Hugo, List: CSP: A *Sign*, or *Representamen*, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its *Object*, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its *Interpretant*, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. (CP 2.274, EP 2:272-3, 1903)
ET: However, it should be emphasized that these terms of First, Second and Third, do not refer to the modal categories but to the order of semiosic processing, where, as Peirce points out ... CSP: A *Representamen *is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate being termed its *Object*, and the possible Third Correlate being termed its *Interpretant*, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. (CP 2.242, EP 2:290, 1903) This is one of my many longstanding disagreements with Edwina about Peirce's "standard model." The two quotations from 1903 are directly parallel and *obviously *connected with his three categories, which are not *merely *"modes" in which signs, objects, and interpretants "operate"--more fundamentally, they are *phaneroscopic*. As he explains earlier in the second passage, "The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the simplest nature ... The Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most complex nature ... The Second Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of middling complexity" (CP 2.235-7, EP 2:290). Peirce realized within the next year or two that this results in any *one *sign (simplest) having *two *objects (middling complexity) and *three *interpretants (most complex), each of which--along with their external relations--can belong to any of the three *universes *(possible, existent, necessitant) that correspond to his categories. This leads to his ten-trichotomy, 66-class sign taxonomy of 1906-8. On the other hand, I agree with Edwina that the interpretant does not represent the *sign*, it represents the same *object* as the sign. That is precisely what both 1903 quotations conclude by saying, although I would add two qualifications--the *dynamical *object of the interpretant is not quite the same as the *dynamical* object of the sign, because it now *includes *the sign itself; and the *real *process of semiosis is *continuous*, such that we always *prescind *discrete signs with their discrete objects and interpretants from it as artifacts of analysis. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Jun 17, 2025 at 1:49 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Hugo, list > > Just a few points. > > 1] I agree with your differentiation between Barbieri’s mechanical code > hypothesis and the Peircean analytic framework within biosemiotics but I > think that Barbier’s domination in the biosemiotic field was due more to > his forceful personality than the validity of his theories in that field!! > I recall once, when we were arguing with him in a restaurant over his > theories - the waiter coming over to tell him that unless he could refrain > from shouting - we’d have to leave. Obviously- I don’t agree with his > mechanical view of biosemiosis. > > 2] I agree with you that the triadic semiosic can’t be reduced to > ‘representation’ [ which is more Saussurian semiology] than Peircean > semiosis. Because for Peirce, the triad is a transformative process and > above all, it is irreducible. You can’t separate the three relations which > is why I also explain them as a function. But there is another vital > alspect of semiosis - and that is the categories. That is- the correlates > operate as modal categories…and you can see their cognitive result in > Peire’s outline of the Ten Signs [ see various examples in 2.240 and on. > You provided the quotation, > > 3] A *Sign*, or *Representamen*, is a First which stands in such a > genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its *Object*, as to be > capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same > triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same > Object. (CP 2.274, 1902). > > However,it should be emphasized that these terms of First, Second and > Third,do not refer to th modal categories but to the order of semiosic > processing, where, as Peirce points out in 2.242, “A Representamen is the > First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate being termed > its object, and the possible Third correlate being termed its > Interpretant’. [ Note; this semiotic processing of input data from the > object via the Reprsentamen/mediation to the resultant output > meaning/Intepretant’ is NOT the same as the movement of the hard data from > the Dynamic Object through the Representamen through the Interpretant]. > > BUT - along with this semiotic triadic process, is the fact that these > correlates all operate within the modal categories - and, as we see > outlined in the TenClasses of Signs,[2.264] each correlate can operate in a > different modal category. BUT - it is vital to note that these are > restricted or constrained by the very nature of the modal category. That > is, a Reprentamen operating in a mode of Firstness,cannot logically or > informationally, produce an Interpretant in a mode of Thirdness! It simply > doesn’t have, in itself, the informational content to do so. And that is > why, in the ten classes,there is only ONE triad with a Representamen in a > mode of Firstness - and it only produces Interpretants in a mode of > Firstness. There are three classes with the Representamen in the mode of > Secondnesss - and they produce Interpretants in either Firstness or > Secondness. B ut of course, are incapable of produce an Interpretant in a > mode of Thirdness. There is only ONE class capable of this - the Argument > symbolic Legisign. > > 4] I agree with you about the external and internal objects and > interpretants..see his outline of the weather in 8.312]. > > 5] And I like your terms of ’source mediator and outcome. As I said - I > have used the terms of ‘input/mediation/output or function where f[X]=y for > over two decades. But I dont’ consider these new analyses of the Peircean > framework - just different terms for his analysis. > > 6] You wrote: "Therefore we must distinguish between the sign as it is > represented by the interpretant, the immediate sign, and the really > efficient sign in the mediation process, the dynamical sign.” > > I don’t see that the Representamen is ‘represented’ by the Interpretant.I > consider that the OBJECT, via the transformative process of the mediative > actions off teh Representamen,…produces the Interpretant..which > ‘represents’ the Object. > > 7] I have not had time read through your second part but from what I can > see,you are attempting to examine how, for example, habits [which are > located in the Representamen] emerge, develop and change. Habits, which > function in the categorical mode of Thridness, can develop as a result of > chance. [Firstness], repetition [Secondness] or..thought/Mind [ > Thirdness]. All of this is found in Peirce . > > Edwina >
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