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http://snipurl.com/emlq Inquiry Finds Abuses at Guant�namo Bay ------------ http://snipurl.com/emlj What went wrong at Abu Ghraib by Janis Karpinski San Francisco Chronicle Thursday, April 7, 2005 As commander of prisons in Iraq, including Abu Ghraib, my experience with a significant piece of coalition operations attests to how a lack of planning screwed up the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq -- and what we must do to repair the image of the American soldier as a just and principled guardian of human rights. The occupation was derailed from the start by a profound lack of understanding of what was needed and for how long. Units operated as individual entities, minus guidance or policy. My units, like most in Iraq, did not have sufficient personnel or appropriate equipment to handle our missions. Although the majority of my soldiers were well trained in prisoner detention, they were not trained or equipped to sustain it in a combat zone. This situation was particularly significant in the reserves, because there was no personnel-replacement system for Army Reserve and National Guard units; when we lost a soldier to medical or other redeployment, we were forced to operate short. Brigade morale declined dramatically when soldiers were notified of the involuntary tour extensions. Soldiers who stepped up and deployed to war with their units did so with bad or false information and were forced to remain twice as long as they had planned, and felt a deep sense of betrayal. Reservists were given orders for 179-day deployments and planned accordingly for child care, bill paying, housing arrangements and family support. Soldiers lost complete trust in the "system" with the news of involuntary extensions of their orders to 365 days, without consideration of the dramatic impact such an extension has on reservists' families. At one point, a senior officer from the National Guard came to Baghdad to brief several of his units. He was sincere and practically apologetic for the tour extensions and erroneous information provided. He explained, "We never thought you were going to be deployed for anywhere near 179 days, let alone extended beyond your original orders. The situation," he continued, "was not one we anticipated." Against this backdrop of demoralized soldiers, the lack of planning elsewhere played out. Civil affairs and banking operations, critical to the success of an emerging democracy, were missing or simply dysfunctional. Prisons were relegated to second-class status. Our mission statement directed us to "coordinate with" the provost marshal and the Coalition Provisional Authority's Ministry of Justice personnel "to assist in repairing, restoring and refurbishing Iraqi prisons." When we arrived in Baghdad in mid-2003, the Prisons Department had just three of the 83 people required; the provost marshal dismissed detention operations as "the lowest priority on my list." The mission also directed my brigade to assist "in developing a training program for Iraqi security personnel, and with transitioning Iraqi prisons to Iraqi control." These missions were in addition to "continuing ... high-value detainee prisoner operations ... and constructing and operating a temporary prison camp at Abu Ghraib." The target for accomplishing these missions was only 90 days -- a totally unrealistic time frame. Nevertheless, my soldiers developed the entire Iraqi guard-training program and conducted training for the first three courses. We were responsible for 17 prisons located throughout Iraq, yet we accomplished far more with far less than any other separate brigade in the theater of operations. Still, something went terribly wrong. One year ago, the infamous photographs of Abu Ghraib were seen around the world. The Pentagon's investigation so far offers nothing new: no smoking gun, and not one individual up the chain of command is targeted for blame or a share of responsibility -- except me. In fact, the biggest outrage from Pentagon brass has not been over the techniques employed, but the audacity of soldiers taking photographs of the activities and the stupidity of appearing in them. Army Reserve Spc. Charles Graner Jr., tagged as the likely ringleader, was not so astute or familiar with the Arab culture to devise the humiliating acts and techniques demonstrated in the photographs. It is unlikely any military person designed or directed these photographs, because soldiers are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and can face prosecution. However, any one of the contract interrogators, immune from military prosecution, may have given instruction. We certainly know they were involved, because they appear in some of the photos. Despite the charges, Graner and the six other soldiers accused did not act without instructions from someone. We can safely conclude they were told to set up the photographs, which would be used to enhance interrogations at some future time. The soldiers were made to believe these actions were authorized by someone with a great deal of authority. The truth is finally emerging, contained in the thousands of pages of documents released under court order to the American Civil Liberties Union. These documents reveal knowledge of the "softening up" techniques at the senior levels of the Department of Defense -- and much earlier than originally reported. The documents reveal similar techniques used in interrogations at Guantanamo Bay, in Afghanistan and in other locations in Iraq, before the appearance of the Abu Ghraib photographs. A copy of Army Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez's signed document authorizing the use of a list of more aggressive interrogation techniques is available on the ACLU Web site (http://snipurl.com/drah). At the very least, this confirms that somebody much higher up in the chain of command authorized use of these techniques. Regardless of how far the investigation goes -- and whom it strikes down and whom it spares -- we must ensure that Abu Ghraib becomes a lesson and not standard operating procedure. We must: -- Admit mistakes. Appoint an independent committee similar to the Sept. 11 commission to conduct an investigation, assign responsibility, identify requisite changes, determine the origins of policies and problems, and define how to prevent further occurrences. -- Encourage whistleblowers to report infractions with absolute guarantees of protection from retribution. -- Earmark the return of prison operations to the host nation's control as the highest priority. The acceptance of responsibility by indigenous personnel for establishing and maintaining security throughout the host nation is critical. -- For interrogation operations, we must immediately develop one clear and consistent policy, defining appropriate interrogation techniques. The policy must be developed by an international committee and detail specific goals of each technique, provide instructions on using each and in what circumstances use is warranted and approved. Interrogations must never be conducted in isolation from observation. -- Do not use military or civilian police or security personnel to set the stage or enhance interrogations. Military personnel are appropriate for interrogation operations in conjunction with war. These interrogations must adhere to the Geneva Conventions and facilities must be accessible without notice, to an international committee, including several military members and Judge Advocate General (JAG) officers. The standards will be reviewed and enforced by an independent international committee with full access to every international interrogation facility conducting interrogations relative to the global war on terrorism. Each representative will have authority to interrupt or halt any interrogation when infractions are observed -- or immediately close a facility when infractions warrant it. -- Stop using contract interrogators, many of whom have no formal training. Immune from legal action or prosecution for violations, they clearly contributed to the situation at Abu Ghraib. As usual, in a rush to judgment, there were many mistakes, many false conclusions, and many people unfairly accused. We must clear the slates of American soldiers by applying fair and equal justice. Only then will we be able to reclaim our position as the standard bearer of justice, fairness and humane treatment for all. Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski commanded the 800th Military Police brigade in Iraq before being suspended pending the Abu Ghraib investigation. She is now writing a book on the episode, due out in 2005 from MiraMax. She will speak Friday at noon at the San Francisco Marriott. For more information, visit http://www.commonwealthclub.org _____________________________ Note: This message comes from the peace-justice-news e-mail mailing list of articles and commentaries about peace and social justice issues, activism, etc. If you do not regularly receive mailings from this list or have received this message as a forward from someone else and would like to be added to the list, send a blank e-mail with the subject "subscribe" to [EMAIL PROTECTED] or you can visit: http://lists.enabled.com/mailman/listinfo/peace-justice-news Go to that same web address to view the list's archives or to unsubscribe. 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