Hi, Here's the summary of the IRC meeting.
--- COMMUNITY MEETING Place: #openvpn-meeting on irc.freenode.net Date: Wed 19th February 2020 Time: 11:30 CET (10:30 UTC) Planned meeting topics for this meeting were here: <https://community.openvpn.net/openvpn/wiki/Topics-2020-02-19> Your local meeting time is easy to check from services such as <http://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock> SUMMARY dazo, lev, mattock, plaisthos and syzzer participated in this meeting. --- Dazo will try to get the ACKed (2.5) patches applied this week. -- Syzzer will review the "Warn about insecure ciphers also in init_key_type" patch from plaisthos. -- Discussed moving people away from --cipher bf-cbc. One option is to make --ncp-ciphers and --cipher aes-256-cbc the default via the openvpn-server@.service unit file, but that would break static key configurations unless we make an expection for them. -- Agreed that deprecating current static key implementation in OpenVPN 2.5 would be a reasonable thing to do. Later, in 2.6 or later it would probably be replaced by a new "static key" mode where certificates are used as static keys. This would allow a high degree of code reuse. -- Full chatlog attached
(12:35:02) lev__: meeting? (12:35:08) lev__: ping mattock (12:35:43) mattock: hi! (12:35:44) dazo: w00t! .... Even I managed to appear here in time :-P (12:36:07) mattock: I almost forgot, but fortunately I received a friendly beep from Pidgin :D (12:36:17) mattock: thanks to lev! (12:36:35) lev__: I am the one who beeps (12:36:35) mattock: so, cron2 probably won't make it today (12:36:39) mattock: indeed you are (12:38:34) mattock: so (12:38:38) syzzer: Short agenda today (12:38:48) syzzer: morning all :) (12:39:05) mattock: https://community.openvpn.net/openvpn/wiki/Topics-2020-02-19 (12:39:08) mattock: yes, a short one (12:39:30) mattock: topic #1: "OpenVPN 2.5. updates/planning" (12:39:35) mattock: I've seen tons of patches fly by (12:39:49) mattock: generally that indicates progress :) (12:40:45) mattock: anyone else besides cron2 who knows what is still missing? (12:41:15) dazo: plaisthos: you around? (12:41:45) dazo: I know plaisthos has been going through the devel-ml and picked up some missing patches as well (12:42:07) plaisthos: yepp (12:42:15) dazo: the struct argv patches are all ACKed, iirc (12:42:38) plaisthos: yeah and I think you also have the rights to commit them right? (12:43:25) dazo: Yeah, technically I do ... but since it's a long time since I've done it .... I don't know what else I'll break in the process .... (like an elephant in a glass store) (12:44:21) plaisthos: Was more thinking to get load off cron2 (12:44:41) dazo: I know ... I can try to take a stab at it this week (12:44:50) dazo: look at all acked patches and get them applied (12:45:32) plaisthos: syzzer: to make all the hyper active kids happy, I also implemnted chacha poly in openvpn3 ;) (12:45:49) syzzer: plaisthos: ah, nice! (12:45:55) mattock: :) (12:48:47) mattock: so dazo will attempt to get patches applied (12:48:58) mattock: anything else on 2.5? any blockers? (12:49:17) plaisthos: there is a still a few of my patches pending iirc (12:49:32) plaisthos: the async compress, warn if blowfish-cbc is in --cipher (12:50:14) mattock: pending as in "needs review"? (12:50:20) plaisthos: yes (12:50:22) syzzer: I'll check that last one (12:50:46) plaisthos: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH] Warn about insecure ciphers also in init_key_type (12:52:18) plaisthos: but we also need some plan forward to get rid of --cipher bf-cbc without forcing everyone to add cipher aes-256-gcm to their configs (12:54:53) dazo: Since Fedora 27-ish, I applied some --ncp-ciphers and --cipher aes-256-cbc (iirc) as the default via the openvpn-server@.service unit file ... no one has complained about that (12:55:12) dazo: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/New_default_cipher_in_OpenVPN (12:55:13) vpnHelper: Title: Changes/New default cipher in OpenVPN - Fedora Project Wiki (at fedoraproject.org) (12:55:46) dazo: oh, aes-256-gcm is the "default" with some more ciphers in ncp-ciphers (12:58:56) syzzer: dazo: thanks only works for tls-client / tls-server, not for static keys (12:59:10) syzzer: how do you handle configs with --secret ? (13:00:40) dazo: syzzer: right, you need a tls setup for this to work, indeed (13:02:20) syzzer: but I like this approach, we might just make 2.5 act like this by default (13:03:12) syzzer: that will break --secret configs. So we should consider whether we care enough to make en exception for --secret (fallback to BF-CBC, or use AES-256-CBC) (13:03:30) dazo: perhaps it's about time to deprecate static key tunnels? ... or that we "fix" the --secret key approach by deriving a pubkey out of it, and switch to TLS mode regardless? (13:05:07) syzzer: dazo: I think that last approach is too much magic, and hard to get right in a backwards-compatible way (13:05:16) dazo: yeah (13:05:28) dazo: and I do see some pitfalls though .... as you need to authenticate the remote end somehow, as there wouldn't be any CA involved (13:05:54) syzzer: we might deprecate static keys in 2.5 indeed (though not *remove* yet) (13:06:08) dazo: but having a simpler operation mode which replaces the static key without needing a full fledged PKI setup would be good (13:06:39) syzzer: dazo: that would be an ssh-like (or wireguard-like, if you want) mode (13:06:46) syzzer: where you just provide the pubkey of the other end (13:06:53) dazo: (and "replaces" as in, not needing to be compatible with static key) (13:07:00) dazo: yeah, exactly (13:07:21) mattock: mmm, so we'd have an openvpn that is "as easy as wireguard" (13:07:27) syzzer: let's postpone that to after 2.5 (13:07:30) mattock: +1 (13:07:36) dazo: yupp! (13:07:46) mattock: but deprecating static keys in 2.5 would be acceptable? (13:08:06) plaisthos: I think for deprecating them we should have the easy mode (13:08:14) syzzer: we should really involve cron2 in that discussion (13:08:14) plaisthos: so we have a good replacement (13:08:28) mattock: I can mention this on agenda so that cron2 and others can chime in (13:08:35) syzzer: mattock: +1 (13:08:58) syzzer: plaisthos: has a good point too, but let's discuss this further when cron2 can chime in :) (13:09:24) dazo: I think deprecating static mode is reasonable ... it is non-PFS capable, with devastating results if the shared key gets leaked ... meaning: capture the traffic and save it until you get a copy of the shared private key and you have the keys to the kingdom (13:09:27) plaisthos: even if the easy mode is just openvpn generates a self-signed cert and you put the public key of the other side in openvpn2 client/server config to make it very easy from implementation perspective (13:10:38) syzzer: plaisthos: interesting thought, that might actually already work right now (13:10:55) syzzer: just add the self-signed certificate from you peer as a CA (13:11:47) dazo: plaisthos: but it would be smoother from a user's perspective just include the remote end's finger print instead of a full certificate in the config (13:12:07) dazo: (similar to what --verify-x509 does today) (13:12:50) syzzer: plaisthos: my review should be on the list (13:13:05) plaisthos: syzzer: yeah. In the end users do not really care how it works on the hood as long as it is very easy to use (13:13:31) plaisthos: will do a rebased version real quick (13:14:19) plaisthos: but having this "use certificates as static keys" under the hood would avoid implementing some other static key mode (13:17:40) dazo: agreed, reusing as much as possible would be ideal (13:19:03) syzzer: I guess that was it for today? (13:21:50) dazo: seems so :) (13:22:52) mattock: yes (13:22:56) mattock: I'm busy writing the summary
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