing implementations.

In the previous attempt to remove DIDs, that removal had to be reverted after 
intervention by the chairs.

In this last PR which now removed DIDs, there were more -1 than +1 votes on 
Github.

In an earlier version of the specification, support for DID Resolution was 
mandatory; after much discussion, the WG consensus was to make it optional.

In the various discussions about this topic, multiple substantial arguments 
were articulated why the feature shouldn't be removed. None of those arguments 
were discussed in the WG.

In contrast, no real arguments have been brought forth why this (optional!) 
feature should be removed; instead, the arguments in favor of removal were 
"it's tiresome", "it's stuff that doesn't work anyway", "it's a reputational 
risk", "there were no real objections to removal other than DIDs are great", 
"you can define an extension", and "DIDs are not interoperable" (without really 
explaining or discussing this last claim).

The editor who has now removed the feature in his fifth attempt has in the past 
admitted to trying to prevent active WG discussion about this topic.

At the last IETF meeting, that same editor has given an extremely one-sided 
presentation about this controversial topic, with almost no time allowed for 
alternative arguments and discussion.

At least one of the people who are now supporting removal in this thread is 
supporting it "because there is no chance to win".

Silently removing a feature that many people didn't want to be removed, and 
then asking for agreement to the removal afterwards, is not an appropriate 
approach to handling such a situation.

The discussion culture around removal of this feature has been passive 
aggressive, provocative, dismissive, instead of substantial discussion about 
the pros and cons. The group pressure to remove this has been enormous.

Markus
On 9/13/25 1:53 AM, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef wrote:
All,

This is an official call for getting the WG’s opinion on the last open issue in 
draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-10 concerning the removal of the DID Document 
Resolution.

In an early version of the SD-JWT VC document, we had three Issuer-signed JWT 
Verification Key Validation techniques:

  1.  JWT VC Issuer Metadata
  2.  X509 based certificates
  3.  DID Document Resolution

Do you agree with the removal of the DID Document Resolution option from the SD 
JWT VC specification?

Please note that this does not prevent future extensions. Interested parties 
are free to define and publish an extension that adds DID Document Resolution 
support, if desired.

Please, reply on the mailing list with your preference by October 3rd.

Regards,
 Rifaat & Hannes



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