Hi Helmut, Are you aware of the work of Louis Kauffman? His works on Peirce and Spencer-Brown are impressive. I am swamped and can’t enter the discussion. I searched for Kauffman's name and this came up in a file on Varela and autopoesis.
Best wishes, Mary > On Jul 23, 2025, at 2:54 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > > Jon, List, > > Thank you, Jon! "S, S-O, S-I" I had taken from the signs- classification > table: Sign, S-O-relation, S-I-relation. That in Entitative Graphs the blank > page would denote "false", stands at "HandWiki" in the internet, which often > does not tell the truth, I should know. I put your post in my email archive > to read it again more closely. Thank you again for your thorough and > enlighting answer! > > Now I have a new idea, I have had it before, but now I have refined it, I > hope. It is about causality, which does occur in the actual thread. > Additionally to efficient and final causation I propose volitional or > exemplaric causation. I prefer "volitional", because "exemplaric causation" > does Aristotelianly exist, and means something more specific (religious) than > that what I mean. I have already posted, that i think efficient c. applies to > the universe, final c. to an organism´s species, and volitional c. (I wrote > "voluntary c.") to an individual nervous system. > > Starting point is the assumption, that causations are real, and inferences > are reflected, but both are related with each other, like something at its > depiction in a mirror. There are three kinds of inference, so there too > should be three kinds of causation. i first cite the three kinds of inference > (citation from somewhere off the internet (I still don´t know better)): > ------------------------- > " > Here is Peirce’s own example (2.623) > DEDUCTION > Rule. — All the beans from this bag are white. > Case. — These beans are from this bag. > ∴ Result. — These beans are white. > INDUCTION > Case. — These beans are from this bag. > Result. — These beans are white. > ∴ Rule. — All the beans from this bag are white > HYPOTHESIS > Rule. — All the beans from this bag are white. > Result. — These beans are white. > ∴ Case. — These beans are from this bag. > "-------------------------- > Now, I interchange the two premisses in "hypothesis" aka abduction, firstly, > because now the order from deduction to induction to abduction is always > taking the top line, and putting it at the bottom (I like that), secondly, > because it fits now to what comes afterwards. > -------------------------- > Rule. — All the beans from this bag are white. > Case. — These beans are from this bag. > ∴ Result. — These beans are white. > INDUCTION > Case. — These beans are from this bag. > Result. — These beans are white. > ∴ Rule. — All the beans from this bag are white > HYPOTHESIS > Result. — These beans are white. > Rule. — All the beans from this bag are white. > ∴ Case. — These beans are from this bag. > ------------------------- > Now I do the same with causalities: > ------------------------- > EFFICIENT CAUSALITY > Rule. - Masses attract each other > Case. - There are two masses in space > Result. - These masses move towards each other > > FINAL CAUSALITY > Case. - An Amoeba is thirsty > Result. - By some molecular mechanism, water is let in through its membrane > Rule. - When you are thirsty, you need water > > VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY > Result. - I (child) wish to get a bobby car next christmas > Rule. - If you wish something for christmas, you have to put it on your wish > list > Case. - I did so, and got a bobby car > ------------------------ > So, maybe causalities are triadic too, but often quite degenerate, maybe. > > Best regards, Helmut > > > 23. Juli 2025 um 19:24 > "Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]> > wrote: > Helmut, List: > > The three dyadic relations that are involved in the genuine triadic relation > of representing or (more generally) mediating are not S, S-O, and S-I. The > first trichotomy in Peirce's initial taxonomies for classifying signs > (qualisign/sinsign/legisign) is not according to any dyadic relation, it is > according to the nature of the sign as a correlate in itself (EP 2:291, 1903; > CP 8.334, SS 32, 1904 Oct 12); and in his later taxonomies (tone/token/type), > it is according to the sign's own mode of being, apprehension, or > presentation (EP 2:480-3, 1908 Dec 23-24). The third dyadic relation is, in > fact, O-I; but there is no separate trichotomy for it in any of Peirce's > taxonomies, presumably because it is always the same as the S-O relation. > > CSP: A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine > triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of > determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic > relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. (CP > 2.274, EP 2:272-3, 1903) > > CSP: A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second > Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate being > termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant > is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the > same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. (CP 2.242, EP 2:290, 1903) > > As for "distinction," Peirce famously identifies three varieties in "On a New > List of Categories" (CP 1.545-67, EP 1:1-10, 1867). > > CSP: The terms "precision" [later "prescission"] and "abstraction," which > were formerly applied to every kind of separation, are now limited, not > merely to mental separation, but to that which arises from attention to one > element and neglect of the other. Exclusive attention consists in a definite > conception or supposition of one part of an object, without any supposition > of the other. Abstraction or precision ought to be carefully distinguished > from two other modes of mental separation, which may be termed discrimination > and dissociation. Discrimination has to do merely with the senses of terms, > and only draws a distinction in meaning. Dissociation is that separation > which, in the absence of a constant association, is permitted by the law of > association of images. It is the consciousness of one thing, without the > necessary simultaneous consciousness of the other. Abstraction or precision, > therefore, supposes a greater separation than discrimination, but a less > separation than dissociation. Thus I can discriminate red from blue, space > from color, and color from space, but not red from color. I can prescind red > from blue, and space from color (as is manifest from the fact that I actually > believe there is an uncolored space between my face and the wall); but I > cannot prescind color from space, nor red from color. I can dissociate red > from blue, but not space from color, color from space, nor red from color. > (CP 1.549, EP 1:2-3) > > Existential and entitative graphs are diagrammatic systems for representing > propositions and their logical relations, and the blank page represents the > continuum of true propositions in both. The rule for converting from one to > the other in accordance with De Morgan's laws is to enclose each subgraph in > a cut and then enclose the entire graph in another cut. When we do this on > the blank page, we obtain an empty double cut, which can be scribed or erased > in any area in either system, leaving us once again with the blank page. > Scribing subgraphs A and B on the blank page iconically asserts "(A and B) is > true" in existential graphs, but instead asserts "either A or B or (A and B) > is true" in entitative graphs. As I understand it, the latter system is fully > isomorphic with Spencer-Brown's laws of form; and Peirce himself says that > existential graphs are about composition, specifically of concepts and ideas > as well as terms, propositions, and arguments. > > CSP: A mystery, or paradox, has always overhung the question of the > Composition of Concepts. Namely, if two concepts, A and B, are to be > compounded, their composition would seem to be necessarily a third > ingredient, Concept C, and the same difficulty will arise as to the > Composition of A and C. But the Method of Existential Graphs solves this > riddle instantly by showing that, as far as propositions go, and it must > evidently be the same with Terms and Arguments, there is but one general way > in which their Composition can possibly take place; namely, each component > must be indeterminate in some respect or another; and in their composition > each determines the other. On the recto this is obvious: "Some man is rich" > is composed of "Something is a man" and "something is rich," and the two > somethings merely explain each other's vagueness in a measure. Two > simultaneous independent assertions are still connected in the same manner; > for each is in itself vague as to the Universe or the "Province" in which its > truth lies, and the two somewhat define each other in this respect. The > composition of a Conditional Proposition is to be explained in the same way. > The Antecedent is a Sign which is Indefinite as to its Interpretant; the > Consequent is a Sign which is Indefinite as to its Object. They supply each > the other's lack. Of course, the explanation of the structure of the > Conditional gives the explanation of negation; for the negative is simply > that from whose Truth it would be true to say that anything you please would > follow de inesse. (CP 4.572, 1906) > > CSP: The System of Existential Graphs recognizes but one mode of combination > of ideas, that by which two indefinite propositions define, or rather > partially define, each other on the recto and by which two general > propositions mutually limit each other upon the verso; or, in a unitary > formula, by which two indeterminate propositions mutually determine each > other in a measure. (CP 4.583, 1906) > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > On Sat, Jul 19, 2025 at 5:19 PM Helmut Raulien <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> Gary, Jon, List, >> >> You have agreed about a lot of things, and I too think, that your positions >> are not contradicting each other: The prescinded sign is only a correlate is >> true, even tautological, as prescission is treating it by thought as a >> correlate, for analytical purpose. That the real sign (not the prescinded >> one) is inseparable from object and interpretant, is of course also true. >> >> In the triad, the sign plays, other than e.g. the object, the central role, >> on one hand, because the (prescinded) dyads are S, S-O, S-I, and not e.g. >> S-O, O-I, I-S (I think like in the Ogden-Richards-model), and on the other >> hand, because the sign has real (not only prescinded) properties, that make >> it discernable from its environment. It is noticeable, even for people who >> don´t understand it as a sign, while an object might be e.g. a place in >> empty space, as I wrote sometime before. So, if something (the triad or the >> interpretant) reenters somewhere, the target of this reentry would be the >> sign, and not e.g. the object, I believe. >> >> What bothers me about Spencer-Brown`s "distinction" is, that I doubt, that >> "distinction" is a common type. You can distinguish kinds or parts. Both is >> very different (see Stanley N. Salthe´s paper "Salthe 12 Axiomathes"). So >> you can distinguish (at least) two kinds of distinction. Wikipedia says, >> that Laws of Form is isomorphic with Entitative graphs. I guess then it >> would be isomorphic with Existential graphs too, because the rules for >> calculation are the same. In Existential graphs the blank page denotes >> "truth" (I propose "all" would do , for not merely talking about >> propositions, but elements in general), so a distinction there is that of a >> kind of truth, or something taken out from "all", a classification. In >> Entitative graphs the blank page denotes "false" (I propose "nothing"). So >> something- with or without a cut around- is an artifact, an added element, >> not a kind of "false", but a put-in part. And a variable without a cut >> around it is already a distinction, while with Spencer-Brown a distinction >> comes only with a "cross". So I suspect, Entitative graphs and Laws of Form >> are not isomorphic. Entitative and Existential graphs are, but the former >> are about composition, "Or", synthesis, and the latter about classification, >> "And", specification, analysis. >> >> Best regards, Helmut > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com > <https://cspeirce.com/> and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com > <https://www.cspeirce.com/> . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY > ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► > PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with > UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the > body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
