Gary R., Jack, List: I drafted this yesterday but complied with the overall limit of two posts per day by waiting to send it until this morning.
I agree that the key definitional aspect of Kant's *Ding an sich* or thing-in-itself is its alleged incognizability. Again, it blocks the way of inquiry to claim that there is *anything *within the universe that *cannot possibly* be known/represented, so denying this is at least a sound methodological principle and regulative hope. JRKC: Then I did a 180 because logically it had to be the case that whatever a thing was to me it could not be that thing (as I experienced it) but must be something else. This does not make any sense to me. If what you experienced was not *that *thing, then what else could it have been? How could you possibly *know *that what you experienced was not *that *thing, but something else? On the contrary, when we really experience anything that *exists*--reacts with the other like things in the environment--we directly experience *that *thing. Whatever predicates we ascribe to what we experience, we ascribe to *that *thing in our involuntary perceptual judgments--"the first premisses of all our reasonings," which "cannot be called in question. All our other judgments are so many theories whose only justification is that they have been and will be borne out by perceptual judgments" (CP 5.116, EP 2:191, 1903). Our resulting cognitions are admittedly *incomplete *representations of *that *thing, because they always include concepts that are general and thus indeterminate to some degree, but they are still cognitions/representations of *that *thing. Besides, as I keep pointing out, Peirce provides a very simple and (in my view) irrefutable demonstration that the thing-in-itself is "meaningless surplusage" (CP 5.525, c. 1905), which can be spelled out as follows. P1. Whatever exists can be denoted by the subject of a proposition. P2. Whatever is denoted by the subject of a proposition cannot be described using words, it must be indicated or found. P3. The *Ding an sich* cannot be indicated or found. C1. Therefore (P2&P3), the *Ding an sich* cannot be denoted by the subject of a proposition. C2. Therefore (P1&C1), the *Ding an sich* does not exist. Since this is a valid deductive argumentation, denying C2 requires denying at least one of the three premisses. Which of them do you deny, and what case can you make to justify that position? You have been claiming for more than two years now that you have an ironclad "proof," but still have yet to produce it here, and your stated reasons for keeping it to yourself suggest that it is not nearly as straightforward as this one. JRKC: I would also add that if apply the same standard, it isn't possible to falsify the idea of infinite inquiry, either, whether used as ideal or not. What exactly would it mean to "falsify the idea of infinite inquiry," properly conceived as an *ideal *limit, not a state that will ever *actually *come about? Again, it is at least a sound methodological principle and regulative hope, derived from Peirce's pragmaticistic definitions of truth and reality--"The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real" (CP 5.407, EP 1:139, 1878). As I have said before, my own summary of this is that truth is the final interpretant of every sign whose dynamical object is reality. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Aug 7, 2025 at 5:15 AM Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > List, GR, Edwina, Jon, > > I actually think Edwina makes a fair series of points. If said terms are > used it would be best, for each of us, to better explain what we mean. I > know that applies to me, anyway, and perhaps better the target for a small > essay than it is for a single list response. > > I went the other way, with respect to Peirce's journey through Kant. I > rejected the thing-in-itself (over the first few years) as outright > nonsense. That's where Peirce landed (whilst retaining a great deal of > "other material/influence from Kant"). Then I did a 180 because logically > it had to be the case that whatever a thing was to me it could not be that > thing (as I experienced it) but must be something else. Now, Jon, citing > Peirce, is right, I cannot know what that is. But I also do know that it > exists. Technically, that's not exactly a problem as Descartes' "cogito" is > scarcely any more solid than that (I understand the difference but there is > a similar methodology in the interchange between Hume and Kant — or rather > Kant's attempt to rescue metaphysics from Hume). > > I would also add that if apply the same standard, it isn't possible to > falsify the idea of infinite inquiry, either, whether used as ideal or not. > Am I wrong here? I don't see how you prove/falsify it. If we're going to > uphold the same set of standards, then I'd ask for consistency in certain > of Peirce's ideas (not all of them of course) which seem to me pretty hard > to falsify. > > Best, > > Jack > ------------------------------ > *From:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Thursday, August 7, 2025 9:20 AM > *To:* [email protected] <[email protected]> > *Cc:* Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>; Jon Alan Schmidt < > [email protected]>; Jack Cody <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Experience and Representation (was Semiosic > Ontology) > > List, Edwina, Jon, Jack, > > ET: I think that both Jack and Jon should define what each one means by > the term of ‘ding an sich’. I suspect that for each, the meanings are > quite different - and therefore, we have a situation of tails chasing tails. > > I concur with Jon's current and earlier explanation of the reasons for > Peirce's (and his and my) rejection of Kant's 'ding an sich'. In a word, > Peirce considers Kant's notion of a thing-in-itself as incoherent since it > posits something completely incognizable. For Peirce *Reality* -- that > is, the reality of physical and mental 'things' -- *is* accessible within > the limits of fallible thought and ongoing inquiry. while the > thing-in-itself is 'something' we cannot discuss meaningfully or use > productively in inquiry. > > Perhaps the following passage will help clarify both just how strongly > Peirce felt himself influenced by Kant as well as his total rejection of > the idea of the 'ding an sich'. I've added the numbers 1 and 2 for clarity > within the passage. This List discussion principally concerns itself with 2. > > Critical Common-sensism may fairly lay claim to this title for two sorts > of reasons; namely, 1. that on the one hand it subjects four opinions to > rigid criticism: its own; that of the Scotch school; that of those who > would base logic or metaphysics on psychology or any other special science, > the least tenable of all the philosophical opinions that have any vogue; > and 2. that of Kant; while on the other hand it has besides some claim to > be called Critical from the fact that it is but a modification of Kantism. > The present writer was a pure Kantist until he was forced by successive > steps into Pragmaticism. The Kantist has only* to abjure from the bottom > of his heart the proposition that a thing-in-itself can, however > indirectly, be conceived*; and then correct the details of Kant's > doctrine accordingly, and he will find himself to have become a Critical > Common-sensist. CP 5.452 (*“Issues of Pragmaticism”* *The Monist*, *Volume > 15, Number 4*, *October 1905, emphasis added)*. > > Best, > > Gary R > > On Wed, Aug 6, 2025 at 2:33 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > > List > > I think that both Jack and Jon should define what each one means by the > term of ‘ding an sich’. I suspect that for each, the meanings are quite > different - and therefore, we have a situation of tails chasing tails. > > With regard to the Peircean outline of the 'ding an sich’….it’s not the > same, as I understand his outline, as the* external object *which is > ‘anything that is not affected by any cognition, whether about it of not, > of the man to whom it is external’ [5.525]. This simply means, to me, an > object which is not being interacted with *at the moment by this human.*ie, > until such time as it becomes a Dynamic Object rather than an ‘external > object’..[EP2.478]. Though I will note that this external object, let’s > call it a tree, is most certainly in the semiosic process of Dynamic > Object interaction with other entities such as a caterpillar, an ant, a > bird, .. > > Peirce continues in this section ….but, if you ‘exaggerate this …”you > have the conception of what is not affected by any cognitions at all…and.. > the notion of what does not affect cognition"…. That is - an entity which > does not affect cognition and which is itself not affected by cognition. > > This means, as I understand it, an entity which is outside of the > processes of Thirdness, because Thridness is the mode of being of > Cognition or Mind, I would just add that for Peirce, cognition does not > require a brain [4.551]…but is operative in > all existentially..ie..existence requires continuity of organization or > habits-of-form, and these habits can be understood as the operation of > Mind/cognition - whether within the formation and operation of a chemical > molecule, a bacterium or an insect. . > > And note further, that Thirdness is communal; ie, Forms or habits don't > exist ‘per se’ [Aristotle vs Plato] but only within existing entities and > operative as a general, as a commonality - operative within a collective > and thus requires interaction…which is to say, semiosis. Can the *ding an > sich* exist per se, outside of semiosis? > In other words - is there such an entity operative without Mind? > Doesn’t a chemical molecule exist only within its common general > formulation? And if it does, then, doesn’t this put us more into the > analysis offered by Peirce? > > So- the definition of ‘ding an sich’,in my view, requires clarification. > > Edwina > >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]?subject=SIG%20peirce-l";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
