Jack: Okay, understood. Full disclosure, I am very familiar with Peirce (of course) but hardly at all with Kant or Hume, so simply referring to their requirements and definitions will mean little or nothing to me--please spell them out, especially for "noumenal."
I typically summarize Peirce's verbal definition of "real" as that which is as it is regardless of what any individual mind or finite group of minds thinks about it, and quote his metaphysical definition of "exist" as "react with the other like things in the environment" (CP 6.495, c. 1906). "Existence, then, is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely determinate" (CP 6.349, 1902). The upshot for Peirce as a self-described "scholastic realist of a somewhat extreme stripe" (CP 5.479, 1907) is that whatever exists (2ns) is real, but there are realities that do not exist--both real possibilities (1ns) and real generals (3ns). Is all that consistent with how you are using these terms? Thanks, Jon On Tue, Jun 24, 2025 at 3:51 PM Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > John, > > It's because it's a very tough audience that I'm going to take my time > here. A day or so. If I rush it, and it criticizes, Peirce, then one > mistake and it's all thrown out (and I know you and others here — peer > review system — will understand that: especially when unorthodox, it has to > be basically flawless). > > It's not me trying to cryptic it's just the only way it can be done. > > I will narrow noumenal for you: I mean it is genuinely apriori (beyond > experience).* I do not deviate from Kant's immediate requirements (nor > Hume's — if proof accepted) for what constitutes a metaphysical proof by > narrowing to more or less the strict definition Kant uses in response to > Hume in the first instance. I do use it more strictly than Kant, that is, I > mean beyond all possible experience and so, as you note, the it's a very > high standard especially when I wish to use "real" (not diverging from > Peirce much at all there) and also try to recontextualize it beyond the > dynamic object or any other classification. > > *First, concerning the sources of metaphysical cognition, it already lies > in the concept of metaphysics that they cannot be empirical. The principles > of such cognition (which include not only its fundamental propositions or > basic principles, but also its fundamental concepts) must therefore never > be taken from experience; for the cognition is supposed to be not physical > but metaphysical, i.e., *lying beyond experience.). * > > Best > > Jack > ------------------------------ > *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> on > behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Tuesday, June 24, 2025 8:28 PM > *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Necessity of the Noumenal (was Modeling and > finalizing Peirce's semiotics with AI, Part 1) > > Jack, List: > > Could you at least go ahead and provide your precise definition of > "noumenal" and the exact formulation of your conclusion about it? I do not > mind waiting for the premisses and other details, but getting that much > right away--the bottom line, so to speak--would be appreciated. > > Fair warning, demonstrating that Peirce's dynamical object is "absolutely > incorrect and fraught with actual inconsistencies" will be a very hard sell > on an e-mail list called Peirce-L. > > Thanks, > > Jon > > On Tue, Jun 24, 2025 at 2:10 PM Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > > Jon, List, > > Thank you for the clarity. I will do as you ask (straight-forward > deductive in accordance with classical propositional logic). > > No, not published as it is yet except internally. The only reason for this > is that it is indeed momentous (I have entailed what is true in Hume and > proven Kant's primary thesis and demonstrated how and why — so not nothing) > and when you have something like that you take your time (as Kant said > after reading Hume, that he'd be back in a few months and returned about a > decade later with the Critique). > > I've had to include the likes of Tarski/Godel and others within frameworks > where not one contradiction emerges — successively. It is very close to > publication but again it's ready when it's ready — the solution, if you > want to call it that, is such that I'm not exactly worried if someone else > wants to claim it because it can only be done one way (and I have it on > record for years). More than accommodate Godel and Tarksi, I've explained > them (the origin of their theories in necessary logical form). This, as I > hope you understand, takes a lot of time. Years. > > Anyway, happy to share. But in advance, I have to do some work here > because I recall the last time this happened someone cited Peirce's dynamic > object which is absolutely incorrect and fraught with actual > inconsistencies which require logical explication in full context. > > So, I appreciate your interest, and challenge, I add, and shall reply to > you/list as soon as is possible. > > Thanks. > > ------------------------------ > *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> on > behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Tuesday, June 24, 2025 8:01 PM > *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Necessity of the Noumenal (was Modeling and > finalizing Peirce's semiotics with AI, Part 1) > > Jack, List: > > Again, precise definitions of your terms are needed up-front, including > "noumenal" and now "real" (why the scare quotes?) as well as "exist." > > I was hoping for a straightforward deductive argumentation in accordance > with classical propositional logic. If that is not possible, then I suggest > choosing one of the standard systems of modal propositional logic, but that > will introduce debatable premisses from the get-go, such as the nature of > the accessibility relation. Requiring anything more sophisticated than that > will further reduce the likelihood that your argument will turn out to be > perspicuous and persuasive. > > I assume that you have published such a momentous result in a > peer-reviewed book or journal. Maybe the first step is simply providing a > link to that. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Tue, Jun 24, 2025 at 12:28 PM Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > > John, List, > > I appreciate your reply. Well, Peirce has a good description and he calls > this the "real". Now, he makes a mistake when he says the noumenal is > nonsense (or words to that effect) for my proof necessitates that the > "real" can only exist (and does in absentia of all formalism I might add, > but I do not say Peirce did not know this either) insofar as you admit the > noumenal and this is beyond all possible experience (precisely as Kant > said). It is genuinely Apriori and is an inferred necessity. > > I'd rather ask you for the precise terms you want the proof in. The style > of logic (consistent/para-modal/etc) and so on rather than present one > which will be dismissed for some formal flaw. It's best that way. I have it > in many different "languages". It is flexible so I can accommodate you > here. You set the formal rules, explicitly, if you could (I ask a lot here > maybe), and I'll return the good faith with a proof in that language/style. > > Best > > Jack > > PS: the "real" is apriori (and I find Peirce most sensible when he does > agree with Kant, at that stage in his life where admits that something like > the noumenal must exist, before he later goes back upon it — if my > chronology is correct). > > ------------------------------ > *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> on > behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Tuesday, June 24, 2025 6:19 PM > *To:* [email protected] <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling and finalizing Peirce's semiotics with > AI, Part 1. > > Jack, List: > > JRKC: I think it close to impossible to demonstrate the necessity of a > triad > > > On the contrary, Robert Burch wrote an entire book to present his proof of > Peirce's reduction thesis ( > https://books.google.com/books/about/A_Peircean_Reduction_Thesis.html?id=MK-EAAAAIAAJ) > and provides a very brief summary in his online SEP entry about Peirce ( > https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce/#red), while Sergiy > Koshkin purports to demonstrate it even more rigorously in a recent > *Transactions > *paper (https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/3/article/886447). Personally, I find > Peirce's own diagrammatic demonstration to be simple and persuasive > enough--relations of any adicity can be built up of triads, but triads > cannot be built up of monads or dyads despite *involving *them (EP 2:364, > 1905). > > [image: image.png] > > JRKC: I can prove the necessity of that Kant calls the Noumenal apriori > > > You have made this ambitious claim here before. What precise definition > are you using for "the Noumenal"? In other words, please spell out exactly > what you believe that you have proved, preferably as a complete deductive > argumentation with carefully formulated premisses and the conclusion that > (allegedly) follows necessarily from them. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Tue, Jun 24, 2025 at 10:11 AM Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > > List, Robert > > Thanks for the link to your paper. > > I have to say, and this may go down like a lead balloon, but to be truly > apriori, insofar as I am certain Kant and Hume use this term consistent > with what it ought to mean, in that it be "independent of experience", then > you must make provision for results which are not restricted to the > triadic. That is, I think it close to impossible to demonstrate the > necessity of a triad, which to me, is an arbitrary schema in all geometry > and sciences, regardless of qualitative distinction surrounding it which I > do understand (Peirce and so forth — it is not arbitrary for Peirce and he > makes his arguments as everyone knows). > > I'd be interested to know if you can prove the necessity of retaining the > triad and qualify "independent of experience" (I cannot). I can prove the > necessity of that Kant calls the Noumenal apriori and it is one of the few > things which is truly apriori (I'm hard pressed to think of a second, in > fact). > >
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