Thanks for taking the time and work to analyze the list in an empirical and data-based rather than speculative manner. We’ll see what results.
Edwina > On Aug 11, 2025, at 10:45 AM, Mike Bergman <[email protected]> wrote: > > List, > > I apologize for the re-send. Ben informs me that about 1/3 of the list > subscribers using gmail did not receive my original post from yesterday > because some of the older postings in the thread had footers that did not > conform to Google's new spam guidelines. I have subsequently removed footers > from prior postings in the thread that might be the offending items. > > As a result, about 2/3 of you will see this message again. My apologies. > Thankfully, Ben has found the reason for these recent "bounces" and we should > see fewer instances of this going forward. > > Thanks for your understanding. > > Mike > > On 8/10/2025 8:17 PM, Mike Bergman wrote: >> List, >> >> Peirce's methodeutic -- closely aligned with the scientific method -- begins >> when a surprising fact prompts us to contemplate the circumstances and form >> plausible hypotheses (abductions) that we test by deriving predictions >> through deduction and then evaluate and refine empirically via induction, in >> an iterative cycle. The surprising fact that engendered my starting this >> thread is the decline in participation and activity on the Peirce-L list. >> >> I posed some data and early observations in a chart that pointed, in my >> view, to imbalanced list moderation and the dominance of some voices, with >> the implied hypothesis being that was stymieing broader participation and >> voices. Gary R's rejoinder, hoping I accurately paraphrase him, was that >> possible causative factors may have been 'vicious assaults' on him and JAS >> by other list members, off list continuations of same, declining interest in >> philosophical e-forums, or shifts in the interests of young scholars, >> perhaps due to changing technologies. >> >> I would submit we are still in the abductive phase of trying to understand >> our list circumstances. In the interest of putting more empirical >> information on the table, I present below an analysis of posters (authors) >> and their contributions over the same period of time as the last chart: >> >> <peirce-l-authors.jpg> >> >> The careful reader will notice some slight differences in posts per year >> from the previous chart due to: 1) the table above is not prorated for 2011 >> and 2025 to a full year as the previous chart was; and 2) a difference in >> data collection, where the initial chart got its totals from the table of >> contents field of the Peirce-L archive Web site whereas the unique authors >> and postings came from a program I wrote to Web scrape and aggregate monthly >> results by author from multiple pages from the same site. (Should anyone be >> interested I will gladly share either the raw data or Python program; just >> contact me directly.) >> >> You all may draw your own conclusions from this chart, but two broad ones >> that appear to me are a decline in authors/posters from 2x to 3x over the >> past decade and an increased dominance of the most active posters. >> >> In order for us to have more complete relevant data to work with, let me >> repeat my request from initial posting: "I would ask the list moderators to >> look over their records and post trends in the number of subscribers -- and >> active ones -- over this similar period." This information is only available >> to the list moderators. Gary R: could you please provide this data? >> >> If we conclude that we are indeed seeing a decline in the amount and >> diversity of postings to Peirce-L, then I suggest we next tackle why that >> might be and what we might do about it. But let's at least begin from a >> baseline of informed knowledge. >> >> Best, Mike >> >> On 8/9/2025 11:14 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: >>> List, Mike, >>> >>> MB: "I have changed the title of this post." >>> GR: When changing the title of a thread it is helpful to put it in this >>> format: "New thread title, was, Old thread title." >>> >>> MB: Since it was requested, I here go on the record as fully supporting >>> Edwina's points about 1) disagreeing with arbitrary one post per day >>> restrictions. . . >>> GR: The rule is one post per thread topic on any given day; two posts >>> maximum if a second thread topic is responded to or introduced. The rule is >>> not arbitrary, is supported by a number of List members, and is the >>> definitive ruling of the moderator of this list, in part as an experiment >>> to see if it can improve List discussion. >>> >>> MB: "2). . . objecting to pseudo appeals to authority when using phrases >>> such as "Peirce and I" . . . >>> GR: I assume you mean such things as employing a phrase paraphrasing >>> Peirce's "the Universe is a vast representamen" by writing "the entire >>> universe is one immense sign." Well, I (and I have very little doubt any >>> logical person) would agree that the two phrases are equivalent. >>> Translations of such phrases are also equivalent. For example, the German, >>> "Das Universum ist ein riesiges Repräsentamen." All the Peirce literature >>> that I'm aware of occasionally, even often, even primarily does paraphrase >>> Peirce's work, comment on its meaning, etc. There'd be no academic papers >>> or books if scholars weren't constantly doing just that. >>> >>> MB: As I mentioned about 5 years ago, approximately the time when I ceased >>> myself to be active on this list, I chalk up these problems to the >>> leadership of the list and the allowance of some posters to dominate the >>> conversation. >>> GR: Well, this attack on me -- unless by "leadership of the list" you meant >>> Nathan Houser or perhaps members of the Peirce Group who have strongly >>> supported my efforts in the 15 years that I've moderated Peirce-L -- seems >>> unseemly to say the least; while by allowing "some posters to dominate the >>> conversation" you are perhaps referring to John Sowa and company who a very >>> few years ago almost brought this forum to its knees with its vicious >>> attacks on Jon Alan Schmidt (and me) on and off List? (But, of course, you >>> probably meant Jon and Edwina). Those attacks on 1. a scholar who was >>> simply trying to do good scholarship and, 2. me, who as List moderator was >>> determined to support his freedom to present his -- any list member's -- >>> work as they saw fit, were the most uncollegial expressions of, what, >>> contempt? that I have ever witnessed. Anywhere. >>> >>> MB: Here are some data points about the decline in the number of postings >>> on this list over time. >>> GR: Ben Udell and I looked at your statistical chart on 8/8. But before I >>> discuss it, let me offer a bit of background which might put it in >>> perspective. >>> >>> Joe Ransdell, whom I more than admired and considered a mentor, died in >>> 2010. I was almost immediately asked to moderate the List following Joe's >>> explicit request that I do so, as well as his request that Ben be made >>> webmaster of Arisbe. I began my tenure as Peirce-L moderator in January of >>> 2011. In addition, Nathan Houser asked me to also manage both Peirce-L and >>> the Arisbe website. However, I made my appointment contingent on Ben being >>> made co-manager with me of both Peirce-L and Arisbe, a choice I have not >>> regretted. >>> >>> Now regarding the chart: >>> <image.png> >>> After a low point after Joe's death, one sees a stiff increase in >>> participation from 2011 peaking very high (the highest point on the chart) >>> in 2014 when we had an extended 'slow read' of Cornelis ('Kees') de Waal's >>> book, Peirce: A Guide for the Perplexed. The stats go up dramatically again >>> (although not as far as in 2014) in 2021 when we had a "slow read" of Andre >>> De Tienne's slide presentation on "The Role and Relevance of Phaneroscopy >>> for Inquiry." It began to slide precipitously after John Sowa and some >>> other List members began their wholly unwarranted and, frankly, vicious >>> assault on Jon and me in both on List posts and off List emails. I should >>> note that I at the time received numerous off List messages deploring that >>> behavior. At that point I should have reminded Sowa and the others involved >>> of the List guideline which included a "caveat about correcting others" >>> https://cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm#correction-caveat which directs >>> List members to contact the List moderator, viz., me, and not themselves to >>> do the "correcting" on or off the List. My own intervention on and off List >>> did not stop the assault. Let me again remind List members that contacting >>> other List members off List is not an appropriate way to handle situations >>> of dissension. >>> >>> In addition, I should note that Joe and I spoke often of the declining >>> interest in philosophical e-forums such that he predicted that with ever >>> new technologies arising and the shift of interest of many people, >>> especially young scholars, to writing, publishing, and pursuing academic >>> and related careers, that one could anticipate such a decline happening >>> with Peirce-L as well. That decline to oblivion happened to Sowa's CG List, >>> and I haven't seen any signs of his creating the 'alternative Peirce list' >>> he said he was planning to do. Many other Lists, for example, the >>> Biosemiotic list, show little to no activity. A few philosophical lists >>> aimed at a general audience do seem to be doing better. >>> >>> I might also add that I have not and do not find Jon's way of posting to be >>> itself the "problem" regarding the List, while the uncollegial, acrimonious >>> and truculent reactions by some to it is in my view a significant part of >>> the problem. Meanwhile, Jon continues to publish in several journals, >>> including now three times in Transactions (with another paper soon to >>> appear there), and none of the editors (or reviewers, I understand) find >>> the sorts of problems with his scholarship that you, Edwina, Sowa, and some >>> others apparently do. >>> >>> To make myself perfectly clear, even when I disagree with Jon, I continue >>> to find his posts lucid and often quite valuable, and I will continue to >>> defend his -- and everyone's -- right to post as they see fit within the >>> guidelines https://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm set up by Joseph >>> Ransdell and continued by me (with very few modifications). >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary Richmond (writing as moderator of Peirce-L, and co-manager with Ben >>> Udell of Peirce-L and Arisbe) >>> >>> On Thu, Aug 7, 2025 at 12:21 PM Mike Bergman <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> I have changed the title of this post. >>>> >>>> Since it was requested, I here go on the record as fully supporting >>>> Edwina's points about 1) disagreeing with arbitrary one post per day >>>> restrictions; and 2) objecting to pseudo appeals to authority when using >>>> phrases such as "Peirce and I" blah, blah, blah. >>>> >>>> In case none of have noticed, we have seen a marked decline in activity on >>>> Peirce-L accompanied by a marked decline in the number and diversity of >>>> posters. Further, we (I) have seen frequent posters in essence drummed off >>>> the list or banned. In my 15 years on the list there have been many >>>> frequent posters who no longer participate due to these causes. If >>>> pressed, I could name names, but it is probably best to keep such neutral >>>> for now. >>>> >>>> As I mentioned about 5 years ago, approximately the time when I ceased >>>> myself to be active on this list, I chalk up these problems to the >>>> leadership of the list and the allowance of some posters to dominate the >>>> conversation. Since the forum no longer has an open give-and-take, I >>>> prefer to devote my efforts studying Peirce, which continue to be nearly >>>> full time, in other venues and for other purposes. Until these list >>>> problems are fixed, I will retain that posture. Edwina, bless her heart, >>>> has continued to labor on in the hopes of some improvement. For that I >>>> applaud her, but I lack similar patience myself. >>>> >>>> Here are some data points about the decline in the number of postings on >>>> this list over time. Note that 2011 and 2025, as partial years, have been >>>> prorated based on adjacent year monthly trends in order to complete the >>>> annual totals. Note, as well, that a few of the postings are >>>> administrative in nature. They have been retained since it was too time >>>> consuming to review each post in detail: >>>> >>>> <peirce-l-postings.jpg> >>>> >>>> Depending on the baseline, it appears that list activity has declined from >>>> 4x to 7x over the past decade. Artificial restrictions on postings hardly >>>> helps this trend. >>>> >>>> I would ask the list moderators to look over their records and post trends >>>> in the number of subscribers -- and active ones -- over this similar >>>> period. I suspect the number of subscribers has also declined. If not, >>>> they have gone mostly silent, as have I. >>>> >>>> I have hesitated to comment on this topic because if one is to be >>>> critical, one should be willing to step forward and work to fix it. My own >>>> commitments prevent me from doing so and I do not have either the grace or >>>> balance to be an effective moderator. My belief, however, is that Peirce >>>> is needed now more than ever as we go through massive changes in thinking >>>> in science and knowledge representation as conventional wisdom and >>>> approaches prove wanting. Peirce-L in the best of all possible worlds >>>> would be a dynamic, broad discussion forum that attracts new adherents and >>>> lively speculation as to Peirce's applicability to our modern -- and >>>> rapidly changing -- world. Sadly, today, in my view, it is not. >>>> >>>> Mike >>>> >>>> On 8/7/2025 3:20 AM, Gary Richmond wrote: >>>>> List, Edwina, Jon, Jack, >>>>> >>>>> Edwina wrote: As for the one-post-per-day- I’m against it, because I >>>>> think it transforms an interactive discussion into a site of polemical >>>>> sermons. >>>>> GR: As I wrote on List and to you, Edwina, off List, so far you are the >>>>> only List member who appears to see it this way; on and off List, >>>>> participants have tended to find this approach reasonable. This is not to >>>>> say that you are the only one who is 'against it'. But, at least for now, >>>>> I see no reason to change that rule. >>>>> >>>>> ET: . . . I really don’t applaud the use of such phrases as ‘Peirce and >>>>> I’ or 'Kant and I’… The ‘best buddies' analogy only works, I suggest, for >>>>> existential reality and since neither gentleman is around..then.... >>>>> GR: I would tend to agree except when someone posts something which is a >>>>> paraphrase of Peirce's own words, especially when that is supported by a >>>>> Peirce quotation demonstrating that the paraphrase does indeed accurately >>>>> express Peirce's idea. There is nothing 'novel' about that in scholarly >>>>> scientific discussion. >>>>> >>>>> ET: I think that both Jack and Jon should define what each one means by >>>>> the term of ‘ding an sich’. I suspect that for each, the meanings are >>>>> quite different - and therefore, we have a situation of tails chasing >>>>> tails. >>>>> >>>>> I concur with Jon's current and earlier explanation of the reasons for >>>>> Peirce's (and his and my) rejection of Kant's 'ding an sich'. In a word, >>>>> Peirce considers Kant's notion of a thing-in-itself as incoherent since >>>>> it posits something completely incognizable. For Peirce Reality -- that >>>>> is, the reality of physical and mental 'things' -- is accessible within >>>>> the limits of fallible thought and ongoing inquiry. while the >>>>> thing-in-itself is 'something' we cannot discuss meaningfully or use >>>>> productively in inquiry. >>>>> >>>>> Perhaps the following passage will help clarify both just how strongly >>>>> Peirce felt himself influenced by Kant as well as his total rejection of >>>>> the idea of the 'ding an sich'. I've added the numbers 1 and 2 for >>>>> clarity within the passage. This List discussion principally concerns >>>>> itself with 2. >>>>> Critical Common-sensism may fairly lay claim to this title for two sorts >>>>> of reasons; namely, 1. that on the one hand it subjects four opinions to >>>>> rigid criticism: its own; that of the Scotch school; that of those who >>>>> would base logic or metaphysics on psychology or any other special >>>>> science, the least tenable of all the philosophical opinions that have >>>>> any vogue; and 2. that of Kant; while on the other hand it has besides >>>>> some claim to be called Critical from the fact that it is but a >>>>> modification of Kantism. The present writer was a pure Kantist until he >>>>> was forced by successive steps into Pragmaticism. The Kantist has only to >>>>> abjure from the bottom of his heart the proposition that a >>>>> thing-in-itself can, however indirectly, be conceived; and then correct >>>>> the details of Kant's doctrine accordingly, and he will find himself to >>>>> have become a Critical Common-sensist. CP 5.452 (“Issues of Pragmaticism” >>>>> The Monist, Volume 15, Number 4, October 1905, emphasis added). >>>>> Best, >>>>> >>>>> Gary R >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Aug 6, 2025 at 2:33 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>>> List >>>>>> >>>>>> I think that both Jack and Jon should define what each one means by the >>>>>> term of ‘ding an sich’. I suspect that for each, the meanings are quite >>>>>> different - and therefore, we have a situation of tails chasing tails. >>>>>> >>>>>> As for the one-post-per-day- I’m against it, because I think it >>>>>> transforms an interactive discussion into a site of polemical sermons. >>>>>> >>>>>> And as an addition to this - I also suggest that posters should be >>>>>> careful to differentiate themselves from their ‘mentors’, so to speak. >>>>>> That is - I really don’t applaud the use of such phrases as ‘Peirce and >>>>>> I’ or 'Kant and I’… The ‘best buddies' analogy only works, I suggest, >>>>>> for existential reality and since neither gentleman is around..then.... >>>>>> >>>>>> With regard to the Peircean outline of the 'ding an sich’….it’s not the >>>>>> same, as I understand his outline, as the external object which is >>>>>> ‘anything that is not affected by any cognition, whether about it of >>>>>> not, of the man to whom it is external’ [5.525]. This simply means, to >>>>>> me, an object which is not being interacted with at the moment by this >>>>>> human.ie, until such time as it becomes a Dynamic Object rather than an >>>>>> ‘external object’..[EP2.478]. Though I will note that this external >>>>>> object, let’s call it a tree, is most certainly in the semiosic process >>>>>> of Dynamic Object interaction with other entities such as a >>>>>> caterpillar, an ant, a bird, .. >>>>>> >>>>>> Peirce continues in this section ….but, if you ‘exaggerate this …”you >>>>>> have the conception of what is not affected by any cognitions at >>>>>> all…and.. the notion of what does not affect cognition"…. That is - an >>>>>> entity which does not affect cognition and which is itself not affected >>>>>> by cognition. >>>>>> >>>>>> This means, as I understand it, an entity which is outside of the >>>>>> processes of Thirdness, because Thridness is the mode of being of >>>>>> Cognition or Mind, I would just add that for Peirce, cognition does not >>>>>> require a brain [4.551]…but is operative in all >>>>>> existentially..ie..existence requires continuity of organization or >>>>>> habits-of-form, and these habits can be understood as the operation of >>>>>> Mind/cognition - whether within the formation and operation of a >>>>>> chemical molecule, a bacterium or an insect. . >>>>>> >>>>>> And note further, that Thirdness is communal; ie, Forms or habits don't >>>>>> exist ‘per se’ [Aristotle vs Plato] but only within existing entities >>>>>> and operative as a general, as a commonality - operative within a >>>>>> collective and thus requires interaction…which is to say, semiosis. Can >>>>>> the ding an sich exist per se, outside of semiosis? >>>>>> In other words - is there such an entity operative without Mind? >>>>>> Doesn’t a chemical molecule exist only within its common general >>>>>> formulation? And if it does, then, doesn’t this put us more into the >>>>>> analysis offered by Peirce? >>>>>> >>>>>> So- the definition of ‘ding an sich’,in my view, requires clarification. >>>>>> >>>>>> Edwina >>>>>> >>>>>> . >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Aug 6, 2025, at 12:35 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected] >>>>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Jack, List: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In addition to the List post to which I am replying, you sent me three >>>>>>> off-List messages within 30 minutes last night, followed by a fourth >>>>>>> one this morning. Why not just wait a few hours to get some sleep, >>>>>>> collect your thoughts, and send a single on-List post--the one per >>>>>>> thread per day that is currently allowed--with everything that you >>>>>>> wanted to say? I have come to appreciate the wisdom of that >>>>>>> restriction, so that is exactly what I am doing here, quoting your >>>>>>> off-List messages where I address them. I have tried to limit the >>>>>>> resulting length of this post by linking or citing some relevant >>>>>>> passages instead of quoting them. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Your first statement below is inscrutable to me, but for "the tree >>>>>>> example," you initially said the following off-List. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> JRKC: Humans may use representational sign-systems but there is zero >>>>>>> proof (and none possible) that trees and so forth do. The tree's >>>>>>> reality may have no "representation" at all. And, insofar as it could, >>>>>>> it would always be beyond us to ever know. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Not surprisingly for someone who has apparently embraced not only >>>>>>> Kantian epistemology and metaphysics, but also Saussurean linguistics, >>>>>>> this reflects a fundamental misunderstanding on your part--experience >>>>>>> is a strictly cognitive phenomenon, but semiosis is not. "It appears in >>>>>>> the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical >>>>>>> world; and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the >>>>>>> colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really there" (CP 4.551, >>>>>>> 1906). At this point, I join Peirce in despairing of making this >>>>>>> "broader conception" understood, at least in your case. As you said >>>>>>> later, "we probably diverge and that's fine." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I previously quoted Kant's own epistemological definition of a priori >>>>>>> as "knowledge that is absolutely independent of all experience" >>>>>>> (emphasis mine). Best I can tell, you are still misapplying that term >>>>>>> to the ontological concept of a thing-in-itself as that which is >>>>>>> (supposedly) "beyond all possible experience" and therefore unknowable. >>>>>>> However, you have yet to address Peirce's simple refutation of this, >>>>>>> which I summarized a couple of days ago >>>>>>> (https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-08/msg00008.html) as >>>>>>> presented in the very same paragraph where he refers to Kant as someone >>>>>>> "whom I more than admire" (CP 5.525, c. 1905; see also CP 6.95, 1903). >>>>>>> Needless to say, I continue to agree with him, and thus disagree with >>>>>>> you and Kant; again, "we probably diverge and that's fine." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> JRKC: Not to be a pain, but the Gödel part is also wrong. When you >>>>>>> demonstrate complete inequivalence it has a bearing on all possible >>>>>>> systems. That includes all possible meaning making systems--including >>>>>>> this one and any possible system Peirce uses. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I still disagree--Gödel's incompleteness theorems strictly pertain to >>>>>>> sufficiently powerful formal systems as mathematical proofs that draw >>>>>>> necessary conclusions about hypothetical states of things. Applying >>>>>>> them in epistemology and ontology requires showing that both our >>>>>>> knowledge and reality itself conform to every single premiss, including >>>>>>> a specific formal system that meets the stipulated criteria. In other >>>>>>> words, complete inequivalence is a controversial hypothesis, not >>>>>>> another established theorem. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> JRKC: Any definition of an object through a symbolic system is a >>>>>>> function of the system, not the object. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Objects do not have definitions, words do; and those definitions are >>>>>>> indeed functions of the sign system being employed, not the objects >>>>>>> that they purport to describe. In Peircean terms, the definition of a >>>>>>> word is its immediate interpretant, and whatever conforms to that >>>>>>> definition is its (potential) immediate object when it is incorporated >>>>>>> into a proposition. Any description of something using words is >>>>>>> inevitably incomplete because the words themselves and the concepts >>>>>>> that they denote are general and therefore indeterminate. As a result, >>>>>>> "[T]he subject of discourse ... can, in fact, not be described in >>>>>>> general terms; it can only be indicated. The actual world cannot be >>>>>>> distinguished from a world of imagination by any description. Hence the >>>>>>> need of pronoun and indices, and the more complicated the subject the >>>>>>> greater the need of them" (CP 3.363, 1885; see also CP 2.337, c. 1895, >>>>>>> and CP 2.536, 1902). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Peirce's Existential Graphs iconically illustrate this. In the Beta >>>>>>> part, names (words) denote general concepts and heavy lines of identity >>>>>>> denote indefinite individuals (objects) to which those concepts are >>>>>>> attributed by attaching their names. The effect of such combinations in >>>>>>> various propositions is making the concepts more determinate and the >>>>>>> individuals more definite--ascribing the same concept to multiple >>>>>>> individuals, increasing that concept's logical breadth; and ascribing >>>>>>> different concepts to the same individual, increasing each concept's >>>>>>> logical depth (see the last two CSP quotations in my post at >>>>>>> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-07/msg00068.html). The >>>>>>> product of these for any particular concept is its information (CP >>>>>>> 2.419, 1867), which increases in both ways. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This finally gets us back to my semiosic ontological hypothesis, which >>>>>>> I will discuss further in a separate post in that thread. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Regards, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>>>>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >>>>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >>>>>>> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / >>>>>>> twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> >>>>>>> On Tue, Aug 5, 2025 at 11:13 PM Jack Cody <[email protected] >>>>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>>>>> I can prove that to/through (mediation) the human being, the thing >>>>>>>> cannot be what it is in asbentia of that relation nor need it even be >>>>>>>> similar or remotely equivalent. I assert it rhetorically here. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Now the tree example below, qua "impossible to know how a tree >>>>>>>> experiences anything as the tree does for a human" - this has an >>>>>>>> obvious bearing on realities that cannot possibly be represented >>>>>>>> (unless we mean represented as in "made-up conceptual stuff which is >>>>>>>> not true"). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> As to ontology — and sorry for the double post — Kant's claim is >>>>>>>> absolutely ontological for the noumenal is an ontological distinction >>>>>>>> and use of "apriori" as beyond experience is catogircally demarcated >>>>>>>> from his use of it in other contexts. He means, by the first a priori, >>>>>>>> that the meaning of the "thing" as it is is beyond all possible >>>>>>>> experience and that is what the thing in itself, generally, >>>>>>>> refers/corresponds to. That is an ontological distinction (you cannot >>>>>>>> merely call it epistemological wheter you accept the ontological >>>>>>>> distinction or not). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Best wishes, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Jack-- > __________________________________________ > > Michael K. Bergman > 319.621.5225 > http://mkbergman.com <http://mkbergman.com/> > http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman > __________________________________________ > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]?subject=SIG%20peirce-l";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]?subject=SIG%20peirce-l";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
