Gary F, List, Sorry for the delay in responding, but I've been up to my neck in *everything *of late. Just a few thoughts on Bateson's and Peirce's conceptions of mind.
Bateson’s conception appears to gel with Peirce’s on several points while their terminologies necessarily differ radically; and, as you noted, Bateson had scientific resources unavailable to Peirce. Peirce would surely agree with Batetson that mental processes are scale-independent so that, for Bateson, they can occur as deep down as neurons all the way up to ecosystems and, perhaps, beyond. Could one say that Peirce's theory of continuous semiosis takes this idea of *scale-independence* even further to suggest that mind is operative not only from atomic structure and crystal formation to galaxies and, perhaps, the entire cosmos? That is, it seems to follow from Peirce's synechism and his *objective idealism* that mind-like processes can be found virtually *everywhere* in nature*. *I do not see Bateson making such a claim,neither one way nor the other. For Bateson a mind is, as you wrote, a cluster of interacting elements, these parts triggered by *difference* which is non-substantial and, as you remarked, relates to *negentropy as organization* (rather than to energy per se). I agree with Jon's description of Peirce's seeing these elements as organized top-down rather than bottom-up; and I would agree with you that Peirce would likely express 'difference' in categorical terms, as you wrote, the 1ns of 2ns (the quality of a relation abstracted from its occurence) since reaction *always* has a qualitative aspect (so, registering 'difference' as it is perceived). Both see this as the basic stimulus of mental activity although, as you noted, Bates expressed it cybernetically and thermodynamically, Peirce phenomenologically and semiotically. I'm not sure how -- even *if* -- Bateson's 'collateral energy' relates to Peirce's 'collateral experience', although they both seem to hold that information needs a 'base' from which to function, although Bates' seems to be physical (and metabolic) while Peirce's is semiotic (which, however, is also the physical in the pansemiotic sense of objective idealism). For Bateson mental processes require feedback loops (or something like them), I believe, while for Peirce all mental processes are triadic in nature such that habits help shape possibilities which, in turn, help shape new habits in an endless evolutionary process in which even laws can be seen to evolve. (As I recall, Bateson also held that laws evolve.) Both would seem to suggest that these processes function in such a way that *the higher levels govern lower ones*, one of the themes of Stejernfelt's *Natural Propositions *as I recall. Best, Gary R On Fri, Aug 15, 2025 at 10:19 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R, I’m pretty much in agreement with your post (below), so rather > than make any specific comments on it, I’d like to unpack a bit further my > reference to the compatibility of Peirce’s idea of *mind* with Gregory > Bateson’s. Back in the 1980s I was very much taken with Bateson’s concept > of mental process as independent of scale (temporal and spatial), such that > it embraced “the phenomena which we call *thought, evolution, ecology, > life, learning* and the like” (Bateson 1979, p. 102; Bateson did not > address the issue of whether mind was ontologically “primary” or not). > > When (years later) I discovered Peirce, it seemed to me that the main > differences between the Peircean and Batesonian concepts of *mind* were > terminological, with Bateson taking advantage of some biological/ecological > concepts that were not available to Peirce. I’d be interested to see > whether other list members agree on that, and how it might relate to > Planck’s ideas. > > In my book I included Bateson’s short list of “criteria” for *mind*, > along with some suggestions of Peircean parallels: > https://gnusystems.ca/TS/xlp.htm#bmnd. It’s not long but includes lots of > links that might be helpful. > > Love, gary f. > > Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg > > > > *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> *On > Behalf Of *Gary Richmond > *Sent:* 14-Aug-25 17:21 > *To:* [email protected]; [email protected]; Evgenii Rudnyi < > [email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Planck and Peirce on mind as primary, matter > secondary > > > > Gary F, Evgenii, List > > > > GF: I guess we are assuming that what Planck called “consciousness” is > essentially what Peirce called “mind.” > > GR: Not exactly. But see below. > > GF: But Peirce was very clear that there is much more to mind than > consciousness — and that consciousness seems limited to *embodied* and > living beings. For instance, he wrote that “Since God, in His essential > character of *Ens necessarium*, is a disembodied spirit, and since there > is strong reason to hold that *what we call consciousness* is either > merely the general sensation of the brain or some part of it, or at all > events some visceral or bodily sensation, God *probably* has no > consciousness" (boldface added) > > GR: Yet that "probably" is significant, especially since he places it in > the context of "what *we* call consciousness." > > In his relatively late Florence lecture, from which I quoted in my > original post, Planck says "There is no matter as such. All matter > originates and exists only by virtue of a force. . . We must assume > behind this force a conscious and intelligent Mind”. > > But why assume that either the 'consciousness' or the 'intelligence' of > Mind is like ours, or at least very much like ours for either Planck or > Peirce? I doubt that either Peirce nor Planck thought that* if *God has > consciousness that it is anything like our human consciousness. And some of > this may be a matter of the extremely fallible terminology that everyone > who tackles Mind in this cosmological sense is forced to employ. > > While Planck was cautious about explicitly theological language (although > he was a practicing Lutheran), my sense is that he tended towards a view in > which the universe’s ultimate reality is mind-like,* far* *more general *than > human > consciousness, perhaps more like a universal cosmic field in which human > minds participate. > > In the Wikipedia article on him, renowned historian of science, John > Heilbron, relates that when asked about his religious views, Planck > replied 'that although he had always been deeply religious, he did not > believe "in a personal God, let alone a Christian God".' Very strong words > from a German Lutheran. > > GF: It seems to me that in the physical world, there are three ontological > requirements for anything to *happen, *to *change*, or to be determined: > *time, > energy *and* matter*. I find it difficult to imagine that any of them can > be more primordial than the other two. This doesn’t seem compatible with > Peirce’s cosmology of the 1890s. > > GR: While it may be that "time, energy and matter" are required once there > * is* " anything to *happen, *to *change*, or to be determined," that > is, once there is a universe. But when I think of Peirce's "cosmology of > the 1890s" I immediately think of the final 1898 lectures, and especially > the famous blackboard analogy. Perhaps it would be helpful to review it > as, in my view, it puts considerable light on what he means by cosmic Mind, > and I will begin that review in a separate post, perhaps a separate thread. > > But first I want to address Evgennii's remarks. > > Evgennii wrote: > > "I would be cautios with this Planck's citation. I have seen it on > Internet but this paper as such is not available. Probably he has said > this but he was already 86 in 1944. And I have not seen something like > this in his previous works." > > I had earlier referenced two quotations by Planck, the one you pointed to. > > “There is no matter as such. All matter originates and exists only by > virtue of a force which brings the particle of an atom to vibration and > holds this most minute solar system of the atom together. We must assume > behind this force the existence of a conscious and intelligent mind -- this > mind is the matrix of all matter.” (*“The Nature of Matter”* (Das Wesen > der Materie), Florence, 1944) > > I'm not sure what his being 86 has much to do with Planck's comment as we > are all familiar with scientists and other intellectuals who have worked > productively in their old age, and from what I've read, the last few years > of Planck's life were full and vibrant. He was frequently visited by famous > scientists, for example, Einstein, and there seems to me no reason to think > that he was not 'of sound mind' when he gave the 1944 lecture in Florence. > > As to the publication of the 1944 lecture, so far all I've been able to > find is this: > > *Das Wesen der Materie* [*The Nature of Matter*], a 1944 speech in > Florence, Italy, Archiv zur Geschichte der Max‑Planck‑Gesellschaft, Abt. > Va, Rep. 11 Planck, Nr. 1797; the German original is as quoted in *The > Spontaneous Healing of Belief* > <https://archive.org/stream/GreggBradenTheSpontaneousHealingOfBelief/Gregg%20Braden/Gregg%20Braden%20-%20The%20Spontaneous%20Healing%20Of%20Belief#page/n1> > (2008) > by Gregg Braden, p. 212. > > As to your comment "I have not seen something like this in his previous > works," the first quotation I gave is from 1931, and while not from one of > his lectures or pape: > > “I regard consciousness as fundamental. I regard matter as derivative from > consciousness. We cannot get behind consciousness. Everything that we talk > about, everything that we regard as existing, postulates consciousness.” > (*The > Observer*, January 25, 1931) > > While not from one of his lectures or papers. I see no reason to doubt the > source. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]?subject=SIG%20peirce-l";>UNSUBSCRIBE > FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your > default email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]?subject=SIG%20peirce-l";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
