Gary R., Gary F., List: I had the same thought about Peirce conceiving mind as broader than consciousness, recalling those very statements in CP 6.489 (1908), but I agree that he and Planck evidently both maintained that matter is "derivative from" mind and thus "presupposes" mind. After all, Peirce's *objective *idealism, the doctrine "that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits [of mind] becoming physical laws [of matter]" (CP 6.25, EP 1:293, 1891), is unquestionably a *species *of idealism as he broadly defined it just four sentences earlier in the same text--"the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial" (CP 6.24, EP 1:292). He carefully explains in that entire passage that once dualism is ruled out, *something *must be primordial--either mind (idealism) or matter (materialism) or both (neutralism); he does not even entertain the possibility that *neither *could be primordial.
In short, Peirce's unambiguously and repeatedly stated view--especially in the 1890s, but even after the turn of the century--is that *everything *is mind, and *some *of it has become matter. He refers to matter as "a peculiar sort of *mind *... mind so completely under the domination of habit as to act with almost perfect regularity & to have lost its powers of forgetting & of learning" (R 936, c. 1891); "specialized and partially deadened mind" (CP 6.102, EP 1:312; 1892); "mind hidebound with habits" (CP 6.158, EP 1:331; 1892); and "mind whose habits have become fixed so as to lose the powers of forming them and losing them" (CP 6.101; 1902). Again, my own reformulation is that every discrete thing (matter) is an instance of a sign (mind), an individual token of a general type that possesses qualitative tones; and every dyadic reaction between such things is a degenerate manifestation of continuous and triadic semiosis. I have more to say on this thread topic, prompted by subsequent posts, but will do so in multiple short replies like this over a few days instead of combining them into a single long one as I sometimes have done in the past. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Aug 13, 2025 at 11:10 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R, list, > > I guess we are assuming that what Planck called “consciousness” is > essentially what Peirce called “mind.” But Peirce was very clear that there > is much more to mind than consciousness — and that consciousness seems > limited to *embodied* and living beings. For instance, he wrote that > “Since God, in His essential character of *Ens necessarium*, is a > disembodied spirit, and since there is strong reason to hold that what we > call consciousness is either merely the general sensation of the brain or > some part of it, or at all events some visceral or bodily sensation, God > probably has no consciousness. Most of us are in the habit of thinking that > consciousness and psychic life are the same thing and otherwise greatly to > overrate the functions of consciousness” (CP 6.489 > <https://gnusystems.ca/CSPgod.htm#gncx>). This is fully compatible with > Gregory Bateson’s *Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity* (1979) and with > the usage of “consciousness” in the sciences of our time that deal with the > subject. > > Peirce does use the terms “Mind” and “Thought” as synonyms, for the most > part, and since Thirdness is predominant in both, clearly Mind has the > power to *determine* what happens in both the psychical and the physical > worlds (which are of course not entirely separate). As implied by Peirce’s > reference Thirdness as that which “brings about a Secondness,” and his > definition of the verb “determine” (“to limit by adding differences”), > determination is that aspect of causality which imposes limits on which > possibilities can be *actualized* in the flow of time (and thus be *real > *possibilities?). > It seems to me that in the physical world, there are three ontological > requirements for anything to *happen, *to *change*, or to be determined: > *time, > energy *and* matter*. I find it difficult to imagine that any of them can > be more primordial than the other two. This doesn’t seem compatible with > Peirce’s cosmology of the 1890s. > > Love, gary f. > > Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg > > } The revelation of the Divine Reality hath everlastingly been identical > with its concealment and its concealment identical with its revelation. > [The Bab] { > > substack.com/@gnox }{ Turning Signs <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/> > > > > *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> *On > Behalf Of *Gary Richmond > *Sent:* 12-Aug-25 20:26 > *To:* Peirce List <[email protected]> > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Planck and Peirce on mind as primary, matter > secondary > > > > List, > > Since my youth I've been interested in what was once called the 'new > physics', especially cosmology and quantum theory, from an > amateur's standpoint, perhaps beginning in middle school when my older > brother, Richard, gave me a book, *The Boy Scientist (A Popular Mechanics > Book)* by John Bryan Lewellen (1955). In my reading concerning quantum > theory, every once in a while I come across this quotation by Max Planck. > > “I regard consciousness as fundamental. I regard matter as derivative from > consciousness. We cannot get behind consciousness. Everything that we talk > about, everything that we regard as existing, postulates consciousness.” > (*The > Observer*, January 25, 1931) > > Planck expanded on this idea in the course of his work. For example, in a > 1944 lecture): > > “There is no matter as such. All matter originates and exists only by > virtue of a force which brings the particle of an atom to vibration and > holds this most minute solar system of the atom together. We must assume > behind this force the existence of a conscious and intelligent mind -- this > mind is the matrix of all matter.” (*“The Nature of Matter”* (Das Wesen > der Materie), Florence, 1944) > > Of course each time I read such quotations I can't help but think of this > famous Peirce quotation. > > "The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective > idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical > laws." CP 6.25 > > It would appear that both thinkers saw Mind as the ultimate foundation of > Reality including, of course, our experience of it, and that matter only > makes sense within that framework. In short, both argue that the existence > of matter presupposes mind, ". . . the matrix of all matter” as Planck put > it. > > So it would appear that Planck, the so-called 'father of quantum theory', > and Peirce, the 'founder of philosophical pragmatism' (and 'founder of > semeiotics' -- at least the triadic form of it) both advanced this idea, > yet from somewhat different standpoints: Planck from investigations at the > forefront of the physics of his time, Peirce from the forefront of > investigations into logic as semeiotic. > > Peirce developed his position via a comprehensive philosophical > 'system', incomplete as it may be in certain regards. For him, mind and > matter are not separate 'substances' (which is dualism) but, rather, > proceed along a continuum, matter appearing as the more fixed, habitual > form of mind’s activity, mind being more 'fluid' (while his *semiosic > synchecism *allows for the evolution of both and together). > > To me, Peirce’s view on the matter seems more 'naturalistic' than Planck's > as he places the primacy of mind within an evolutionary cosmology, while > Planck attributes it to a singular conscious source. As is well known, they > both characterized themselves as theists, although it can be argued (and I > do mean both pro and con) that each saw God/Mind as a unifying, rational, > ordering principle of the cosmos and less the anthropomorphic deity of > traditional theology. And both emphasized that science and religion needn't > be in conflict, for Planck because he considered that they deal with > different aspects of reality: famously, science with the *how *of things, > religion with the *why *of them. I'm not sure at the moment how I'd > characterize Peirce's position on this matter. Any thoughts there? > > As I see it, and in a nutshell, for Planck mind/consciousness is an > irreducible *point d'origin* that underlies all physical existence. For > Peirce it is the ongoing, universal, continuous, semiosic process from > which matter forms. Planck’s vision is more reflective, leaning towards > personal metaphysical assertions; Peirce’s vision is semiotically > structured, mind seen within a more fully developed, detailed, and > considerably more systematized account of cosmic development. > > As always, I'd be interested in what forum members think about any of this > matter of Planck and Peirce seeing mind as primary, matter secondary > > Best, > > Gary R >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]?subject=SIG%20peirce-l";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
