> On Apr 14, 2018, at 3:32 PM, Richard Levitte <levi...@openssl.org> wrote: > > So regarding assumptions, there's only one assumption that I'm ready > to make: a program that worked correctly with libssl 1.1.0 and uses > its functionality as advertised should work the same with libssl > 1.1.1. Note that I'm not saying that this excludes new features > "under the hood", but in that case, those new features should work > transparently enough that a program doesn't need to be changed because > of them. Also, note again that I'm not talking about recompilation, > but the implicit relinking that is what happens when a shared library > is upgraded but keeps the same library version number (no "bump"). > (mind you, explicit relinking would make no different in this regard). > > Does anyone disagree with that assumption?
It must be possible to upgrade from 1.1.0 to 1.1.1 without source code changes, or relinking the program. From what you describe, it seems that source code changes might be needed to adapt to a TLS-1.3-capable library. That should not happen. > 1. There's the option of making the new release 1.2.0 instead of 1.1.1. > I think most of us aren't keen on this, but it has to be said. This does not address the issue of yet another compatibility break, with many distributions not yet done adopting 1.1.0. So I don't see that as a solution. > 2. Make TLSv1.2 the absolutely maximum TLS version available for > programs linked with libssl 1.1.0. This is what's done in this PR: > https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5945 > This makes sense insofar that it's safe, it works within the known > parameters for the library these programs were built for. > It also makes sense if we view TLSv1.3 as new functionality, and > new functionality is usually only available to those who > explicitely build their programs for the new library version. > TLSv1.3 is unusual in this sense because it's at least it great > part "under the hood", just no 100% transparently so. This should NOT be necessary. What it is about enabling TLS 1.3 that breaks existing code? Let's fix that. > 3. .... I dunno, please share ideas if you have them. We need to make sure that the introduction of TLS 1.3 is transparent, aside from occasionally leading to a connection that uses TLS 1.3. If all that's failing is our test-suite, which is too sensitive to the underlying implementation details, that's fine, not all the tests are designed to run cross-library. Will real applications run into any meaningful problems? While can artificially limit the max protocol in applications compiled for 1.1.0, I don't think that's a compelling design choice. We have support in 1.1.0 for min/max protocol, applications can use those controls explicitly. In any case in order of preference, I'd like to see: 1. Fix any issues so that it is safe to upgrade. 2. Make the library version 1.2 3. Hack the API to cap the protocol version based on compile-time maximum. -- -- Viktor. _______________________________________________ openssl-project mailing list firstname.lastname@example.org https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-project