All excellent information, and well reasoned.

However, I take issue with the 100% requirement for paper ballots.  It
is concievable that PKI infrastructure be used for a verifiable
electronic-only voting system...  Assuming every citizen had their own
key pair.

The situation would be analagous to GPG-encrypted e-mail...  albeit
with truckloads of extra security measures (some regulatory, some
electronic).

I'm not saying it would be easy...  just possible.

--tim

On 4/14/06, Jack Carroll <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>         Rather than try to recap everything I've been doing for the last
> year, let me point you to www.democracyfornewhampshire.com.  We have just
> succeeded in passing a law to permanently outlaw vote recording machines in
> New Hampshire.  Ballot counting machines are still allowed, but all recounts
> must be performed "without mechanical, electronic, or optical devices".
>         Our Secretary and Assistant Secretary of State are two of the top
> experts in the country on how to run an honest election, and the state
> legislators I've met are pretty knowledgable too.  Some central principles
> have become generally accepted after much discussion.
>         Two key ideas:
> 1.  A tamper-proof election requires durable paper ballots, which the voter
> can directly verify as a correct expression of the intended votes, before
> handing it in to the ballot box.  The election officials see the marks in
> the voter's own hand, without any possibility that some device might have
> corrupted them.
> 2.  Recounts can be conducted as many times as necessary, until everyone is
> satisfied that the result is correct.  New Hampshire election results are
> verifiable.  It's not enough that they're correct -- they're _provably_
> correct.
>
>         There's none of this baloney about a "voter-verifiable paper trail".
> There's the voter-marked ballot, and nothing else.  Keep it simple, keep it
> visible.
>         _Everything_ about New Hampshire elections is done in the plain
> sight of the public.  The statutes are extremely explicit about the
> procedures to be followed, to ensure ballot security while making everything
> public and verifiable.
>
>         Now, I think there's a place for open source software in ballot
> counting machines.  A provably correct ballot counting machine can save
> enough labor to justify solving the formidable problems involved.  But
> there's a lot more to it than just opening up the firmware source code to
> public verification.  For one thing, the hardware has to be provably
> correct, both at design time and at run time, otherwise correct firmware
> means nothing.
>         Here's how I'd go at it.
>         Start by putting a state regulatory agency in charge of approving
> standards and specifications for the design of vote recording machines.
> Harvest ideas from other regulatory agencies that approve safety-critical
> hardware and software, such as Underwriters Laboratories and the Federal
> Aviation Administration.  From UL 372 I'd take fail-safe design and formal
> Failure Mode Effects Analysis.  This means that every physically possible
> failure of any component must be either analyzed or tested, and formally
> shown to result in a safe condition -- which means that it can't cause
> an incorrect result without giving clear indication that it has failed.
> >From RTCA/DO-178 and RTCA/DO-254 I'd take structured engineering discipline,
> which is extremely painful to follow, but demonstrates exhaustive logical
> proof that the hardware logic and the firmware is free of errors.
>         Divide the development into clear phases.  First, the writing of
> regulatory rules and the adoption of standards and specifications.  Every
> decision the state regulators make must be done through rulemaking actions,
> which means publishing a public notice, allowing sufficient time for
> comments and testimony, and then making the decision.
>         Next, requirements capture.  Do surveys and hold hearings to
> determine the required functionality and features.
>         Then, compile and issue a design specification.  After that, invite
> bids from engineering firms for the design work, and issue contracts for
> design.
>         Now, here's the real key: the state board approves all Engineering
> Change Orders through its rulemaking process.  Before any drawing can be
> approved or revised, it must be put into the public record and published,
> and the board must announce the proposed ECO as a rulemaking action for
> public analysis and comment.  There must be _NOTHING_ in a piece of
> electoral equipment that is hidden from public knowledge and criticism.
> That principle is fundamental to squashing conspiracy theories.  Will that
> slow things down?  Oh, yeah.  It would probably add a couple of years before
> a full set of drawings would ever get signed off.  But we only need to get
> one design approved, and its service life would be measured in decades.
>         Only when a complete set of drawings has been approved after public
> hearings would the state invite bids to actually manufacture the hardware.
>         As for the firmware, its source code would also be in the public
> record and approved by state ECO, but it doesn't stop there.  The complete
> tool chain should also be open source, both source and executable, and the
> build process should be performed on isolated, state-owned computers.  The
> source and object code of everything would go into the public record, and be
> placed on line with the Secretary of State's electronic signature, so that
> anyone could perform the build process independently, and verify it.  The
> Secretary of State's office would distribute the executables as certified
> copies in the form of OTP EPROMs, which the machines would execute directly
> from the ROM socket so that there would be no possibility of internally
> stored copies doing something different from the official approved source
> code.  The EPROMs would bear handwritten signatures, certifying
> authenticity.  They would be delivered along with the ballots by trusted
> courier, with documented chain of custody.
>         The configuration file that sets up the machine for a particular
> election should reside in a separate OTP EPROM, so that executable code
> couldn't be tampered with.  It should be a plain text file, in a publicly
> documented format, with the original in the public record and a verifiable
> distribution procedure.
>         There's more, but you get the idea.
>
>         As for vote recording machines, the only justification I can see for
> one is to allow a blind voter to cast a ballot without taking an assistant
> into the voting booth (see RSA 656:20, if I remember the statute correctly).
>         Here's my reasoning: if we accept as an absolute requirement for
> election integrity that every vote must be recorded as human-readable marks
> on a durable paper ballot, and in no other form, then no device, no matter
> how complicated, can save either the voter or the election officials any
> time, compared to marking by hand with a pen.  And the pen is orders of
> magnitude cheaper and more reliable than any other device that could perform
> the same function.  Therefore, for any voter who can see the ballot,
> developing anything to replace the hand-held pen is an absolute waste of
> money and can only introduce possibilities for malfunction and tampering
> that otherwise would not exist.
>         Theoretically, a vote recording device might be considered for the
> exclusive use of blind voters.  However, once a ballot goes into the box,
> there is no possibility of detecting a recording error and recovering from
> it.  Therefore a device like that demands extreme reliability and resistance
> to tampering.  To guard against an undetected error, there should be a
> completely separate device to read the marked ballot back to any voter who
> can't see the marks.
>         It's apt to be horrendously expensive to develop, and the population
> needing it is very small.  The cost effectiveness is dubious, to put it
> mildly.  We in New Hampshire are notorious for insisting on thrifty and
> cost-effective use of our tax money.
>         But, maybe that problem could be solved without some complicated
> computer-controlled whizbang.  How about a molded plastic template to hold a
> ballot, with guide holes identified by Braille letters or numbers?  The
> voter would play spoken instructions on a common, off-the-shelf audio
> cassette recorder, which would identify candidates and propositions with
> particular guide holes.  The blind voter would then mark the paper ballot
> with a pen, the same as anyone else.
>
>         There's one place in all this for conventional open-source software
> running on off-the-shelf hardware, though.  An unofficial count.  This is my
> one original idea.
>         NH law provides for election inspectors from the opposing parties,
> who are part of the official ballot counting team.  They might be permitted
> to run the ballots through a privately owned scanner, for an unofficial
> count using hardware and software completely independent of the approved
> design.  It wouldn't be eligible to be certified as the official result, but
> it would serve as a quality control check on the counting process.  That
> gives the parties a rational way to decide when to spend the money for an
> official hand recount.  In effect, that wraps fault tolerance around the
> outside of the whole process.
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