Jon, List,
Thank you, Jon! "S, S-O, S-I" I had taken from the signs- classification table: Sign, S-O-relation, S-I-relation. That in Entitative Graphs the blank page would denote "false", stands at "HandWiki" in the internet, which often does not tell the truth, I should know. I put your post in my email archive to read it again more closely. Thank you again for your thorough and enlighting answer!
Now I have a new idea, I have had it before, but now I have refined it, I hope. It is about causality, which does occur in the actual thread. Additionally to efficient and final causation I propose volitional or exemplaric causation. I prefer "volitional", because "exemplaric causation" does Aristotelianly exist, and means something more specific (religious) than that what I mean. I have already posted, that i think efficient c. applies to the universe, final c. to an organism´s species, and volitional c. (I wrote "voluntary c.") to an individual nervous system.
Starting point is the assumption, that causations are real, and inferences are reflected, but both are related with each other, like something at its depiction in a mirror. There are three kinds of inference, so there too should be three kinds of causation. i first cite the three kinds of inference (citation from somewhere off the internet (I still don´t know better)):
-------------------------
"
Here is Peirce’s own example (2.623)
DEDUCTION
Rule. — All the beans from this bag are white.
Case. — These beans are from this bag.
∴ Result. — These beans are white.
INDUCTION
Case. — These beans are from this bag.
Result. — These beans are white.
∴ Rule. — All the beans from this bag are white
HYPOTHESIS
Rule. — All the beans from this bag are white.
Result. — These beans are white.
∴ Case. — These beans are from this bag.
"--------------------------
Now, I interchange the two premisses in "hypothesis" aka abduction, firstly, because now the order from deduction to induction to abduction is always taking the top line, and putting it at the bottom (I like that), secondly, because it fits now to what comes afterwards.
--------------------------
Rule. — All the beans from this bag are white.
Case. — These beans are from this bag.
∴ Result. — These beans are white.
INDUCTION
Case. — These beans are from this bag.
Result. — These beans are white.
∴ Rule. — All the beans from this bag are white
HYPOTHESIS
Result. — These beans are white.
Rule. — All the beans from this bag are white.
∴ Case. — These beans are from this bag.
-------------------------
Now I do the same with causalities:
-------------------------
EFFICIENT CAUSALITY
Rule. - Masses attract each other
Case. - There are two masses in space
Result. - These masses move towards each other
FINAL CAUSALITY
Case. - An Amoeba is thirsty
Result. - By some molecular mechanism, water is let in through its membrane
Rule. - When you are thirsty, you need water
VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY
Result. - I (child) wish to get a bobby car next christmas
Rule. - If you wish something for christmas, you have to put it on your wish list
Case. - I did so, and got a bobby car
------------------------
So, maybe causalities are triadic too, but often quite degenerate, maybe.
Best regards, Helmut
23. Juli 2025 um 19:24
"Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]>
wrote:Helmut, List:
The three dyadic relations that are involved in the genuine triadic relation of representing or (more generally) mediating are not S, S-O, and S-I. The first trichotomy in Peirce's initial taxonomies for classifying signs (qualisign/sinsign/legisign) is not according to any dyadic relation, it is according to the nature of the sign as a correlate in itself (EP 2:291, 1903; CP 8.334, SS 32, 1904 Oct 12); and in his later taxonomies (tone/token/type), it is according to the sign's own mode of being, apprehension, or presentation (EP 2:480-3, 1908 Dec 23-24). The third dyadic relation is, in fact, O-I; but there is no separate trichotomy for it in any of Peirce's taxonomies, presumably because it is always the same as the S-O relation.
CSP: A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. (CP 2.274, EP 2:272-3, 1903)CSP: A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. (CP 2.242, EP 2:290, 1903)
As for "distinction," Peirce famously identifies three varieties in "On a New List of Categories" (CP 1.545-67, EP 1:1-10, 1867).
CSP: The terms "precision" [later "prescission"] and "abstraction," which were formerly applied to every kind of separation, are now limited, not merely to mental separation, but to that which arises from attention to one element and neglect of the other. Exclusive attention consists in a definite conception or supposition of one part of an object, without any supposition of the other. Abstraction or precision ought to be carefully distinguished from two other modes of mental separation, which may be termed discrimination and dissociation. Discrimination has to do merely with the senses of terms, and only draws a distinction in meaning. Dissociation is that separation which, in the absence of a constant association, is permitted by the law of association of images. It is the consciousness of one thing, without the necessary simultaneous consciousness of the other. Abstraction or precision, therefore, supposes a greater separation than discrimination, but a less separation than dissociation. Thus I can discriminate red from blue, space from color, and color from space, but not red from color. I can prescind red from blue, and space from color (as is manifest from the fact that I actually believe there is an uncolored space between my face and the wall); but I cannot prescind color from space, nor red from color. I can dissociate red from blue, but not space from color, color from space, nor red from color. (CP 1.549, EP 1:2-3)
Existential and entitative graphs are diagrammatic systems for representing propositions and their logical relations, and the blank page represents the continuum of true propositions in both. The rule for converting from one to the other in accordance with De Morgan's laws is to enclose each subgraph in a cut and then enclose the entire graph in another cut. When we do this on the blank page, we obtain an empty double cut, which can be scribed or erased in any area in either system, leaving us once again with the blank page. Scribing subgraphs A and B on the blank page iconically asserts "(A and B) is true" in existential graphs, but instead asserts "either A or B or (A and B) is true" in entitative graphs. As I understand it, the latter system is fully isomorphic with Spencer-Brown's laws of form; and Peirce himself says that existential graphs are about composition, specifically of concepts and ideas as well as terms, propositions, and arguments.
CSP: A mystery, or paradox, has always overhung the question of the Composition of Concepts. Namely, if two concepts, A and B, are to be compounded, their composition would seem to be necessarily a third ingredient, Concept C, and the same difficulty will arise as to the Composition of A and C. But the Method of Existential Graphs solves this riddle instantly by showing that, as far as propositions go, and it must evidently be the same with Terms and Arguments, there is but one general way in which their Composition can possibly take place; namely, each component must be indeterminate in some respect or another; and in their composition each determines the other. On the recto this is obvious: "Some man is rich" is composed of "Something is a man" and "something is rich," and the two somethings merely explain each other's vagueness in a measure. Two simultaneous independent assertions are still connected in the same manner; for each is in itself vague as to the Universe or the "Province" in which its truth lies, and the two somewhat define each other in this respect. The composition of a Conditional Proposition is to be explained in the same way. The Antecedent is a Sign which is Indefinite as to its Interpretant; the Consequent is a Sign which is Indefinite as to its Object. They supply each the other's lack. Of course, the explanation of the structure of the Conditional gives the explanation of negation; for the negative is simply that from whose Truth it would be true to say that anything you please would follow de inesse. (CP 4.572, 1906)
CSP: The System of Existential Graphs recognizes but one mode of combination of ideas, that by which two indefinite propositions define, or rather partially define, each other on the recto and by which two general propositions mutually limit each other upon the verso; or, in a unitary formula, by which two indeterminate propositions mutually determine each other in a measure. (CP 4.583, 1906)
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
On Sat, Jul 19, 2025 at 5:19 PM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote:
Gary, Jon, List,You have agreed about a lot of things, and I too think, that your positions are not contradicting each other: The prescinded sign is only a correlate is true, even tautological, as prescission is treating it by thought as a correlate, for analytical purpose. That the real sign (not the prescinded one) is inseparable from object and interpretant, is of course also true.In the triad, the sign plays, other than e.g. the object, the central role, on one hand, because the (prescinded) dyads are S, S-O, S-I, and not e.g. S-O, O-I, I-S (I think like in the Ogden-Richards-model), and on the other hand, because the sign has real (not only prescinded) properties, that make it discernable from its environment. It is noticeable, even for people who don´t understand it as a sign, while an object might be e.g. a place in empty space, as I wrote sometime before. So, if something (the triad or the interpretant) reenters somewhere, the target of this reentry would be the sign, and not e.g. the object, I believe.What bothers me about Spencer-Brown`s "distinction" is, that I doubt, that "distinction" is a common type. You can distinguish kinds or parts. Both is very different (see Stanley N. Salthe´s paper "Salthe 12 Axiomathes"). So you can distinguish (at least) two kinds of distinction. Wikipedia says, that Laws of Form is isomorphic with Entitative graphs. I guess then it would be isomorphic with Existential graphs too, because the rules for calculation are the same. In Existential graphs the blank page denotes "truth" (I propose "all" would do , for not merely talking about propositions, but elements in general), so a distinction there is that of a kind of truth, or something taken out from "all", a classification. In Entitative graphs the blank page denotes "false" (I propose "nothing"). So something- with or without a cut around- is an artifact, an added element, not a kind of "false", but a put-in part. And a variable without a cut around it is already a distinction, while with Spencer-Brown a distinction comes only with a "cross". So I suspect, Entitative graphs and Laws of Form are not isomorphic. Entitative and Existential graphs are, but the former are about composition, "Or", synthesis, and the latter about classification, "And", specification, analysis.Best regards, Helmut
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