Jerry, List: I am invoking the recently revised posting rules that allow me "to reply to a response on the same day" only because I can do so quite briefly in this case.
The quotation below from my previous post is not *my* analysis of *my own* views, it is *Peirce's *semiotic definition and analysis of a proposition as presented at EP 2:168 (1903) and CP 5.525 (c. 1905). Personally, I do not use the terms "supposition," "transposition," or "thesis" at all when discussing reasoning, whether publicly or privately. However, in medieval logic, supposition has to do with *terms *standing for general concepts, so Peirce's analysis assigns them to the logical *predicate *(not logical *subject*) of a proposition; grammatical transposition has no effect on that analysis, just like the spatial arrangement of multiple words attached to a line of identity in Beta EG is logically irrelevant; and unless there is some technical definition in this context of which I am not aware, a thesis *is *a proposition. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Sep 2, 2025 at 4:29 PM Jerry LR Chandler < [email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List: > > Thank You for your analysis of your views of the term “proposition”. > > Curious as it is, it prompts the following: > > In your private usage of common terminology for reasoning, > > Q. Would you say the same for a “supposition" from the Middle Ages? > > Q. Would you say the same for a transposition between Subject - Predicate > and Predicate - Subject (that is, grammatical homeostasis)? > > Q. Would you differentiate any reasoning with these terms (proposition, > supposition, transposition) from the use of the notion of “thesis” (which > is, in a Fregean sense, closely related etymologically)? > > Have fun! > > Cheers > > Jerry > > On Sep 2, 2025, at 1:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Jerry, Jack, List: > > JAS: Every proposition has at least one subject that cannot be represented > *symbolically*, but this does not entail that it is structurally > incapable of denoting it--only that it must do so *indexically* instead. > > JLRC: Oh dear me, I have a symbol that can not be symbolized! Is this a > variant on the Russell paradox? > > > No, it is simply the logical principle that every proposition as a symbol > must *involve* an indexical part to denote at least one of its subjects. > As Peirce explains, "A proposition is a symbol which separately INDICATES > its object, and the representation in the proposition of that object is > called the *subject *of the proposition. Now to INDICATE is to represent > in the manner in which an index represents. ... Thus the subject of a > proposition if not an index is a precept prescribing the conditions under > which an index is to be had" (EP 2:168, 1903). This is another way of > saying that "after all that words can convey has been thrown into the > predicate, there remains a subject that is indescribable and that can only > be pointed at or otherwise indicated, unless a way, of finding what is > referred to, be prescribed" (CP 5.525, c. 1905). > >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]?subject=SIG%20peirce-l";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
