Dear Jon Allan, You are making an apparent mistake regarding the concept of complexity. In fact, in the context of phenomenology, it has always been closely linked to universal categories from the very beginning, as can be seen as early as 1883:
*As to the three universal categories, as I call them, perhaps with no very good reason for thinking that they are more universal than the others, we first notice that Secondness and Thirdness are conceptions of complexity.* (CP 1.526) Firstness, given its monadic character, is the least complex, Thirdness the most complex, and Secondness is of intermediate complexity. Peirce uses precisely this ordering of complexities in the research he outlines in his fifth lecture at the Lowell Institute in November 1903. The corresponding manuscript (MS 540) begins with this sentence: “*The principles and analogies of Phenomenology enable us to describe, in a distant way, what the divisions of triadic relations must be*.” He goes on to apply these principles using the concept of nature, which encompasses and orders possible complexities. A priori, each of the correlates of a triadic relation is likely to belong to one of the three categories, in other words, to be more or less complex. In each of the 3 x 3 x 3 = 27 possible combinations of three abstract correlates, Peirce is therefore able to distinguish which is the least complex, i.e., the one whose nature is the simplest, which will be the First Correlate (CP 235). The Third Correlate is the most complex, which will be the one whose nature is the most complex (CP 236), and the remaining correlate is the Second Correlate (CP 2.237). He announces—without justification—the conclusion of his research: the ten classes of triadic relations. I will soon publish a chapter that details the path he took. I have entrusted the tedious combinatorial part to artificial intelligence, placing the reader in the position of a spectator of this construction, which should facilitate communication. The misinterpretation is therefore evident in your use of complexity when you write: “*Peirce realized within the next year or two that this results in any one sign (simplest) having two objects (middling complexity) and three interpretants (most complex), each of which—along with their external relations—can belong to any of the three universes (possible, existent, necessitating) that correspond to his categories.”* The fact that there are two objects and three interpretants in this new approach to semiotics, with one sign, two objects, and three interpretants, may appear to be a complication of the triadic model. Still, in itself*, it *is a notion completely foreign to the previous one. The proof is that you rightly consider that each of these six objects can be affected by a “phenomenological nature” (which will be six degrees), which, as in the triadic case, leads to a reduction in the number of valid signs—to 28 classes instead of 729—a result that I have long systematized by other means. Best regards, Robert Marty Honorary Professor; PhD Mathematics; PhD Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* Le mer. 18 juin 2025 à 00:04, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> a écrit : > Hugo, List: > > CSP: A *Sign*, or *Representamen*, is a First which stands in such a > genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its *Object*, as to be > capable of determining a Third, called its *Interpretant*, to assume the > same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same > Object. (CP 2.274, EP 2:272-3, 1903) > > > ET: However, it should be emphasized that these terms of First, Second and > Third, do not refer to the modal categories but to the order of semiosic > processing, where, as Peirce points out ... > > CSP: A *Representamen *is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the > Second Correlate being termed its *Object*, and the possible Third > Correlate being termed its *Interpretant*, by which triadic relation the > possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same > triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. > (CP 2.242, EP 2:290, 1903) > > > This is one of my many longstanding disagreements with Edwina about > Peirce's "standard model." The two quotations from 1903 are directly > parallel and *obviously *connected with his three categories, which are > not *merely *"modes" in which signs, objects, and interpretants > "operate"--more fundamentally, they are *phaneroscopic*. As he explains > earlier in the second passage, "The First Correlate is that one of the > three which is regarded as of the simplest nature ... The Third Correlate > is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most complex nature > ... The Second Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of > middling complexity" (CP 2.235-7, EP 2:290). Peirce realized within the > next year or two that this results in any *one *sign (simplest) having *two > *objects (middling complexity) and *three *interpretants (most complex), > each of which--along with their external relations--can belong to any of > the three *universes *(possible, existent, necessitant) that correspond > to his categories. This leads to his ten-trichotomy, 66-class sign taxonomy > of 1906-8. > > On the other hand, I agree with Edwina that the interpretant does not > represent the *sign*, it represents the same *object* as the sign. That > is precisely what both 1903 quotations conclude by saying, although I would > add two qualifications--the *dynamical *object of the interpretant is not > quite the same as the *dynamical* object of the sign, because it now *includes > *the sign itself; and the *real *process of semiosis is *continuous*, > such that we always *prescind *discrete signs with their discrete objects > and interpretants from it as artifacts of analysis. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Tue, Jun 17, 2025 at 1:49 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Hugo, list >> >> Just a few points. >> >> 1] I agree with your differentiation between Barbieri’s mechanical code >> hypothesis and the Peircean analytic framework within biosemiotics but I >> think that Barbier’s domination in the biosemiotic field was due more to >> his forceful personality than the validity of his theories in that field!! >> I recall once, when we were arguing with him in a restaurant over his >> theories - the waiter coming over to tell him that unless he could refrain >> from shouting - we’d have to leave. Obviously- I don’t agree with his >> mechanical view of biosemiosis. >> >> 2] I agree with you that the triadic semiosic can’t be reduced to >> ‘representation’ [ which is more Saussurian semiology] than Peircean >> semiosis. Because for Peirce, the triad is a transformative process and >> above all, it is irreducible. You can’t separate the three relations which >> is why I also explain them as a function. But there is another vital >> alspect of semiosis - and that is the categories. That is- the correlates >> operate as modal categories…and you can see their cognitive result in >> Peire’s outline of the Ten Signs [ see various examples in 2.240 and on. >> You provided the quotation, >> >> 3] A *Sign*, or *Representamen*, is a First which stands in such a >> genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its *Object*, as to be >> capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same >> triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same >> Object. (CP 2.274, 1902). >> >> However,it should be emphasized that these terms of First, Second and >> Third,do not refer to th modal categories but to the order of semiosic >> processing, where, as Peirce points out in 2.242, “A Representamen is the >> First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate being termed >> its object, and the possible Third correlate being termed its >> Interpretant’. [ Note; this semiotic processing of input data from the >> object via the Reprsentamen/mediation to the resultant output >> meaning/Intepretant’ is NOT the same as the movement of the hard data from >> the Dynamic Object through the Representamen through the Interpretant]. >> >> BUT - along with this semiotic triadic process, is the fact that these >> correlates all operate within the modal categories - and, as we see >> outlined in the TenClasses of Signs,[2.264] each correlate can operate in a >> different modal category. BUT - it is vital to note that these are >> restricted or constrained by the very nature of the modal category. That >> is, a Reprentamen operating in a mode of Firstness,cannot logically or >> informationally, produce an Interpretant in a mode of Thirdness! It simply >> doesn’t have, in itself, the informational content to do so. And that is >> why, in the ten classes,there is only ONE triad with a Representamen in a >> mode of Firstness - and it only produces Interpretants in a mode of >> Firstness. There are three classes with the Representamen in the mode of >> Secondnesss - and they produce Interpretants in either Firstness or >> Secondness. B ut of course, are incapable of produce an Interpretant in a >> mode of Thirdness. There is only ONE class capable of this - the Argument >> symbolic Legisign. >> >> 4] I agree with you about the external and internal objects and >> interpretants..see his outline of the weather in 8.312]. >> >> 5] And I like your terms of ’source mediator and outcome. As I said - I >> have used the terms of ‘input/mediation/output or function where f[X]=y for >> over two decades. But I dont’ consider these new analyses of the Peircean >> framework - just different terms for his analysis. >> >> 6] You wrote: "Therefore we must distinguish between the sign as it is >> represented by the interpretant, the immediate sign, and the really >> efficient sign in the mediation process, the dynamical sign.” >> >> I don’t see that the Representamen is ‘represented’ by the Interpretant.I >> consider that the OBJECT, via the transformative process of the mediative >> actions off teh Representamen,…produces the Interpretant..which >> ‘represents’ the Object. >> >> 7] I have not had time read through your second part but from what I can >> see,you are attempting to examine how, for example, habits [which are >> located in the Representamen] emerge, develop and change. Habits, which >> function in the categorical mode of Thridness, can develop as a result of >> chance. [Firstness], repetition [Secondness] or..thought/Mind [ >> Thirdness]. All of this is found in Peirce . >> >> Edwina >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
