Hi Arup, Remote OS authentication whether with OPS$ or not is still a risk. You are intimating that SYSTEM is the only risky account involved here. What if any of the newly created OPS$ accounts have useful privileges. I have seen a similar application to the one described recently. There were forms within the application for administration and user management (in oracle, not the application) and the users who had access to these were assigned the DBA role and were of course external accounts.
I think what you should add to your comment is that the issue is overrated is that any OPS$ / external accounts should not have any dangerous privileges granted and certainly not DBA. If you can guess the name of an admin account even if its OPS$ then the issue is still severe. cheers Pete -- Pete Finnigan email:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Web site: http://www.petefinnigan.com - Oracle security audit specialists Book:Oracle security step-by-step Guide - see http://store.sans.org for details. -- Please see the official ORACLE-L FAQ: http://www.orafaq.net -- Author: Pete Finnigan INET: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Fat City Network Services -- 858-538-5051 http://www.fatcity.com San Diego, California -- Mailing list and web hosting services --------------------------------------------------------------------- To REMOVE yourself from this mailing list, send an E-Mail message to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (note EXACT spelling of 'ListGuru') and in the message BODY, include a line containing: UNSUB ORACLE-L (or the name of mailing list you want to be removed from). You may also send the HELP command for other information (like subscribing).
