Julian,
My point is that what's left for Reload payload is 1492-1292 = 200
bytes. Many Reload messages will have to be fragmented.
--Michael
jc wrote:
This is greater than the MTU of an xbox 360 but less than your averge
router at 1492. Doesn't DTLS in OpenSSL already have the real path MTU
after the handshake? If not I know it can do this for you. You can use
that MTU and fragment your packets.
Julian
Sent from my iPhone
On Sep 30, 2009, at 10:50 AM, Michael Chen <[email protected]>
wrote:
Julian,
I have no scientific data, just a personal concern. Consider a Reload
STORE request with your 691 byte cert, the total fat (non-payload) on
the wire for a UDP/DTLS transport is:
DTLS header (13 bytes)
Reload header
Forward header (38 bytes)
Destination list (18 bytes, single hop)
Reload Message
STORE (SIP_REGISTRATION)
AOR
RSA Signature (256 bytes)
Reload Security Block
Certificates (691 bytes)
Signer ID (20+ bytes)
RSA Signature (256 bytes)
DTSL MAC and padding (20+ bytes)
These are rough numbers, and it total 1292 bytes excluding the AOR.
It is very close to the 1500 byte network packet size (MTU).
--Michael
jc wrote:
On Sep 24, 2009, at 9:35 PM, Michael Chen wrote:
I also want to point out that even with the most simple encoding
(JDK keytool), a 1024 bit RSA public key certificate takes up 619
bytes. A production strength 2048 bit RSA cert is 880 bytes. If a
peer can only be reached via UDP, the overhead of DTLS + Reload
Signature on message leaves very little room for the relevant data
fragment (e.g. 1500 packet size), which means UDP transport may be
very inefficient. Transport overhead should be a separate
discussion thread.
In my RELOAD implementation a 2048 bit RSA public key is 691 bytes
long, see output below. Do you have statistics that show the current
fragmentation algorithm to be sub-optimal?
Julian
*
*
*Running 1 test case...*
*......................+++*
*........................+++*
*debug: RSA* junglecat::rsa::generate_key_pair(): Succeeded
generating RSA key.*
*..............................+++*
*..............+++*
*debug: RSA* junglecat::rsa::generate_key_pair(): Succeeded
generating RSA key.*
*debug: X509_NAME* junglecat::x509::allocate_common_name(const
char*): Allocated*
*debug: X509_NAME* junglecat::x509::allocate_common_name(const
char*): Allocated*
*debug: X509* junglecat::x509::generate_certificate(RSA*, RSA*,
const char*, const char*, unsigned int, const EVP_MD*): Success*
*Certificate:*
* Data:*
* Version: 3 (0x2)*
* Serial Number: 1253857645 (0x4abc596d)*
* Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption*
* Issuer: CN=common_name_issuer*
* Validity*
* Not Before: Sep 25 05:47:25 2009 GMT*
* Not After : Sep 25 06:47:25 2009 GMT*
* Subject: CN=common_name*
* Subject Public Key Info:*
* Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption*
* RSA Public Key: (2048 bit)*
* Modulus (2048 bit):*
* 00:ab:54:2c:7b:9a:d8:3c:4b:b8:08:46:04:ee:02:*
* 51:8a:94:4c:62:58:d0:ed:50:f8:2f:5a:43:b2:b0:*
* aa:1a:7c:46:32:ad:93:b3:80:1b:dd:62:d7:72:14:*
* aa:0e:43:7c:6b:00:a6:56:f3:62:ed:b5:d4:ff:c4:*
* da:72:6c:ff:8c:75:a2:8a:0c:e9:fb:9d:f0:f3:6f:*
* d8:65:1e:85:7b:7c:91:cc:b3:8a:eb:f7:ff:1d:c7:*
* e0:9f:e5:d3:e0:d4:23:3a:e9:0a:9c:be:f7:fc:44:*
* 59:3f:03:19:65:8c:fd:07:bd:40:c0:40:3c:04:8e:*
* 46:5c:13:1a:85:68:d8:48:01:f9:03:75:98:e9:1f:*
* a7:bb:d7:75:c7:dc:6b:3c:eb:6e:6c:ee:21:73:94:*
* 66:dd:d6:4a:13:79:7b:19:91:75:f8:14:0e:ba:dd:*
* 01:79:83:0e:3f:e1:9a:10:ea:98:cc:ae:d5:41:d7:*
* 2d:33:0e:ab:6c:be:49:d3:cd:dd:fe:f4:5e:0c:ef:*
* b8:cb:ae:bf:80:e4:cf:9e:66:86:42:2a:1c:3a:ca:*
* d0:d5:ab:ad:34:ba:eb:6e:2d:33:86:4e:29:e8:1b:*
* cb:ee:f4:d5:8f:2c:d1:f6:10:a6:84:4b:4f:05:2d:*
* 17:31:09:03:bd:9e:63:32:0f:14:ae:a6:0c:74:aa:*
* 0a:d3*
* Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)*
* Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption*
* 52:2a:cd:4d:f3:cc:c1:94:5e:5e:09:63:34:f6:fb:9b:c0:52:*
* dc:98:90:30:88:44:bd:f6:73:0a:e2:ed:6c:f1:bc:26:f0:d9:*
* 72:c0:a7:d1:79:85:8d:f1:eb:4c:cc:d1:b0:73:fa:8f:de:e1:*
* 81:9d:32:fa:c6:c3:eb:37:5e:7f:30:c6:7e:a2:34:e0:d1:9d:*
* af:a2:e7:00:59:68:eb:7c:f6:c1:6d:18:0e:f5:14:5e:cc:c9:*
* f2:07:f1:60:a3:b4:a3:28:89:23:93:ac:14:d4:1e:69:f5:c7:*
* b8:90:68:b7:f2:bc:70:6c:2b:7e:01:48:34:77:ae:67:b2:ff:*
* 0f:b7:15:c6:42:4c:9f:c6:dd:02:ed:06:9b:04:60:4a:74:52:*
* ee:03:29:0e:e3:75:62:07:92:a3:48:f6:a4:f5:bb:8c:09:b0:*
* cf:71:12:24:63:33:0f:9f:97:d4:ab:01:da:d7:d8:7f:c8:17:*
* 94:0e:70:03:7a:f0:5e:14:8b:ec:c8:11:d9:b4:b4:74:2c:4e:*
* 0c:56:35:c7:0f:b0:9e:6a:df:b2:63:68:3e:05:53:05:86:7c:*
* 45:82:a4:94:93:12:8e:b4:a2:0d:5f:29:d8:7d:52:d3:ab:8f:*
* d4:cf:6f:26:b7:36:f6:5f:a4:c7:64:da:a2:ec:da:74:3b:e5:*
* 8d:2a:7b:21*
*X509 structure size: 92*
*RSA structure size: 88*
len:691
**** No errors detected*
*
*
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