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Power Grid In Iraq Far From Fixed
New Government Inherits Huge Task

By Caryle Murphy and Bassam Sebti
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, May 1, 2005; A01

BAGHDAD -- When his lights and television go dark, as they regularly do,
Khalid Qasim Ali flips a switch in his living room to bring back the
power. This electricity is not state-supplied. Instead, it comes from a
generator three blocks away that is connected to Ali's home by a wire
strung in the air.

All told, 107 families in Baghdad's working-class neighborhood of Topchi
are hooked up to the generator. The arrangement gives them power during
the long blackouts that are routine in Iraq. It also darkens the skies
over Topchi with a tangled skein of unsightly, dangerous cables. Like
everyone else, Ali is billed by the ampere. He pays the generator's owner
around $10 a month.

"We should enjoy electricity without using a generator because Iraq is a
wealthy country," said Ali, a 65-year-old retired truck driver.
"Regretfully, the Americans did nothing since they came."

Thousands of roaring generators in Iraqi back yards, driveways and street
corners demonstrate that after two years and at least $1.2 billion, the
U.S. effort to resuscitate Iraq's electrical system is still very wide of
its mark. In fact, the national grid's average daily output of 4,000-4,200
megawatts falls below its prewar level of about 4,400 megawatts.

The shortage is a huge source of public anger and dissatisfaction, as seen
in a recent poll by the International Republican Institute, a U.S.-funded
nonprofit organization that promotes democracy. Asked what the
government's priorities should be, Iraqis put "inadequate electricity"
first, ahead of "crime," which was fourth, "the presence of coalition
forces," which ranked seventh, and "terrorists," which ranked eighth.

Nothing has done more to puncture Iraqis' once-widespread belief in
Americans' technological superiority and power than their inability to
quickly revive the power system, vital for Iraq's oil industry. And
perhaps nothing has frustrated U.S. reconstruction officials more than
that failure.

There are many reasons for the slow pace, from flawed planning by the U.S.
early on, to continuing sabotage by insurgents. In addition, with the
establishment of an interim government in June, U.S. officials said they
had to work more closely with Iraqi electricity officials who were not
always as efficient or as willing to take on responsibility as the
Americans had hoped.

Now, as Iraq's first democratically elected government assumes power, U.S.
officials insist they are only playing a supportive role in rebuilding
Iraq's electricity sector. The country's civilian leaders, they say, are
responsible for bringing reliable power to Iraq's 26 million people, a
task experts estimate will take years and require billions more dollars.

"It is the government of this country who is going to provide electricity.
The Americans don't provide electricity," William B. Taylor, director of
the U.S. Embassy's Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, said in an
interview. "The government is going to get the credit and they're taking
the responsibility, and they're doing a good job. They've got some
problems. We're helping them as much as we can. We got a lot of money
we're putting into this. And we have a lot at stake here. We want them to
succeed. We want them to be able to provide electricity to their people."

With a scorching summer approaching, Iraqi and U.S. officials are worried
about the shortage. A brisk consumer goods market has put more
refrigerators and air conditioners in Iraqi homes than ever, leading U.S.
officials to forecast that peak daily demand in the 100-degree days of
July and August could go up to 8,000 to 8,800 megawatts.

Although current output averages 4,000 to 4,200 megawatts, the level on
many days is lower because of unplanned outages or shutdowns for scheduled
maintenance. During the second week in April, for example, average output
was 3,517 megawatts, according to the Iraq Index, which is compiled by the
Brookings Institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy.

"I have concerns about this summer," said Rick Whitaker, who oversees
power-related projects in Iraq for the U.S. Agency for International
Development. Whitaker estimated that by midsummer, the national grid might
be able to produce "slightly less than 6,000 megawatts daily peak."

Electricity "is a huge issue in every province," said Mohammed Musabah,
governor of Iraq's southern city of Basra, where riots broke out in the
summer of 2003 to protest lengthy power cuts. Musabah gets a daily report
on power production and frequent visits from Maytham Wasfi, assistant
general director for power distribution for southern Iraq.

"We want people to understand," Wasfi said recently, "the situation of
electricity this summer is going to be worse than last summer."


'A Rusty Old Car'

American expertise, Iraqi ingenuity and U.S. taxpayer dollars were
supposed to have rapidly resurrected Iraq's electrical grid. What went
wrong?

Even before the U.S. invasion, Iraq's power system did not produce enough
power to meet demand, which ranged from 3,000 to 6,500 megawatts,
depending on the weather. Before March 2003, average output was 4,400
megawatts, according to the Brookings' Iraq Index.

Former president Saddam Hussein drained power from other parts of the
country to serve Baghdad. U.S. occupation authorities ordered that the
burden be equally shared, and the routine almost everywhere has been three
hours on, three hours off.

During the summer of 2003, U.S. officials spent about $230 million on
emergency repairs and brought grid production back to around 3,500
megawatts. In the fall, they launched a campaign to increase output to
4,400 megawatts by midwinter, concentrating on repairs and purchasing
spare parts. When that succeeded, they set a new goal: Reach 6,000
megawatts by June 1, 2004.

"The mantra was 'megawatts on the grid,' " recalled a senior U.S. Embassy
official involved in reconstruction who could not be identified under
embassy ground rules. "We didn't make it."

By this point, U.S. officials knew that they had initially failed to grasp
how fragile the network was. Decades of poor maintenance, the U.S. bombing
of Iraqi infrastructure in 1991, more than a dozen years of harsh economic
sanctions and postwar looting in 2003 contributed to a state of severe
dilapidation not fully recognized at first.

"It was like trying to restore a rusty old car on a farm some place," said
the embassy official. "You repair it when you really should have started
from scratch. But we didn't have the time or the money to do that."

It was a misjudgment that still bedevils the U.S. effort, according to the
latest report on U.S. reconstruction delivered to Congress in April. The
report said the "original estimate of the damage done to the basic
infrastructure from decades of neglect and warfare was significantly
underestimated," and as a result, "more time and resources are required to
stand-up and maintain systems than originally thought."

Another major drag on increasing the grid's output has been insufficient
fuel supplies. The favored fuels are either natural gas or diesel. But
because Iraq does not produce enough diesel and has little natural gas, it
has been substituting other fuels. The substitutes make generators less
efficient. State Department figures released in mid-April, for example,
indicate that nearly 1,000 megawatts are "currently offline in unplanned
outages" and that 341 of those are "due to insufficient fuel supplies."

But perhaps the biggest constraint has been the insurgency, which Whitaker
called "a big wet blanket that's thrown over the projects. It's a big
decelerator." In a dramatic example, a huge, German-made 260-megawatt
combustion turbine generator for Kirkuk power station sat in Jordan for at
least six months until U.S. military and civilian officials could organize
a convoy to bring it unscathed through insurgent territory.

"Security continues to be a destabilizing factor, leading to project
delays and cost increases," the recent update to Congress stated. Sabotage
to an oil line has delayed the addition of two combustion turbine units at
Baiji power station, it noted. And at the Baghdad South power plant, where
21 workdays were lost because of a mortar attack and the murder of two
Iraqi engineers, installation of two new generators will be delayed
several months.

The insurgency has also sharply raised security costs for U.S.
corporations working in the electrical sector. For example, an ongoing
project to install two huge generators at a power station in Kirkuk
involves 323 mostly foreign employees who live on-site. Of those workers,
141 provide security for the rest.

"Every month, costs were going up," the embassy official recalled. "And
we'd have weeks with no work getting done."

After U.S. occupation officials transferred political authority to an
Iraqi interim government in June, the U.S. Embassy's Iraq Reconstruction
Management Office took over the rebuilding effort from the Pentagon.

The relationship between U.S. and Iraqi officials then changed -- they
became more like consultant and client, as the embassy official put it.
And different kinds of problems surfaced, including "a general resistance
by some Ministry personnel to accept responsibility for managing and
operating power stations," said the recent report to Congress.

"There's an apathy within the plants," Whitaker said. "They haven't
grabbed it and said 'good.' "

Taylor and Whitaker blame the lethargy on years of working in a system in
which the fear of punishment reduced individual initiative. "When you made
a mistake under Saddam Hussein bad things happened to you," Taylor said.
"There was not an incentive . . . to take responsibility."

An Iraqi businessman, Khalid Baderkhan, whose firm manages electrical
construction projects, offered another explanation. Many ministry
employees, he said, are holdovers from the Hussein government who got
their jobs through patronage and see change as a threat. As products of a
state-run, socialist economy, he added, they lack modern management
skills, and do not appreciate the importance of costs, schedules and
quality control.

"As long as people in control of the ministries are the old guard who act
like mafias and are controlling all management and financial dealings," it
will be difficult to make headway in improving the power system, said
Baderkhan. "If they don't benefit" from a new project, he said, "they will
block it."

Reconstruction chief Taylor said poor information plagued the effort from
the start. "Everyone assumed that the plant and equipment just needed some
work." he said. "Well, it turns out it needs a lot of work. We assumed the
Iraqis could and would take care of it and that's proven to be a wrong
assumption."

U.S. officials moved millions of dollars designated for electricity
improvement to the Oil Ministry to facilitate projects needed by power
plants, such as improving a natural gas line from the southern oil fields.
But the Oil Ministry moved slowly or not at all on these projects, the
embassy official said.

There have also been "delays caused by the transition" to a new Iraqi
government, the report to Congress stated. In the three months since the
Jan. 30 election, construction projects, major new contracts and
government reorganization were put on hold until a new government was
formed.


Billions More Needed

During a review of U.S. reconstruction spending last year, about $1
billion was diverted to security programs from the $5.5 billion that
Congress had allocated for electricity improvement in late 2003.

Of the $4.3 billion still currently assigned to the electric sector, $961
million had been spent as of mid-April, according to the latest State
Department figures. With the $230 million spent on emergency repairs in
2003, the total outlay so far is at least $1.2 billion. Another $2.9
billion is currently under contract, the figures show.

Last year, a joint United Nations and World Bank study estimated that
restoring Iraq's power sector would cost $12 billion through 2007. That
will require international investment, which is likely only after drastic
improvement in security and legal reforms, experts say.

Despite their ubiquity, generators are beyond the family budget for
millions of Iraqis. "It is too much for a family with one breadwinner,"
said Um Abeer, who lives in Topchi with her brother and daughter in a tiny
house with cracked walls and, during a recent visit, no power.

"We are tired from just thinking of the coming summer," Um Abeer said,
adding, "I am confident that the new government will not listen to the
Americans and will start depending on the Iraqi experience to return the
power back."

Electrician Ahmed Abdul Sahib, however, said the Americans still have a
big role to play. "They occupied Iraq so they are responsible," said
Sahib, 43. "If they are making Iraq a model for democracy, they must make
things go well. Others will not welcome American democracy if they see
Iraq in this situation."


Correspondent Anthony Shadid contributed to this report.

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