On 07/03/2012 15:02, danimoth wrote:
Il giorno mar, 06/03/2012 alle 16.34 +0000, Michael Rogers ha scritto:
If you're modelling a DHT as a game then who are the players, what are
the possible strategies, what are the payoffs, how much do the players
know about each other's strategies and payoffs, and what strategy do
you
want to encourage?
That's are the questions I'm asking to myself since first post, and
looking to other's work (if exists) applied to p2p networks maybe could
help me.
There's actually plenty of work on incentives to cooperation in P2P
systems that can actually interest you. The keywords to look for in
Google Scholar are probably "p2p incentives", "p2p reputation".
The papers about the topic that I like most are: "Incentives build
robustness in BitTorrent" by Bram Cohen (P2PEcon 2003) and "Sybilproof
reputation mechanisms" by Alice Cheng and Eric Friedman (P2PEcon 2005).
I wrote my Ph.D. thesis on incentives to cooperation in P2P, and you
might be interested in the Background chapter:
http://www.disi.unige.it/person/DellamicoM/research/phd-thesis.pdf
cheers!
matteo
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