I'm not sure which part this refers to.  For example, theRAD is a standard 
specification that
can be implemented in multiple technologies.

Thanks,

Dave
Thomas Clark writes:
 > Hi David,
 > 
 > Definitely a component to be included in the:
 > facility-facility-DataStore-Management
 > network. There are other candidates, i.e., want to avoid focusing on a
 > single technology.
 > 
 > -Thomas Clark
 > 
 > ----- Original Message -----
 > From: "David Forslund" <dwf at lanl.gov>
 > To: "Patrick Lefebvre" <patrick.lefebvre at psl.ap-hop-paris.fr>;
 > <openehr-technical at openehr.org>; "Thomas Beale" <thomas at 
 > deepthought.com.au>
 > Sent: Tuesday, May 06, 2003 11:29 PM
 > Subject: Re: openEHR security
 > 
 > 
 > > At 03:18 PM 5/6/2003 +0200, Patrick Lefebvre wrote:
 > > >Hi everyone,
 > > >
 > > >As Thomas & al. pointed, security addresses "a number of aspects",
 > > >including security policy (defining who does what), data safety, and how
 > > >security is ensured: so, including safety of the network, the application
 > > >architecture -including management of messages: asynchronous/EHRcom/XML,
 > > >or synchronous/CorbaMed/IDL-, the programs, and the platform.
 > >
 > > Just a minor comment here.  "CORBAmed" and thus CORBA deals with both
 > > asynchronous and synchronous "messaging".
 > > I would also second the comment by Tom Culpepper about a service which
 > goes
 > > a long way to mediate the security requirements in healthcare.
 > >
 > > Dave
 > >
 > > >Great.
 > > >
 > > >I agree with Gerard Freriks's considerations (legal, social control and
 > > >organisational aspects) but for now I only focus on the technical
 > > >specification.
 > > >
 > > >For now, I will focus on far restricted objectives.
 > > >One of EHRcom's startpoints is ENV 13606-1999, and we all want to ensure
 > > >ascending compatibility.
 > > >ENV13606 messages (part  3 : "distribution rules") describe access policy
 > > >in terms of objects ("Who", "When", "Where",etc.) whose instanciations
 > > >define the allowed access context to message objects.
 > > >
 > > >So, in the viewpoint of EHRcom release 1 in 2004,
 > > >* Will this (or such an) architecture be reused in EHRcom ?
 > > >* If no, will we have a tool to convert distribution rules into
 > > >corresponding archetypes ?
 > > >* If no, how is it planned to ensure ascending compatibility ?
 > > >
 > > >Another basic, technical, concrete security point is: ensuring data
 > > >(transmission + authoring) integrity in the message.
 > > >One solution proposed by ENV13606 was: systematic digital signature of
 > > >each transaction.
 > > >Will EHRcom reuse this mechanism ?
 > > >
 > > >One last point is: our deadline for a (definitive ? initial ?)
 > specification.
 > > >In EHRcom specs, what can we define for now as a stable 2004 milestone ?
 > > >
 > > >Maybe my questions are FAQs.
 > > >Thank you for your kind replies.
 > > >
 > > >-- Patrick Lefebvre
 > > >
 > > >-
 > > >If you have any questions about using this list,
 > > >please send a message to d.lloyd at openehr.org
 > >
 > > -
 > > If you have any questions about using this list,
 > > please send a message to d.lloyd at openehr.org
 > 
-
If you have any questions about using this list,
please send a message to d.lloyd at openehr.org

Reply via email to