On 07/03/12 20:05, James A. Donald wrote: > If I understand the proposed system > http://www.ee.ucl.ac.uk/~mrio/papers/infocom09.pdf correctly: > > Every entity has a public key. > > Leechers issue IOUs to seeders. This creates a network of IOUs. The > pledgeroute software looks for ways to cancel out IOUs, thus honoring > them - for example Ann seeds Bob, Bob seeds Carol, and Carol seeds Ann. > > If your IOUs get cancelled out, your key gains reputation, causing your > IOUs to be valued. > > It is not clear to me how the sybil attack is avoided: Is it that you > only gain reputation with those benefiting from the cancellation?
If you consider a cluster of Sybils, the creator of the Sybils is free to create any structure of IOUs within the cluster, and any structure of IOUs from Sybils to non-Sybils. But IOUs from non-Sybils to Sybils can only be created by non-Sybils, and that only happens when the Sybils provide a service. No matter how many Sybils a person creates, the total debt owed to them by non-Sybils is limited by the total amount of service they provide. So there's no advantage in creating Sybils. It's not impossible - it's just pointless. I think that's how it works, anyway - it's been a while since I read the paper and I could be confusing it with the Sybilproof reputation mechanisms paper Matteo mentioned. Cheers, Michael _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list [email protected] http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
