On Wed, 2007-08-22 at 16:11 -0700, Alan Wright wrote:
> Sorry we don't have that information and we are unlikely to
> be able to provide a definitive answer.  Some clients use
> only plain-text, some use cram-md5.  ndmpd supports multiple
> versions of the protocol and there are may be some older
> clients that use plain-text but newer revisions of those
> same clients use v4 and cram-md5.
 
I took a look at the ndmp protocol spec.  It looks like the NDMP v4 spec
allows a client to query the server for the list of supported
authentication algorithms.  But I was hoping to get data on actual
observed v4 client behavior when connecting to a server which did both.

(ndmp.org failed to let me download the v3 spec so I couldn't tell when
this showed up).

To summarize the state of this issue:

original proposal:
        plaintext and cram-md5 always enabled
        single secret used for both protocols.

my proposed change:
        separate secrets for each protocol; 
        - setting secret to null (default out of box config) disables
          protocol
        - allows best practice operation (never use same secret with
          multiple algorithms).
        - setting both secrets to the same value allows behavior like
          the original proposal if you really want that.

project team counterproposal:
        single secret value, and a second parameter listing enabled 
        protocols which use the single secret value.

I still don't like the counterproposal.  It's still built around a
really horrible idea (potentially using one secret with more than one
protocol/algorithm) which I don't want to see copied by other projects.
And I don't really think it's either more or less usable than my
suggested change.  

In particular, a big part of security usability is being transparent
about what's going on under the hood, and from that standpoint, having
separate per-protocol secrets makes it much more likely that the admin
setting policy is aware that there are meaningful differences in
security between v4 and earlier protocols. 

But the only even vaguely sensible security policy is to avoid pre-v4
clients and configure the server for md5-only, and in that configuration
(only) there's no practical difference.

So I'm torn.

                                        - Bill











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