Jon, Ivar, Gary F, Helmut, List, You asked what I considered to be 'the critical matter' in consideration of your post to which Gary F initially responded. As I see it, it is whether the top-down approach makes sense from any other than an omniscient perspective, a theosemiotic one, that is, a God's eye point of view.
And even from that perspective there appear to me to be some questions. For example, does the statement that “There is but one *individual*, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the "all of reality,” include the clearly very real* evolutionary tendencies* of the cosmos? Wouldn't chance come into play -- and not only in past cosmic (and biologic, intellectual, etc.) evolution, but in the ongoing evolution of the cosmos? Such a "completely determinate state of things" would appear to contradict not only the role of chance in evolution, but perhaps cosmic evolution itself. How, in other words, can one argue that evolution is "completely determinate"? I assume that you'll address Ivar's "possible contradiction." You claim that 'everything is a sign' and that the whole universe is a sign (top-down) and, further, that the whole is prior to its parts. But Ivar suggested that while it may be ontologically possible to argue this, can't the parts be logically prior to the whole? For a simple example, a conceived possible conclusion of my current post may by chance -- or otherwise, say, by design -- be interrupted, changed to move in an entirely different direction. The future's not for us mere mortals to know. Only an omniscient Mind could know the whole unfolding of the cosmos, and to me that suggests a kind of 'cosmic determinism' (although that's not quite the right phrase; but neither is 'omniscience') entirely different from the mechanical one. But again, how can one argue that evolution in the cosmos is "completely determinate"? Further, if “There is but one *individual*, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the all of reality,” why did Peirce also write that “our knowledge is never absolute but always swims, as it were, *in a continuum of uncertainty and of indeterminacy*. *Now the doctrine of continuity is that all things so swim in continua*” (emphasis added)? So, not only "our knowledge" but "*all things* so swim in continua.” So, all signs swim in continua? Further, you argue that signs are not parts but the pattern of the whole: Anything that exists can function as a sign’s object and so is “of the nature of a sign.” But since signs are* determined* by their objects as well as *determining* their interpretants, they must themselves be *determinable*, i.e. they are not “completely determinate.” How then can they be included in “the all of reality”? As I recall, your argument involves seeing God as the Object of the entire Semiosic Universe. You say with Peirce that "The entire universe is *perfused* by signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" and, further, that its unfolding is a lawful, triadic, continuous process. But if real laws exist independently of human minds, then they demand an explanation. One classical answer is that such a structure implies a rational law giver. But since Peirce argues that laws themselves can evolve (and evolution includes chance -- chance 'sporting' in biological evolution), what could be the role of a rational law giver, viz., God? How would both lawfulness come into being and laws themselves evolve? Again, you reject the pansemiotic idea, that “everything is a sign” bottom-up, in favor of a top-down “semiosic synechism” where the *whole* is a sign. This would seem to make the universe a kind of grand semiotic unity which we can try to read (through science, etc.) as if it were a book, the universe appearing as a coherent text, real laws being like rational decrees, and our human minds participating in reading the cosmic meaning -- all pointing to a Cosmic Mind in which all signs find their final interpretant. Does that in any way conform with you view? I suppose that, although I'd prefer to keep God and theism out of this discussion, in my thinking it's impossible to do so. Or, rather, that “There is but one *individual*, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the all of reality” is a difficult notion to swallow from a strictly semeiotic vantage point. And that Peirce's own professed theism may have influenced such a -- to my mind, at least -- radically unscientific view. Best, Gary R ReplyForward Add reaction On Wed, Jul 23, 2025 at 5:50 AM Ivar <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List, > > Thank you for the clarifications, the latest posts have cleared up many > confusions for me. > > (1) Beginning with my second question above, if every individual, or > perhaps object, is a sign, you, Jon, deny this in the last post, > > Jon: "everything is a sign" does not mean that every *individual *thing > is a sign (bottom-up), but that everything *as a whole* is a sign > (top-down) > > But in the previous post you wrote > > Jon: Again, what I am proposing is that the entire universe is a vast > semiosic continuum, signs all the way down. > > which could be quite easily be misleading! Now I will try to make sense of > your position. Individuals and possibilites can only be signs > contingently, because if an individual or possibility was a sign > necessarily it would not be possible to prescind an individual or > possibility from a sign, but it is possible, thus individuals and > possibilities are not signs necessarily. I guess this is what you mean when > denying a bottom-up perspective of the claim of semiosic synechism. It > makes sense when combining this with the claim that you ascribe to Peirce, > that the whole is ontologically prior (I presume) to its parts. That is, at > least one continuity is prior to all discrete objects. But then I begin to > wonder, if the whole is ontologically prior to its parts, are the parts > logically prior to the whole, in line with his use of prescission? Is this > discrepancy harmless? Granted the statement, can the whole be ontologically > prior if the parts are logically prior? > > (2) Returning to my first question once again, do you Jon, claim that > signs can be actual? And thus individuals? I fail to find an answer in your > posts! Maybe I did not read you correctly. > > (3) Lastly, a new question has popped up concerning the relation to > Peirce. As I see it there are three main directions, first, Peirce is used > in order to construct an independent theory, second, Peirce is claimed to > subscribe to the theory laid out, and third, the theory is a natural > consequence of Peirce's ideas, developing one of his "children". Would you, > Jon, agree to be aligned to one of these? The answer determines if this is > some sort of commentary on Peirce or something else inspired by Peirce, and > to our guesswork of Peirce's interpretations in relation to the claims made. > > To finish, I just want to say that on the whole I am very sympathetic to > your project and I believe that I agree with the general theory! It is an > exciting topic. > > Best regards > Ivar > > Le mercredi 23 juillet 2025 à 00:50, Jon Alan Schmidt < > [email protected]> a écrit : > > Gary F., Gary R., List: > > I appreciate the clarification from Gary F. and am now eager to find out > what Gary R. views as "the critical matter" here. I am also still wondering > if my previous post, perhaps in conjunction with this one, adequately > addresses Ivar's specific questions. > > Peirce's quoted criticism of Mill seems to be that he mistakenly treats > the effect of a cause as an *event*, with the trivial result that "the > entire Universe of being" is *both *cause and effect. By contrast, Peirce > claims that "everybody else" maintains that the effect of a cause "is, not > the entire event, but such abstracted element of an event as is expressible > in a proposition, or what we call a 'fact.'" As he writes elsewhere, "A *state > of things* is an abstract constituent part of reality, of such a nature > that a proposition is needed to represent it. There is but one > *individual*, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the all > of reality. A *fact *is so highly a prescissively abstract state of > things, that it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition" (CP > 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906). We prescind a fact from "the all of reality" as an > effect, and then identify its cause as an antecedent prescinded fact--one > without which the entire effect "could not be realized." > > This matches up nicely with what I advocate as the first steps of semiotic > analysis--we prescind an individual sign from the real and continuous > process of semiosis, and then identify its object as an antecedent > prescinded sign. The key difference, of course, is that a sign and its > antecedent object are always in a *genuine *triadic relation with a > consequent interpretant, while an effect and its cause are usually > understood to be in a strictly dyadic relation with each other. The effect > might then serve as the cause of a subsequent effect, but the series is > reducible to the two dyadic reactions--if there is a triadic relation at > all, it is a *degenerate *one. I am suggesting that there *is *such a > triadic relation, because the series of causes and effects is governed by > *real > laws*, which can only be represented by subjunctive conditional > propositions. Mill, like Hume and unlike Peirce, was a nominalist who > denied this. > > Otherwise, my only immediate response to Gary F. is belaboring a point > that I have already made repeatedly, which is the reason why I prefer to > call my position "semiosic synechism" instead of "pansemioticism"--for me, > "everything is a sign" does not mean that every *individual *thing is a > sign (bottom-up), but that everything *as a whole* is a sign (top-down). > In other words, the entire universe--"not merely the universe of existents, > but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, > the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as 'the truth'" (CP > 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906)--is not *composed *of signs in the sense of being > *built > up* from them, but instead is *perfused *with signs in the sense that > "every part has parts of the same kind." Again, whatever is, in any of the > three Universes of Experience, is *representable*--capable of serving as > the dynamical object of a sign--and thus likewise of the nature of a sign. > > The further implications of this are what I am continuing to explore. As > Peirce recognized, we primarily do that by studying *human *semiosis, and > then generalizing our findings to ascertain whether and how well they match > up with other observable phenomena. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Tue, Jul 22, 2025 at 1:19 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> List, >> >> I won't comment for now on what I think is the critical matter that Gary >> F takes up in this latest post, although I may have a few things to say. >> But I'd like to read Jon's response to Gary F's remarks before I add any of >> my own. >> >> For those without a copy of EP2 at hand, or who'd prefer not to mill >> through the longer excerpt Gary F linked to, here is a short excerpt that >> gets at the heart of Peirce's point that "Mill’s usage of the word >> “cause” deprived *that* word of all utility." I have broken the passage >> into two paragraphs and boldfaced an essential snippet in the 2nd paragraph. >> >> GF: All I’m trying to say is that for those purposes, your idea of “signs >> all the way down” deprives the word “sign” of all utility, just as Mill’s >> usage of the word “cause” deprived *that* word of all utility, according >> to Peirce (EP2:315 <https://gnusystems.ca/KainaStoicheia.htm#Millcause>). >> >> What is a law, then? It is a formula to which real events truly conform. >> By "conform," I mean that, taking the formula as a general principle, if >> experience shows that the formula applies to a given event, then the result >> will be confirmed by experience. But that such a general formula is a >> symbol, and more particularly, an asserted symbolical proposition, is >> evident. Whether or not this symbol is a reality, even if not recognized by >> you or me or any generations of men, and whether, if so, it implies an >> Utterer, are metaphysical questions into which I will not now enter. One >> distinguished writer seems to hold that, although events conform to the >> formula, or rather, although /the formula/ conforms to the Truth of facts, >> yet it does not influence the facts. This comes perilously near to being >> pure verbiage; for, seeing that nobody pretends that the formula exerts a >> compulsive force on the events, what definite meaning can attach to this >> emphatic denial of the law's "influencing" the facts? The law had such mode >> of being as it ever has before all the facts had come into existence, for >> it might already be experientially known; and then the law existing, when >> the facts happen there is agreement between them and the law. What is it, >> then, that this writer has in mind? >> >> If it were not for the extraordinary misconception of the word "cause" by >> Mill, I should say that the idea of metaphysical sequence implied in that >> word, in "influence," and in other similar words, was perfectly clear. >> *Mill's >> singularity is that he speaks of the cause of a singular event. Everybody >> else speaks of the cause of a "fact," which is an element of the event. >> But, with Mill, it is the event in its entirety which is caused. The >> consequence is that Mill is obliged to define the cause as the totality of >> all the circumstances attending the event. This is, strictly speaking, the >> Universe of being in its totality. But any event, just as it exists, in its >> entirety, is nothing else but the same Universe of being in its totality. >> It strictly follows, therefore, from Mill's use of the words, that the only >> causatum is the entire Universe of being and that its only cause is itself. >> He thus deprives the word of all utility.* As everybody else but Mill >> and his school more or less clearly understands the word, it is a highly >> useful one. That which is caused, the causatum, is, not the entire event, >> but such abstracted element of an event as is expressible in a proposition, >> or what we call a "fact." The cause is another "fact." Namely, it is, in >> the first place, a fact which could, within the range of possibility, have >> its being without the being of the causatum; but, secondly, it could not be >> a real fact while a certain third complementary fact, expressed or >> understood, was realized, without the being of the causatum; and thirdly, >> although the actually realized causatum might perhaps be realized by other >> causes or by accident, yet the existence of the entire possible causatum >> could not be realized without the cause in question. It may be added that a >> part of a cause, if a part in that respect in which the cause is a cause, >> is also called a cause. In other respects, too, the scope of the word will >> be somewhat widened in the sequel. EP2:314-5 >> >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> On Tue, Jul 22, 2025 at 1:34 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Jon, I have been following your argument that “the entire universe is a >>> vast semiosic continuum, signs all the way down.” My comment was not >>> intended to challenge the exegesis that leads you to that conclusion from >>> your selection of Peirce’s texts. Correct me if I’m wrong, but I’ve been >>> assuming that your “entire universe” includes not only all universes of >>> discourse but also the physical and psychical universes. In other words, >>> your argument virtually erases all distinctions between signs and anything >>> else, or between semiosis and the flow of time. The only distinctions left >>> are between degrees of degeneracy. >>> >>> I have no objection to pansemiotic or theosemiotic language games; they >>> are instructive on some level. I’m just saying that they are irrelevant to >>> investigations of the reality of biosemiosis (including anthroposemiosis) >>> as we experience it every day and hour. I don’t see how we in our time can >>> carry forward Peirce’s inquiry into actual semiosis if we don’t apply what >>> has been learned since his time about complex systems and how they work. >>> Peirce could not think in those terms because they were simply not >>> available then; it’s up to us (those of us who are interested in how >>> “quasi-minds” actually get determined) to go beyond Peirce, as he himself >>> said more than once. >>> >>> All I’m trying to say is that for those purposes, your idea of “signs >>> all the way down” deprives the word “sign” of all utility, just as Mill’s >>> usage of the word “cause” deprived *that* word of all utility, >>> according to Peirce (EP2:315 >>> <https://gnusystems.ca/KainaStoicheia.htm#Millcause>). >>> >>> Love, gary f. >>> >>> Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg >>> >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
