> On Apr 17, 2018, at 2:15 PM, Richard Levitte <levi...@openssl.org> wrote: > > Depends on what "the best thing you know to do" is. In my mind, > simply refusing to run as before because the new kid in town didn't > like the environment (for example a cert that's perfectly valid for > TLSv1.2 but invalid for TLSv1.3) it ended up in isn't "the best thing > you know to do". > > But I get you, your idea of "the best thing you know to do" is to run > the newest protocol unconditionally unless the user / application says > otherwise, regardless of if it's at all possible given the environment > (like said cert).
If there were a non-negligible use of certificates that work with TLS 1.2, and that (implementation bugs aside) can't work with TLS 1.3, I'd support your position strongly. As it stands, I think you're right in principle, but not yet in practice. If we find no show-stopper issues, we should allow TLS 1.3 to happen. I'm far more concerned about lingering middle-box issues, than about some edge-case certificates... -- Viktor. _______________________________________________ openssl-project mailing list email@example.com https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-project