After discussion with Dr Dipak Kalra, we felt that the following would 
be of interest:

As part of the EHR developments at UCL we have been looking at 
appropriate ways of auditing user interactions with individual EHRs, as 
part of an overall security approach. For over a year our record server 
has kept an audit trail of each user access to or addition of data to 
any EHR. Through a helpful student project last summer (thanks to Asif 
Ali) we now also have a first prototype client and query service that 
permits an administrator to examine which users have accessed parts of 
an individual patient's record, which records a given user has 
accessed, or the general accesses that have occurred for any given 
archetype, within any date-time period. What we next need to do is to 
extend the client to support richer interrogation, and to examine again 
if we are retaining the most appropriate data items within the audit 
log. A further challenge is for us to explore the level of granularity 
at which to retain the audit information.

The biggest question in Dipak's mind is how best to "audit" the result 
of running a query in which many record components are extracted and 
examined (perhaps by an application) to determine if they fulfil the 
query criteria, but only a few are actually returned to the end user 
initiating the request. The record server might not "know" of the 
filtration taking place, since its interactions would only be with the 
application, and not the end-user.

On consideration of the recent discussion regarding the Harvard 
University experiments to display warning messages on the screens of 
clinicians, we have this facility to log user (whether users are 
clinicians or patients) access to EHRs; a work in progress project to 
develop a browser screen to access this data and display it is 
described above - please see:

  http://www.ehr.chime.ucl.ac.uk/docs/Ali,%20Asif%20(MSc%202003).pdf

The data which is persisted and the GUI is keyed to logging user 
access, primarily to ensure that patient episode information and 
treatment recording is exported in a way which promotes efficient 
patient care and clinician support, with the added value that records 
access is logged for scrutiny should it be necessary.

Best wishes,

Nathan

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