Jack, List: Again, Peirce's "Will to Learn" (CP 5.583, EP 2:47, 1898) is a matter of aiming to adopt only true beliefs, and thus abandoning any false belief when the corresponding habits of conduct are confounded by experience--"the Outward Clash" with reality (CP 8.43, EP 1:234, 1885)--which is what makes the method of science intrinsically self-correcting in the long run. As I have noted before, his pragmaticistic definitions of reality and truth are such that their relationship aligns with that between a sign's dynamical object and its final interpretant--"The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real" (CP 5.407, EP 1:139, 1878). I have been pondering this further in light of the logical principle that Peirce states in CP 5.525 (c. 1905)--every proposition has at least one subject that is indescribable in words and must instead be indicated or found--and came up with the following summary.
Every proposition involves logical subjects indexically denoting indefinite individuals as its dynamical objects, logical predicates symbolically signifying general concepts, and syntax iconically embodying their logical relations. Its final interpretant consists in the habits of conduct corresponding to the belief that those individuals conform to the concepts that it attributes to them. The proposition is *true *just in case its dynamical objects are real--they are as they are regardless of what any finite minds think about them--and its final interpretant would never be confounded by any possible future experience, i.e., it would be affirmed by an infinite community after infinite investigation and thus infinite experience. Accordingly, I disagree that metaphysical hypotheses are *utterly *incapable of empirical testing. As I said in the thread on "Peirce's Blackboard," the observations that are central to metaphysics (and the rest of philosophy) are those that "come within the range of every man's normal experience, and for the most part in every waking hour of his life" (CP 1.241, 1902). Obviously, any hypothesis that is plainly inconsistent with such everyday observations--or, for that matter, the more deliberate and sophisticated observations of the special sciences--is ruled out on that basis, so it becomes a question of how to evaluate competing hypotheses that *do not* fail this basic test. How would our future experience be different if one were true and the other false? How might we facilitate having such distinguishing experience sooner, rather than later? Necessary inference is not the answer because "it is impossible to reason necessarily concerning anything else than a pure hypothesis. Of course, I do not mean that if such pure hypothesis happened to be true of an actual state of things, the reasoning would thereby cease to be necessary. Only, it never would be known apodictically to be true of an actual state of things" (CP 4.232, 1902). In other words, "It is to ideal states of things alone--or to real states of things as ideally conceived, always more or less departing from the reality--that deduction applies" (CP 2.778, 1902). Consequently, "I have never met with an attempt to state a transcendental argument with precision which began to convince me" (CP 2:35, 1902). A metaphysical inference is usually abductive/retroductive and therefore plausible (at best), not deductive and therefore certain; there is reason to *suspect *that it is true because otherwise surprising facts would then be a matter of course, but the resulting hypothesis is rarely the *only possible* explanation. The upshot of all this is that Peirce's pragmaticism clarifies why truth cannot be defined *within *any formal systems of deductive logic--they *preserve *truth by ensuring that only true conclusions can be derived from true premisses, but the truth of those premisses must be (fallibly) established by experience, which occurs *outside* any formal systems through interaction with reality. It also clarifies why the notion of an incognizable thing-in-itself is *meaningless*--since no concepts can be attributed to it, believing or disbelieving in it never has any effects on anyone's habits of conduct, and thus makes no difference whatsoever in anyone's experience. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Aug 25, 2025 at 12:39 PM Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Helmut, Ivar, List, > > Really interesting conversation by all. I'm wondering about something I'm > just going to call the "will to truth" or "will of truth". > > Or, qua the real as principle, do any of you surmise that what is "real" > (not merely after infinite inquiry) must also be present. I.e., the real, > what in Peirce's view would be the truthful understanding a community would > come to in a hypothethical infinity, — surely we can assert that such is > always present even if we cannot understand it whether individually or > collective. > > In the more general sense, I don't see how we can talk very well, within > Peirce's system, about will without considering the "real". > > As for metaphysical testing — it cannot be empirically tested (as such) > which is what one gets from reading Hume and Kant (whether one accepts > either of their conclusions and so forth being a different matter). It > would be something that logical inquiry would have to demonstrate exists in > some way of necessary inference (pure reason or something akin to that). > > For Kant, and the thing in itself, it's either something which you > consider necessary to infer after logical analysis and thinking and so > forth, or else dismiss. Regardless of the ding-an-sich (I'm not trying to > make this a post about that...), I think the method Kant outlines stands > regardless of whether one accepts his conclusions (at least, the > regulations he imposes having read Hume). > > It is worth reading the Prolegomena if only for Kant's reasoning about how > it would be possible (if and only if... with respect to Hume's thesis) to > infer metaphysical necessity. > > Insofar as will exists, in Peircean mode, it would have to, if true at > least, correspond to the real? Or the real (as truth-standard here whatever > the ideal/principle) would be that which we will toward in > inquiry/practice? > > Just some thoughts. > > Best, > Jack >
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