It is unrelated to OGP.
This "backdoor" is about possibility to obtain a key to the lock set in
the hardware so one can program a locked device with new bitstream.
It is obtained by measuring the current consumption.
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sps32/sec_news.html
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sps32/AES_in_the_blink_draft.pdf
It is like guessing what letters you write, by looking at ink
consumption between letters. The common way to obfuscate that is to use
a fancy font / randomize the strokes... which is the "deliberately
unstable clock".
D.
On 05/29/2012 07:24 PM, Dieter BSD wrote:
So I'm skimming through
http://it.slashdot.org/story/12/05/28/1454222/backdoor-found-in-china-made-us-military-chip
and find:
"These secure FPGAs contain a heavily obfuscated hardware crypto-engine,
with lots of techniques to obstruct DPA (deliberately unstable clocks,"
Hmmm, I seem to remember there was some problem with an unstable clock
on OGD1.
And of course, open hardware provides a more secure environment
than closed hardware. If AMD/ATI or Nvidia has a security hole
(intentional or unintentional) in their hardware or closed driver,
what can the user do? This can be a selling point, not just to
the military, but to banking, and to *many* other applications.
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