Hi Tim,

Security policies are included as are implementation approaches.

Regards!

-Thomas Clark

Tim Churches wrote:

>On Wed, 2004-03-10 at 19:10, Thomas Clark wrote:
>  
>
>>Hi Tim,
>>
>>Might want to add:
>>
>>Computer Security Basics
>>http://www.oreilly.de/catalog/csb/toc.html
>>
>>IEEE; Compartmented Mode Workstation: Prototype Highlights
>>http://csdl.computer.org/comp/trans/ts/1990/06/e0608abs.htm
>>
>>CMU; Trusted Operating Systems
>>http://www.sei.cmu.edu/str/descriptions/trusted_body.html
>>
>>Operating System Security
>>http://www.cs.ucd.ie/staff/tahar/home/courses/4thyear/chapter4/ppframe.htm
>>
>> From Security protocols to System Security
>>http://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/2003/HPL-2003-147.html
>>
>>Trusted Computing Platforms
>>http://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/2002/HPL-2002-221.html
>>
>>ASPECT - a tool for checking protocol security
>>http://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/2002/HPL-2002-246.html
>>
>>Resilient Infrastructure for Network Security
>>http://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/2002/HPL-2002-273.html
>>
>>Security Infrastructure for A Web Service Based Resource Management  System
>>http://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/2002/HPL-2002-297.html
>>
>>Trusted Solaris Developers Guide
>>http://docs.sun.com/db/doc/805-8060?q=compartmented+mode+workstation
>>
>>Trusted Network Environment
>>http://www.tinfosol.com/lab/lab.html
>>
>>RFC 1825 - Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol
>>http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc1825.html
>>
>>RFC 1827 - IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
>>http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc1827.html
>>
>>Secure Trusted Operating System (STOS) Consortium
>>http://www.stosdarwin.org/
>>
>>The Blue Book
>>http://secinf.net/info/rainbow/tg29.txt
>>
>>UK Security Citations Bibliography
>>http://chacs.nrl.navy.mil/xtp1/uksecbib.html
>>    
>>
>
>All of those deal with security implementation issues i.e. how you
>achieve certain objectives. The BMA security policy sets out what those
>objectives ought to be. Defining the security objectives, which in turn
>ought be be informed by specific threat models, needs to be done before
>you can consider which security technologies are appropriate. But yes,
>most of those are appropriate.
>
>Tim c
>
>  
>
>>Regards!
>>
>>-Thomas Clark
>>
>>
>>Tim Churches wrote:
>>
>>    
>>
>>>On Tue, 2004-03-09 at 23:20, Thompson, Ken wrote:
>>> 
>>>
>>>      
>>>
>>>>2) A mechanism on the patient record itself that displays a list of all
>>>>users that have accessed the record (with date and time). This will probably
>>>>be made available to the patient at some point, so they will actually
>>>>provide a critical part of the checks and balances in the system.
>>>>   
>>>>
>>>>        
>>>>
>>>This is similar to the mechanisms envisaged under the "Consent and
>>>notification" secion of the now-famous BMA Security Policy, developed by
>>>Ross Anderson - see
>>>http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/policy11/policy11.html
>>>
>>>This is still the gold standard for EHR security policies, IMHO, yet
>>>most people I have met who are involved in EHR work and who know of it
>>>(curiously many seem ignorant of it) tend to dismiss it, not because the
>>>policies are unsound (although they do need minor tweaking here and
>>>there), but because implementing them is very difficult in practice - 
>>>particularly the multilateral as opposed to multilevel access control
>>>policy. In fact you need both, but of the two, the former is more
>>>important. In other words, role-based access control, where the "roles"
>>>are specific to each patient, as well as to each health professional.
>>>
>>>
>>> 
>>>
>>>      
>>>
>>-
>>If you have any questions about using this list,
>>please send a message to d.lloyd at openehr.org
>>    
>>


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