On Thu, 17 Mar 2005 17:01:50 -0500
Timothy Miller <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Thu, 17 Mar 2005 22:27:23 +0100, Attila Kinali <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > This is IMHO a no-issue. No unprivileged user space programm
> > should be able to insert anything directly into the graphic card w/o
> > the interception of a driver. Any priviledge checking and enforcing
> > has to be done in software as 1) it is impossible to forsee
> > how future OS will handle priviledges and 2) to keep the transistor
> > count down.
>
> The plan is to allow unpriveleged processes to do any evil thing they
> want, as long as it can't compromize system stability.
Interesting. But may i ask whether it is worth the
transistors spend on this ? It's far more easy to do
that in software in the driver instead of hardware (IMHO).
> With some
> clever use of mmap, we can restrict which pages of the graphics memory
> are visible to a process, but we're unlikely to be able to prevent the
> process from reading or clobbering someone else's windows. The key is
> that the process cannot lock up the engine or initiate arbitrary DMA,
> so there's no security/stability compromize.
An application clobbering or reading my windows is already a security
risk to me. Just think about an application showing sensitive
data on the monitor and an other user reading the displayed data.
Not a very nice prospect. If it isn't possible to shield
applications against each other, then i would leave this
feature as it might (and most likely will) turn into a bug.
Attila Kinali
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