On 07/03/12 14:02, danimoth wrote: > Il giorno mar, 06/03/2012 alle 16.34 +0000, Michael Rogers ha scritto: >> If you're modelling a DHT as a game then who are the players, what are >> the possible strategies, what are the payoffs, how much do the players >> know about each other's strategies and payoffs, and what strategy do >> you want to encourage? >> > That's are the questions I'm asking to myself since first post, and > looking to other's work (if exists) applied to p2p networks maybe could > help me.
It's been a while since I looked at this area, but apart from the papers Matteo mentioned you could try these: http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/econcs/pubs/podc04.pdf http://www.csl.mtu.edu/cs6461/www/Reading/Feldman04.pdf http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/isdal/papers/onehop_nsdi08.pdf There's a ton of other work on P2P incentive mechanisms out there, but I'm not sure how much of it deals specifically with DHTs. One large body of work focusses on persuading peers in BitTorrent-like systems to upload, another focusses on persuading peers in multi-hop networks to forward packets. In a DHT setting I guess you might be able to use the multi-hop work, and you might also need to consider the issue of persuading peers to store data, for which you could look at P2P backup systems: http://www.cs.rochester.edu/sosp2003/papers/p135-cox.pdf http://www.iptps.org/papers-2003/fair_sharing.pdf Cheers, Michael _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list [email protected] http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
