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Thanks Nancy, Tom, et al,

I also checked with the TLS chairs and ADs[0], and Ben replied saying
that he feels it should be fine in OPSEC[1], but that it's probably
worth giving a heads-up to TLS if / when this approaches WGLC.

So, great - as I think I've already mentioned, I happen to think that
this is useful.

Thanks everyone,
W

[0]: It's really not good having WGs stepping on each other's toes,
and I hadn't been following this in TLS...
[1]: Seeing as Roman is an author, I'm gonna count that as implicit
support for it being here :-)




On Thu, Jun 11, 2020 at 4:14 AM tom petch <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> From: Nancy Cam-Winget (ncamwing) <[email protected]>
> Sent: 11 June 2020 03:30
>
> On 6/10/20, 5:42 AM, "OPSEC on behalf of Warren Kumari" 
> <[email protected] on behalf of [email protected]> wrote:
>
>     On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 6:18 AM tom petch <[email protected]> wrote:
>     > From: OPSEC <[email protected]> on behalf of Ron Bonica 
> <[email protected]>
>     > Sent: 05 June 2020 16:04
>     >
>     > Folks,
>     >
>     > This email begins a call for adoption on 
> draft-camwinget-opsec-ns-impact<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-camwinget-opsec-ns-impact/>.
>  The call for adoption will end on 6/19/2020.
>     >
>     > Support
>     >
>     > I would have liked this to be a TLS document but the fact that it is 
> not makes it even more important that it is adopted.
>
>     Actually, that raises an important point -- why is it *not* a TLS
>     document? Are we wading into deep waters here? Did TLS object to this
>     document, or just show no interest, or say "'tis a fine idea, but too
>     operational for here, vaya con dios"?
> [NCW] It is the latter, that is, it is more about the operational impacts of 
> network security.  When it was presented at the TLS WG,
> It was noted that the draft presented TLS use cases but from an operational 
> perspective and didn't fit with their current charter.
> There were suggestions that opsec could be a better fit.
>
> <tp>
> I track the discussions on the TLS list, saw the discussion there inter alia 
> and have a more jaundiced view.
> <rant>
> The TLS WG has many highly skilled, highly active proponents, more so than 
> any other IETF WG I know.  Its culture I see as perfect security no matter 
> what.  TLS 1.3 thus addresses all known problems no matter what.  If this 
> renders it unusable in places, too bad - perfect security cannot be 
> compromised.  This I-D says TLS 1.3 is not perfect in some settings so the 
> TLS WG would commit suicide before ever adopting it.  Which is a shame since 
> that is where the expertise lies and where any infelicities in the I-D might 
> be detected.  Shame, but that is how it is.
> </rant>
> Tom Petch
>
>     Can this CfA be CCed to the TLS WG so that we get more review?
>
>
>     W
>
>     >
>     > Tom Petch
>     >
>     >                                         Ron and Jen
>     >
>     >
>     > Juniper Business Use Only
>     >
>     > _______________________________________________
>     > OPSEC mailing list
>     > [email protected]
>     > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
>
>
>
>     --
>     I don't think the execution is relevant when it was obviously a bad
>     idea in the first place.
>     This is like putting rabid weasels in your pants, and later expressing
>     regret at having chosen those particular rabid weasels and that pair
>     of pants.
>        ---maf
>
>     _______________________________________________
>     OPSEC mailing list
>     [email protected]
>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
>
>


-- 
I don't think the execution is relevant when it was obviously a bad
idea in the first place.
This is like putting rabid weasels in your pants, and later expressing
regret at having chosen those particular rabid weasels and that pair
of pants.
   ---maf

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